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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the process of construction of linguistic meaning from a 
diachronic perspective. The analysis is based on the theories of intertextuality 
and social construction and applies a corpus analysis of collocations and 
paraphrases of key notions discussed in Darwin’s correspondence. In particular, 
the focus of the analysis is on the terms species and varieties with the aim to 
observe how the meanings of these terms are formed in a process of social 
negotiation. The thesis analyses the difference in the meanings of these terms, 
but also focuses on the diachronic dimension of their use in the 
correspondence, which allows for the observation of how different 
interpretations of meanings emerge in discourse. Thus far, diachronic studies in 
the field of corpus linguistics focused on comparing different historical corpora 
rather than observing the diachronic change of the immediate contextual 
environment of particular terms. The results presented in this thesis show that 
the meanings of terms are not only formed of different interpretations in 
discourse, but that these interpretations can be specific to particular temporal 
spans in discourse.   
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1 Introduction 
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose  
By any other name would smell as sweet  
(Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the diachronic aspect of intertextual 
construction of meaning in the correspondence of Charles Darwin. This is 
achieved by a corpus analysis of collocation and paraphrases of key notions 
discussed in Darwin’s correspondence, in particular, the notions of species and 
varieties. Namely, as the correspondence corpus offers the possibility to 
observe discourse as a diachronic phenomenon, collocation and paraphrase 
analysis will demonstrate that certain meanings, i.e. interpretations of meaning 
realised as paraphrases, are specific to particular diachronic points in 
discourse. In addition to collocation and paraphrase analysis, the thesis focuses 
on the analysis of markers of intertextuality, i.e. expressions which explicitly link 
subsequent paraphrases to previous discourse. This will demonstrate, not only 
that meaning changes diachronically, but that the change is the product of 
negotiation in discourse. From the diachronic perspective, this analysis will not 
only show that certain meanings are added in new discourses, but also that 
certain meanings are abandoned in later discourses. In this sense, meaning 
and language are seen as social rather than psychological phenomena. 
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The issue of meaning has been the focus of study of many philosophers who 
discussed it at lengths to discover its very nature. Meaning itself is not a uniform 
concept; sounds, images, words, objects, actions, intentions, colours etc. can all 
have meaning, mean multiple things at the same time and even be meaningful 
in different ways. Ruth Millikan (2004) devoted a whole book on different 
varieties of meaning and how they relate to one another. However, this thesis 
does not attempt to come up with a theory of meaning, or even with an answer 
to the question of what meaning is. The focus of this thesis is on linguistic 
meaning, or rather how meaning is constructed in language. The aim of the 
thesis is to demonstrate that meaning in language is constructed socially by 
never-ending negotiation. This will be demonstrated by analysing the 
correspondence of Charles Darwin with the aim of showing that even when 
describing the natural world, the meaning of the words used is constructed in 
discourse. 
As Darwin’s focus was on the origin of species, this thesis examines the origin 
of meaning, that is, what makes the noises and images of language meaningful. 
Although Darwin is celebrated for his theory of evolution, the questions he set 
out to answer, i.e. the origin of species, and more importantly what species are, 
are still a matter of debate. Ever since Plato and Aristotle, theories have been 
proposed to answer the question of species. From the moment language 
started to be considered as separate from the surrounding world, this question 
got a new dimension, namely whether species actually existed in nature as 
natural kinds rather than as categories of language.  
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The aim of this thesis is not to answer the question of whether species actually 
exist in the world, but to demonstrate that linguistic meaning is a product of 
social interactions in discourse rather than a mirror physical reality, or innate to 
human beings. For example, most linguists would agree that a word like chair is 
merely a conventional symbol representing a particular object, having no direct 
relation to the object itself. In other words, any other symbol could be used in its 
place, like Stuhl in German or stolica in Croatian language. However, the origin 
of the meaning of these symbols is a matter of debate among linguists. For 
some cognitive linguists based around Noam Chomsky’s theory of universal 
grammar, the meaning of such symbols is innate in some primordial mental 
language of concepts that all humans possess (see Section 2.1.1.2 Cognitivist 
approach). Furthermore, theorists like John Searle (2010) argue that these 
concepts are based on ‘brute facts’ and the reality that surrounds us. On the 
other hand, the approach taken in this thesis is based on theories which define 
the meaning of such symbols as a product of interactions in discourse. In this 
sense, just like the symbol itself, its meaning is defined as convention, thus it is 
contingent and constantly (re)negotiated in discourse. 
The aim of this introductory chapter is to firstly provide a background of the 
study, namely state the theoretical and empirical assumptions the research is 
based on. Secondly this chapter aims to offer a rationale for research into the 
issue and outline the main research goals.  
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1.2 Background 
This research builds, to some extent, on the more recent work of Wolfgang 
Teubert, published in his book Meaning, Discourse and Society (2010) and the 
work of his former PhD student Lisa Mei Ling Cheung (2009) on collaborative 
knowledge construction. Teubert’s (2010) argument is that linguistic meaning is 
a product of language itself and that there is little evidence of any discourse-
independent or universal meanings. This argument contradicts cognitive theory 
of language as realisation of mental concepts (See Section 2.1.1 Language as 
a psychological phenomenon). Similarly, Cheung’s (2009) thesis focuses on the 
processes of collaborative knowledge construction, examining how students 
negotiate and develop meaning by discussing the definitions of concepts on 
web bulletin boards.  
My thesis is similar to their work in the sense that it presents an argument that 
linguistic meaning is a product of social interactions. The thesis focuses on a 
discourse of scientific correspondence, namely that of Charles Darwin, and 
analyses the language surrounding Darwin’s notion of species. My approach is 
different in that it takes a single notion, i.e. the term species, and observes its 
negotiation in discourse diachronically. The aim of such analysis is to observe 
the instances of the term species over the whole period of Charles Darwin’s 
correspondence in order to demonstrate, firstly, that meaning of the term 
changes over time and, secondly, that the formulation and the change of 
meaning occurs in discourse. Thus, the thesis aims to support Teubert’s (2010) 
and Cheung’s (2009) arguments that linguistic meaning is a product of 
discourse.  
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Consequently, by demonstrating the process of meaning construction in 
discourse, this thesis argues against realist and cognitivist theories of meaning 
construction, such as those by Searle (2010) and Chomsky (2006) (See section 
2.1.1 for more details). For example, according to such approaches to the 
construction of meaning, as natural objects, species must be something 
occurring in nature even if they are not discussed in discourse. Thus species 
are merely discovered; they are not invented, just like Darwin reports in his 
letter to his cousin William D. Fox: “Of Course you have heard of the new 
species of wild Swan, discovered in England, by Mr. Yarrell” referring to a 
discovery made by the famous British ornithologist. Although from such a 
statement it is implied that species exist independently of human interaction, 
declaring something as a new species may be seen as a discourse action. For 
example, because of Mr Yarrell’s expertise, Darwin expresses no doubt about 
the truthfulness of this news, on the contrary, he adds: “Yarrell himself, has 
pronounced it to be the new sort, so there can be no doubt.”1 However, even in 
Searle’s (2010) theory, pronouncing an object a new species can be seen as an 
act of declaration, which is in itself an act of constructing social reality. 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the meaning of the word species is 
formed in discourse regardless of whether species actually exist as discourse-
independent natural kinds. As Roland Barthes (1968, p. 10) states ‘objects, 
images, patterns of behaviour can signify, and do so on a large scale, but never 
autonomously; every semiological system has its linguistics admixture.’ Thus 
                                              
1
 [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-00081] 
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the meaning of discourse objects swan or species is not based on the 
properties of the natural objects, but it is rather constructed in discourse.   
Ferdinand de Saussure (1974, p. 116)  in his Course in General Linguistics 
proposed that meanings are language specific, which he demonstrated by 
turning to the variety of languages: ‘[i]f words stood for pre-existing concepts, 
they would all have exact equivalents in meaning from one language to the 
next; but this is not true’. Thus, for example, in English language tells apart cod 
from haddock in its everyday use, whereas they are both translated as bakalar 
in Croatian.  
Furthermore, as Teubert (2010, p. 11) notes, the discourse-external reality will 
not tell us whether an elevation is a hill or a mountain, because ‘nature does not 
come with categories.’ Teubert’s argument that categories ‘hill’ and ‘mountain’ 
are products of discourse is essentially nominalist. Nominalism, unlike Searle’s 
(2010) proposition of different principles for constructing social reality and 
reporting on external reality, allows language to operate on the same principles 
regardless whether the discussed object exists as a natural object or a cultural 
institution. As it seems unlikely that the process or mechanism of meaning 
construction is domain specific (i.e. different in literature and law as opposed to 
biology, physics, etc.), nominalism appears to be more likely proposition for 
meaning construction. Furthermore, proposing meaning as a convention formed 
in discourse allows us to analyse its construction empirically. 
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Joseph Dalton Hooker, a botanist and a friend of Darwin’s, demonstrates in a 
letter to Darwin how the meaning of the word species is a matter of discourse 
convention: “Species (or what we call species) may be muteable.”2 Here a 
fellow scientist of Darwin’s indicates the possibility that it is the discourse 
construct we refer to as species that may be mutable. Darwin often discussed 
the classification of species with the fellow naturalist and the curator of the 
Zoological Society of London, George Robert Waterhouse. In the opening of 
one of such letter, Darwin expresses his opinion and asks others to freely 
criticise it, or as he puts it – ‘hoot at’ it, just as much as he ought to have 
criticised their opinions earlier:   
“According to my opinion, (which I give every one leave to hoot at, like 
I should have, six years since, hooted at them, for holding like views) 
classification consists in grouping beings according to their actual 
relationship” [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-684] 
Darwin’s argument corresponds with the argument proposed by the Russian 
Marxist philosopher, Mikhail Bakhtin, who argued that every utterance responds 
to previous one but also seeks a further response. If the utterance did not relate 
to previous and future utterances it would be meaningless (Bakhtin, Holquist, & 
Emerson, 1986, p. 72). The above example demonstrates that Darwin’s opinion 
is indeed a reaction to what others have said six years before him and invokes 
further dialogue on the issue. For this reason, Bakhtin describes language as 
dialogic since ‘[l]anguage acquires life and historically evolves […] in concrete 
verbal communication, and not in the abstract linguistic system of a language, 
                                              
2
 [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-00784]. 
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nor in the individual psyche of speakers’ (Bakhtin, et al., 1986, p. 95). Thus, to 
Bakhtin, language has to be expressed to be alive and to develop – it cannot 
live and develop in the mind.  
However, we can observe Darwin’s realist stance in this example, proposing 
that classification is based on actual relationship. In this sense, the meaning of 
species is formed as a representation of a true natural kind; it is based on what 
Searle (1995) calls a ‘brute fact’ rather than constructed as a contingent 
category of discourse. As brute facts are not directly represented by language, 
Searle and other cognitivists, particularly Jerry Fodor (1975) and Steven Pinker 
(1994), argue that they are represented as mental concepts. From Darwin’s 
correspondence, we can infer that at times Darwin describes species (or what 
we call species) as clear natural kinds which are just a matter of description:  
“I shall bring home a very great number of undescribed species both 
from Brazil & the Rio Plata.— It may be a foolish fear, but I often 
wonder, if any person will be found who will describe so many minute 
insects.” [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-227] 
Thus Darwin believes, in line with Cartesian reasoning, that we understand 
what species are and that we are perfectly able to tell them apart. It is only 
classification and systematization that are negotiable; at least until the peer 
community of biologists agree on a ‘scientific’ method of distinguishing between 
species and varieties.   
Since empirical research can only be done on observable data, an abstract 
system and mental concepts are not helpful constructions for the analysis of 
how meaning is constructed in language. Meaning can even be described as a 
precondition for discourse, since without meaning discourse would be just 
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noise. Thus, one is the precondition for the other and vice versa, or just as 
Teubert notices: ‘it is meaning that creates society, it is society that gives rise to 
meaning’ (Teubert, 2010, p. vii). Although Teubert here focuses on society 
rather than discourse, it can be argued that society would not exist without 
discourse just as discourse cannot exist without society. It is the social 
interaction, i.e. discourse, that creates and demonstrates meaning, at least the 
linguistic meaning. Hence, if we accept Barthes’ premise that there is no 
meaning without some linguistic admixture, we can conclude that to look for 
meaning one has to look into discourse. 
Although we can utter infinity of possible meanings, as most of the daily social 
interaction is relatively routine we tend to repeat ourselves. Sinclair (1991, p. 
108) noticed discourse is mostly “made of the occurrence of common words in 
common patterns, or in slight variants of those common patterns.’ Despite the 
infinite number of possible linguistic combinations, certain words tend not only 
to occur together, but have particular meaning depending on that combination: 
‘[m]ost everyday words do not have an independent meaning, or meanings, but 
are components of a rich repertoire of multi-word patterns that make up text. 
This is totally obscured by the procedures of conventional grammar’ (1991, p. 
113). Furthermore, according to Sinclair (ibid), frequent words, or frequent 
senses of words, ‘have more ambiguous meaning than less frequent words or 
senses.’ However, in a sentence, they are very rarely ambiguous, which 
indicates that the usage, that is discourse, determines the meaning. Corpus 
linguists have long argued that the meaning of words can be identified from the 
way they are used in discourse and have thus revolutionised modern 
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lexicography. The theories of intertextuality, social constructivism and 
constructionism, hermeneutics and various discourse studies have similar 
assumptions on meaning, discourse and society. 
In the never-ending discourse, linguistic meaning cannot be fixed and is 
perpetually renegotiated. Julia Kristeva when forming her theory of 
intertextuality adopts this stance and describes text as a state of production, 
rather than a finished product. Influenced greatly by the work of Bakhtin, 
Kristeva sees text as production irreducible to representation since the subject 
is involved into the production of meaning (Kristeva & Moi, 1986, p. 86). Thus 
discourse is not a representation of meaning coming from another source like 
the mind for example, but the ‘space’ where discourse members produce 
meaning.  
Kristeva (1986), similarly to Sinclair, proposes that, for the study of linguistic 
meaning, the focus should be on the articulations of a word in a sentence in 
order to observe ‘the same functions and relationships at the articulatory level of 
larger sequences’. Kristeva (ibid) argues that the meaning of the word is 
essentially the totality of its articulation in discourse. However, the proposal to 
look for recurring patterns, as well as the practice established by corpus 
linguists in lexicography, tells us that it is not the totality of the articulation that 
creates the meaning but rather the repetitions that remain in the constant 
renegotiation of meaning. To some extent all articulations add to the meaning, 
but it is only those articulations that are accepted and repeated by the discourse 
community that constitute the meaning of a word. This inclusion of others’ 
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words, the mosaic of quotations, intertextuality, in a new utterance creates the 
meaning. 
British geneticist, Richard Dawkins (2006) in his book The Selfish Gene 
compared this process to genetic transmission and related the natural and 
linguistic evolution. Since natural evolution occurs in the process of genetic 
replication, Dawkins proposed a unit of cultural replication, or imitation, which 
he called a meme. Like with the gene, Dawkins (2006) stressed that the 
longevity of a particular unit is not as important as its fecundity. Thus, for a 
particular unit of meaning it is most important for it to be replicated, i.e. repeated 
in discourse, since this replication ‘affirms continuity and complexity as recipe 
for long-term success and evolution, but with similarity and some difference as 
the all-important leaven’ (Dawkins, 2006, p. 103). In other words, through 
repetition, but with some difference, new patterns start to occur, thus expanding 
the meaning of the unit.  
Consider the following example from Darwin’s letter to Joseph Dalton Hooker, in 
which Darwin expresses his uncertainty about the recent work of his colleague, 
Swainson, particularly expressing uncertainty about the meaning of the phrases 
‘typical forms’ and ‘wide ranges’. However, when a similar mark is made by 
Waterhouse, whom Darwin regards highly, the statement, in line with Dawkins’ 
theory, becomes more believable. Thus the longevity of Swainson’s statement 
is clearly less important that its fecundity: 
“Swainson has remarked (& Westwood contradicted) that typical 
genera have wide ranges: Waterhouse, (without knowing these 
previous remarkers) made to me this same observation: I feel a 
laudable doubt & disinclination to believe any statement of 
12 
 
Swainson’s, but now Waterhouse remarks it, I am curious on the 
point. There is, however, so much vague in the meaning of “typical 
forms” & no little ambiguity in the mere assertion of “wide ranges”, 
(for zoologist seldom go into strict & disagreeable arithmetic, like you 
Botanists so wisely do) that I feel very doubtful, though some 
considerations tempt me to believe in this 
remark.”[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-744] 
In the following example, Joseph Dalton Hooker is just as confused about the 
meaning of ‘typical form’, but in his reply he tries to contribute to the discussion 
by expanding on the remarks of Swainson and Waterhouse that Darwin had 
inquired about. Particularly interesting is how he reformulates Swainson’s 
statement that ‘typical genera have wide ranges’ into that the most typical 
genera are the ones ‘most widely diffused’, illustrating the combination of 
repetition with a degree of difference to formulate a new meaning. Finally, in the 
last sentences of the example below, Hooker provides Darwin with an 
alternative formulation which he also expands with his criticism: 
“I hardly know what is always meant by a typical form. The character 
of a group should be founded on the most important objects it 
contains in the œconomy of nature. The most important genus of a 
class is surely generally either the largest or the most widely 
diffused; if the largest genus is the type, we have already seen that 
large genera are generally most widely diffused. The type of a group 
often turns out (on extended knowledge of that group) to be the most 
aberrant form in it.—  
Perhaps Swainson has put the cart before the horse & should have 
said “a typical group or genus is that which is the most widely 
diffused”—  
Some however I think define typical forms as those which are most 
fully developed or what they call most perfect, now though it may be 
very easy in any group to point out many which are not the most 
perfect or fully developed, a great many remain amongst which it is 
difficult to say which has the advantage of the other in organization.”  
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-745] 
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Darwin acknowledges to Hooker that his reformulation made it clearer for him to 
understand, not only what Swainson and Waterhouse meant when using the 
phrase ‘typical forms’, but actually how typical forms of genera and species are 
determined in botany and zoology: 
“You seem, however, to have put the case of “typical forms”, in a 
clearer point of view, than I ever saw it & stripped the word of half, if 
not all its mystery: I have long suspected that typical & abnormal 
forms consist only of those, in which a greater or less variety have 
been created or modifyed— with this excellently!! expressed sentence, 
I will conclude” [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-746] 
From these examples we can observe how the meaning of ‘typical forms’ is 
shared in the in the discourse between Hooker and Darwin, but also Swainson 
and Waterhouse who are by reference a part of that shared discourse since it is 
their work that is being interpreted. Thus, the above examples represent a 
series of interactions in which the meaning of the notion of ‘typical forms’ is not 
merely interpreted, but rather constructed or defined in a process of 
collaborative negotiation.  
The analysis presented in this thesis is based on the principles shown in the 
examples above. Namely, the thesis takes the approach that linguistic meaning 
is a product of social interaction, much in the way the notion of ‘typical forms’ 
was defined through the interactions of Darwin and his correspondents. In a 
sense meanings are formed in relation to one another in discourse. Thus by 
analysing the discourse, or rather the types of interpretations of meaning such 
as those demonstrated by Darwin and his correspondents in the examples 
above, we can observe the processes of the construction of meaning. 
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1.3 Research goals 
The aim of this thesis is to show that the processes of meaning construction are 
collaborative acts of meaning interpretation and reformulation. This thesis 
focusses on the notions of the construction of meaning, knowledge and reality 
in discourse. The key argument is that apart from the discourse, there is nothing 
else available to linguists to study how the meaning is constructed and 
negotiated. The minds of Charles Darwin and his correspondents are not 
available, even if they were still alive, for us to analyse. Thus, the thesis will 
analyse the discourse of Charles Darwin’s correspondence in order to find 
evidence to support the hypothesis that meaning is a result of perpetual 
negotiation in discourse.  
The first goal of the analysis is to analyse the intertextual and dialogic aspect of 
meaning construction and negotiation. This analysis is based on the theories of 
dialogism (Bakhtin, et al., 1986; Bakhtin, Morris, Voloshinov, & Medvedev, 
1994) and intertextuality (Barthes, 1968; Barthes & Heath, 1977; Kristeva & 
Moi, 1986; Orr, 2003). These theories imply that the meaning of discourse 
depends on social interaction and negotiations. Thus the aim of the analysis is 
to demonstrate that the meaning of the term species is formed in the 
correspondence of Charles Darwin through negotiation in discourse. 
The second goal of the analysis is to demonstrate that meaning is a diachronic 
property of discourse. Namely, by assuming dialogism, intertextuality and social 
construction of meaning, the meaning is locked in a constant state of 
renegotiation. Thus the aim of the analysis is to demonstrate the diachronic 
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aspect of meaning of the term species. Namely, the aim is to demonstrate that 
certain interpretations which form the meaning of the term species are limited to 
a particular temporal span in discourse and gradually disappear from the 
general discourse. 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
The research goals outlined in this section can be summarised in the following 
research questions. 
1. Is there any evidence to suggest that the meaning of the term species is 
a product of a generative language system and thus independent from 
discourse? 
2. Is there any evidence to suggest that the meaning of the term species is 
a product of negotiation in discourse? 
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that the meaning of the term species is 
either synchronic or diachronic? In other words, does the meaning of the 
term species change over time? 
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2 Literature review 
2.1 On the origin meaning: approaches in language 
theory 
This chapter provides a historical overview of the development of linguistics 
regarding its relation to the construction of meaning. Starting from Saussure’s 
definition of a linguistic sign as the smallest unit of meaning, constituted as a 
dichotomy of concept and signifier, the development of linguistics was followed 
by so-called cognitive approach formed around Chomsky’s theory of universal 
grammar. In reaction to structuralist and later cognitivist theories, Marxist 
theorists developed a social approach to language that views language not as a 
psychological system, but rather as a system of social relations and power. 
Corpus linguistics focuses on the analysis of large amounts of language in use, 
i.e. discourse, and where meaning is concerned, it focuses on its realisation in 
discourse. The most prominent application of these methods has been achieved 
in the field of lexicography. Thus corpus linguistics is a suitable approach to the 
study of meaning. However, hitherto, few attempts have been made to observe 
the processes of meaning construction, with the focus mostly being the 
meaning of particular lexical items.  
In this thesis, corpus analysis is underlined by the theoretical formulation of 
language as a social phenomenon in order to support the approach to the 
diachronic analysis of the construction and change of linguistic meaning. Thus it 
is necessary to review different theoretical approaches to language and 
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meaning in order to support the argument that linguistic meaning is a social and 
contingent construction. 
Firstly, the theoretical approaches that define language as a psychological 
phenomenon which acts as the underlying mechanism for all language output 
will be reviewed. The aim of this section (2.1.1 Language as a psychological 
phenomenon) is to argue why such theoretical approaches are incompatible 
with the corpus approach to the diachronic analysis of meaning construction 
presented in this thesis. The section is characterised by theories that argue for 
an abstract language system, often defined as part of the mental capacity of the 
speaker, which governs both the production and interpretation of meaning.  
In contrast, a review of theories that define language as a social phenomenon is 
used to support the argument that meaning is a property of discourse, and as 
such it is not only socially constructed, but also perpetually renegotiated. This 
section (2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon) is characterised by theories 
which argue that meaning is formed in the discourse, thus arguing that it is the 
social aspect of language that maintains the structure of language and ensures  
both the production and interpretation of meaning.  
Finally, the key aspects of the theories covered in this chapter are summarised 
and contrasted in relation to the study of linguistic meaning and its construction. 
 
2.1.1 Language as a psychological phenomenon 
The theories reviewed in this section are characterised by their approach to 
linguistic meaning as a product of an abstract language system. The main two 
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approaches reviewed are the structuralist approach developed from the work of 
Ferdinand de Saussure and the cognitive approach developed from the works 
of Noam Chomsky. The common aspect of these approaches is that they view 
language as a dichotomy of language in use, i.e. discourse, and the underlying 
language system which governs the production of discourse. Thus, meaning is 
independent of the individual and usually operates on a subconscious or 
unconscious level. 
The assumption that language operates on a subconscious or unconscious 
level leads to conclusions that language system is a mental structure; and for 
some even an innate structure. This implies that humans are biologically wired 
to possess a language, with the differences between languages being only 
superficially different. The linguistic meaning is thus a product of unconscious 
deeper structures which the language user is unaware of. For this reason, 
system oriented approaches often ignore discourse as only a product of deeper 
structures focusing rather on the structures that govern its production, such as 
phonology, morphology, syntax, etc. The focus on structures of phonemes, 
words or sentences leads to study of language as a monologic phenomenon, 
where no discourse participants or exchanges are relevant to the analysis. The 
construction and interpretation of meaning is a mechanical or a computational 
process where structure and lexis are combined to realise meaning. In this 
sense, language production is independent of its main function of social 
communication.  
Approaches to language as a psychological phenomenon are reviewed in order 
to be contrasted by the approaches to language as a social phenomenon. The 
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aim is to demonstrate the inability of these approaches to define and account 
for all aspects of meaning construction and contrast these with the social and 
discourse approaches to language. Specifically, as the aim of the thesis is to 
argue for a diachronic approach to the study of meaning construction, 
negotiation and change, it is necessary to demonstrate that these are major 
aspects of meaning construction which the theory of language as a 
psychological phenomenon cannot account for.   
 
2.1.1.1 Structuralist approach 
In Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure (Saussure, et al., 
1974) redefined the science of language by defining the linguistic sign as the 
object of its study, which was to be studied as a part of a language system, or 
langue, rather than as it occurs in discourse, or parole.  Saussure argued that it 
is not the spoken language that is natural to the man, but the faculty responsible 
for its production (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 10). Thus, language in general was 
divided into two distinctive planes: langue, or the language system, and parole, 
or discourse. The language system, langue, is defined as the unconscious part 
of language, only passively registered by the individual, whereas parole, or 
discourse, is defined a deliberate act of will and intelligence realised by an 
utterance (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 14). This division of language into 
discourse and linguistic system is still a foundation of many modern approaches 
in linguistic science. For example, a similar view on the aspects of language is 
taken by Noam Chomsky (1957, 1965) who divides language into the aspects of 
competence and performance, which correspond to Saussure’s langue and 
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parole respectively, in the sense that the former is the unconscious systematic 
plane of language and the latter its realisation in the utterance.  
Saussure (1974) describes langue as the governing mechanism which rules the 
production of parole and makes utterances structured and comprehensible. 
Similarly, Chomsky describes his language system as ‘constituted by rules that 
interact to determine the form and intrinsic meaning of a potentially infinite 
number of sentences’ (2006, p. 62). Thus, although the speaker may choose 
what to say, the structures of the language system, of which the user is 
unconscious, determine how that something is uttered.  
Another important development presented in Course was Saussure’s 
formulation of the linguistic sign as a dichotomy of the signifier and the signified 
which disassociated the linguistic sign from the natural object it represents. 
Specifically, the objects of the world are recreated in language as symbolic 
representations to which specific sounds and images are assigned, called 
signified and signifier respectively. The Stoics have long before Saussure 
disassociated the sound-image of a word from its meaning; defining the relation 
between the two as the product of convention, consensus, and reason (Harris, 
1993, p. 12). However, for Saussure (1974), the signified is not a mental 
replication of a natural object, but a construct of an abstract language system in 
which the meaning of signs is defined through their systematic relations. 
Specifically, Saussure defined the signified negatively as what distinguishes it 
from all the other signifieds. Thus, Saussure never defined what signified 
actually is, in the sense that, for example, cognitive linguists define mental 
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concepts,  but focused his analysis on the study of signs, of which signifier and 
signified are just its two aspects.  
For Saussure, the meaning of linguistic signs is not based on the relation 
between the signifier and the signified, since then language would be reduced 
to mere nomenclature (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 112). The relations between 
signs are defined as structures that form the language system, langue. 
Discovering these structures was the goal of Saussure’s linguistic research, 
which became commonly known as Structural Linguistics. To Saussure (1974, 
p. 120) both the concepts-meanings and the sound-images of language, i.e. the 
signifieds and the signifiers, constitute the structures of the language system, 
but also at the same time they are the products of that system:  
 ‘Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither 
ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only 
conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system.’  
To demonstrate his point that meanings arise from the language system, 
Saussure (1974, p. 116) turned to the variety of languages and the lack of 
concord between concepts in different languages most evident in translation: ‘If 
words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have exact equivalents in 
meaning from one language to the next; but this is not true.’ As an example 
Saussure used the French word mouton and its English counterparts mutton 
and sheep. Where the English language has two signs, one for the animal and 
the other for the type meat, the French language only has one. Similarly, 
Teubert (2010, pp. 55-56) offers the example of the German words Kummer, 
Trauer, and Gram, which are translated into English as either grief or sorrow. 
Another example would be the English verbs lend and borrow which are both 
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translated in Croatian with the verb posuditi, which does not make any 
difference between the acts of giving or receiving. To Saussure that is sufficient 
evidence to conclude that words do not refer to a set of universal concepts or 
signifieds, but that these are determined by the language they are expressed in. 
Similarly, sound-images of the language, i.e. the signifier, also come from the 
system; for example, the differences between voiced and voiceless sounds can 
only be realised in relation to one another. The systematic relations of sounds 
were particularly well investigated by Roman Jakobson (1978) who argued that 
although acoustics can provide an image of each sound in great detail, it cannot 
interpret that image; it cannot tell whether a particular sound is a variation of 
another or if they are two different sounds. Furthermore, Jakobson (1978) 
demonstrated that the selection of each sound restricts the selection of the 
sounds that follow it, thus the sounds of a language form systematic relations – 
they form signs. As signs, they are distinct from one another not based on their 
acoustics, but on their relation to other signs of the system.  
The relation between signs within the system Saussure (1974, p. 113) defined 
as value: ‘[a]s an element in a system, the word has not only a meaning but 
also – above all – a value.’ Value involves the similarities and dissimilarities 
between particular signs, which help define their particular meanings (ibid). 
However, Saussure extended the notion of value beyond the plane of the 
language system to the plane of discourse. The reason for this lies in the 
diachronic dimension of discourse – sounds and ideas are neither uttered nor 
perceived instantly, but in succession and ‘[a]lmost all linguistic units depend 
either on what precedes or follows in the spoken sequence, or else on the 
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successive parts of which they are themselves composed’ (Saussure, et al., 
1974, p. 126). In the sequence of the utterance, signs are also realised in 
syntagmatic relations, which complement the paradigmatic relations stemming 
from the system. For example, Jakobson (1978) demonstrated that a selection 
of one phoneme limits the selection of the following. Thus, Saussure does not 
see a clear boundary between langue and parole when syntagmas are 
considered, thus accepting many syntagmatic relations are product of both 
langue and parole in proportions that cannot be accurately measured 
(Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 123).  
Although Saussure assigns the construction of the meaning of linguistic signs to 
the language system, he also expands the process of meaning construction 
with the notion of value. The distinction between meaning and value is not 
clearly defined by Saussure, but by including the syntagmatic relations he adds 
another dimension to the formulation of meaning in language, i.e. discourse or 
parole. However, Saussure’s formulation of the linguistic sign without positive 
terms allows him to focus on the structures of langue and ignore the 
syntagmatic aspects of value realised in parole.  
Analysing discourse is, for Saussure, in the domain of historical linguistics as 
discourse interactions effectively represent historical events. The comparison of 
different historical discourses leads to the study of diachronic events, rather 
than synchronic states of language (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 87). Saussure 
supports his argument with an analogy to a chess game, where the state on the 
chess board corresponds to the state of language. Thus, in a game of chess, 
the rules of the game, analogue to the structures of the system, govern the 
24 
 
possible position of the pieces. The knowledge of the rules is perfectly sufficient 
for any observer to understand the current state at any point in the game. 
Saussure (1974, p. 88) argues that the observer who has observed the game 
from the beginning does not gain any advantage from the diachronic 
perspective in understanding the current position. In other words, the observer 
who understands the rules of chess will, according to Saussure, assess the 
current situation on the chess board just as well as someone who had the 
chance to observe the diachronic evolution of the game.  
In this sense, Saussure acknowledges that languages evolve and change, but 
rejects the study of these diachronic changes defining them as mere 
realisations of the underlying system. Thus the systems primordial status as 
discourse production mechanism is confirmed, as all linguistic changes are 
essentially products of that system. However, as discourse is always the 
product of the system, one can observe discourse as a series of diachronic 
language events and look for certain consistencies in order to observe its 
structures. To Saussure and structural linguists, this is the process by which 
children acquire language. Saussure’s the notion of ‘grammatical’ implied 
‘synchronic’ and ‘meaningful’ (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 133); thus discourse is 
just the means to study linguistic continuity which arises from the system and 
forms the system and meaning.  
In order to study the system through discourse, which essentially encompasses 
all human interaction in the infinite number of possible utterances, Saussure 
(1974, p. 89) argues that only those linguistic changes that exhibit a form of 
continuity, i.e. the ones that become a part of the system, and hence 
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synchronic, should be studied. Otherwise, diachronic point of view is not 
examining language but only ‘a series of events’ (ibid). These historical events 
are objects of the discourse, which is infinite in the number of possible events 
but also endless – the discourse always continues. As the new discourse 
always replaces the old, Saussure concludes that no synchronic phenomenon 
has anything in common with any diachronic phenomenon, since one is a 
relationship between simultaneous elements, and the other a substitution of one 
element for another in time (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 90). In other words, the 
relevant aspects of language are the stable values of language that apply as 
much in the present as they did in the past, whereas the changes of written 
form or sound merely replace the old form for the new. For this reason, 
Saussure argues that diachronic changes are insignificant in comparison with 
linguistic continuity as only ‘a synchronic law simply expresses an existing 
order’ (Saussure, et al., 1974, p. 91). 
Saussure’s system is one of linguistic signs, where both signified and signifier, 
i.e. content and form, are products of the system. This system is symbolic and 
both the sounds and ideas of the system come from it. However, its origins, for 
Saussure, come from the practice of speech, i.e. discourse.  Namely, Saussure 
noticed that in language there are many series of phrases and sentences that 
the individual does not combine himself but have become a part of language 
(Barthes, 1968, p. 19). These patterns come about through repetition and 
imitation by members of a discourse community until they become a part of 
language. Thus the values of a system are formed by usage and general 
agreement in discourse: ‘[n]othing enters the language before having been tried 
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out in speech. […] a speaker had first to improvise it, and others to imitate it and 
repeat it, until it became accepted usage’ (Saussure, Bally, Sechehaye, 
Riedlinger, & Harris, 1983, p. 167). From this we can see that discourse plays 
an important role in the formation of the language system. Roland Barthes 
(Barthes, 1968, p. 15) affirms this premise saying that ‘there is no language 
without speech, and no speech outside language’; one cannot exist without the 
other.  
Defining the system as accumulated through discourse implies that it is a 
collective phenomenon. Thus Saussure (1983, p. 13) argues the system exists 
in ‘in the brains of a group of individuals; for the language is never complete in 
any single individual, but exists perfectly only in the collectivity.’ Similarly, 
Barthes argues that as a collective phenomenon the system can only exist 
perfectly ‘in the speaking mass’ (Barthes, 1968, p. 16).  Thus, initially, Saussure 
argued that the language system is the social part of language, external to the 
individual, who by himself is unable to create or modify it. Furthermore, the 
structures of langue are not something an individual is aware of. Thus, for 
Saussure, the unconscious of language was collective and not individual. 
However Saussure (1974, p. 19) was not consistent with his formulation of the 
system stating later that langue ‘takes the form of a totality of imprints in 
everyone’s brain, rather like a dictionary of which each individual has an 
identical copy.’ This latter formulation by Saussure implies that langue is a 
psychological phenomenon and that the speakers of language are unaware of 
the structures of language that govern the formulation of meaningful discourse. 
Thus despite initially forming the system ‘in the collectivity’, Saussure placed it 
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inside the brains of individuals. In this other sense, language system is identical 
for each member of the language community. Thus Teubert (2010, p. 46) 
argues that because of this placing of the system in the brains of individuals 
Saussure can be considered as ‘a precursor to cognitive linguistics, but not as a 
cognitive linguist.’  
As we have observed so far, for Saussure, meaning is the product of the 
relations within the language system. This is best exemplified by Saussure’s 
formulation of binary oppositions (Saussure, et al., 1983, p. 120) – Saussure’s 
system is one without positive terms, only oppositions and differences exist 
between the elements of the system; where there is synonymy, there always is 
a degree of difference and opposition. Thus, for example, the linguistic sign 
species acquires meaning from its syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations to 
other signs. If we consider associative relations, that is, the paradigmatic 
relations of the sign species, we may come up with signs such as varieties, 
genera, kind, race, breed etc. Each of these signs is conceptually related to the 
sign species. These paradigmatic relations between species and other related 
signs determine its meaning in the system; whereas syntagmatic relations 
contribute to the meaning of species in the context of the utterance.  
The division of language into the planes of discourse and language system 
allowed linguists to study language as a system of laws similar to the laws of 
universe. The proposition of two different aspects of language had significant 
impacts on the construction of linguistic meaning. As the system was seen as 
the generative mechanism of language, it was natural to assume that linguistic 
meaning is its product.  This shift of the analysis of language towards the 
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unconscious structures allowed for the first time in social sciences for the 
observer to separate himself from the object observed. This level of “scientific 
objectivity” was only made possible by Saussure’s formulation of language as a 
system without positive terms. 
French anthropologist, Claude Lévi-Strauss (Johnson, 2003) was particularly 
impressed by the development in structural linguistics and wanted to extend the 
application of structural analysis not only to anthropology but all humanist 
sciences. Lévi-Strauss saw society as a system of communication, and as 
individuals are unaware of the structures of the language, they are also 
unaware of the underlying structures of their social interactions. Thus, as these 
structures are unconscious they ‘precede individual agency and resist historical 
contingency’ (Johnson, 2003, p. 107). Similarly, Emile Durkheim argued that 
collective ideas are independent in relation to the individual, with the cultural 
forms such as marriage and kinship demonstrating a ‘deeper reality’ operating 
unconsciously and underlying all social phenomena (Durkheim & Allcock, 1983; 
McCarthy, 1996). 
Lévi-Strauss (1987, pp. 33-36) constructed his theory around the idea of a 
‘mental unconscious common to all subjects, regardless of cultural variations.’ 
This unconscious Lévi-Strauss described as the deep structures of language 
revealed by structural linguistics, which guaranteed ultimate intelligibility of 
different systems of representation radically different from our own; for example, 
there is no human language so remote that we would be unable to learn it 
(Johnson, 2003, p. 70). Furthermore, Lévi-Strauss (Johnson, 2003) argued that 
by uncovering linguistic structures one can look into the deepest structures of 
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the human mind – which are also universal. Apart from the universality of social 
structures, there was nothing to explain why, in various cultures throughout the 
world, social institutions such as kinship and marriage rituals were so similar. 
Particularly the example of the universal incest prohibition among different 
cultures was central for the argument for universal mental concepts (Johnson, 
2003). Similarly, Jakobson (1978) posited the question whether language, 
although a social phenomenon, is ‘in some way imposed on us by nature?’  
For structuralists, the appeal of studying an unconscious abstract system of 
language was that it represented itself as a system akin to the laws of the 
nature. The innateness and universality of such system meant that language 
was a natural object rather than a product of human activity. In other words, 
unlike works of literature, a systematic unconscious system of language exists 
regardless of human action, thus allowing the researchers to remove 
themselves from the object of their study. However, in that case, the language 
system must be considered as synchronic and monologic. A common 
unconscious language system can only function as a synchronic system so that 
it can account for all the historical and cultural differences shown in different 
languages. As a generative mechanism of language, the system is also 
inherently monologic since meaning is formulated in the unconscious and 
precedes the act of communication. 
With respect to the analysis presented in this thesis, structural linguistic theory 
supports the study of discourse for features such as collocations as these 
features can be related to the linguistic structure to some extent. However, the 
diachronic and dialogic aspects of meaning construction, such as the process of 
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negotiation of meaning, are not supported by this theory. As mentioned above, 
diachronic change is seen as substitution of one element with another 
performing the same functions within the synchronic system. On the other hand, 
the dialogic dimension is completely ignored by this approach. Even with 
Saussure’s alternative formulation of the system as a ‘common unconscious’, 
the construction of meaning is considered as realised in the system 
independently of the communicative event. Thus structural approach to 
language analysis completely ignores the main aspect and purpose of language 
– communication.  
From the aspect of the construction of meaning, structural approach accepts 
that certain aspects of meaning are formed in communication, i.e. discourse. By 
ignoring the communicative aspect of language, this approach cannot support 
the analysis of meaning construction. But more importantly, by accepting and 
ignoring the fact that meaning is at least partly a product of communication, 
structuralist theory knowingly produces an incomplete answer to the problem of 
meaning construction. As such, structural theory cannot be used for the study of 
the construction meaning in language. 
 
2.1.1.2 Cognitivist approach 
Cognitive theories reviewed in this chapter are based on the work of Noam 
Chomsky and his theory of generative-transformational grammar (Chomsky, 
1957, 1965). Although the aim of generative-transformational grammar was to 
introduce a new approach to the study of language, Chomsky’s theory had 
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many implications on the origin of linguistic meaning. Furthermore, Chomsky’s 
theory inspired theorists such as John Searle (1969, 1995, 2010; 1980), Steven 
Pinker (1994) and Jerry Fodor (1975, 1998), who further developed the 
cognitive approach to language and meaning.  
Cognitive theories are important to review since they reject the two main 
assumptions this research is based on: a) that meaning is a product of social 
negotiations in discourse; and b) that discourse and meaning inherently have a 
diachronic dimension. Additionally, much like the propositions of Lévi-Strauss 
discussed in the previous section (2.1.1.1 Structuralist approach), the 
characteristic feature of these theories is that they also propose an innate 
language generative system. For these reasons it is necessary to examine 
these theoretical assumptions in detail in order to demonstrate the shortcoming 
of these theories in regard to meaning construction.  
Noam Chomsky criticised the approach of analysing discourse in order to 
discover structures of language as the study of the empirical evidence itself, 
stating that was comparable to designating natural science as ‘the science of 
meter readings’ (Chomsky, 2006, p. 57). Chomsky’s criticism was aimed at the 
approaches of American structuralism in the tradition of Leonard Bloomfield, 
which to Chomsky were too preoccupied with phonology and morphology and 
ignored the issue of meaning. Chomsky argued that a sign like ‘apple’ is not 
involved in meaning until it is realised in a structure like ‘John ate an apple’ or 
‘Did John eat an apple’ (Chomsky, 1957, p. 71).  
However, for Chomsky, meaning is not realised in utterances like these, but 
rather the underlying structures which make them meaningful, namely the 
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syntactic structures. Chomsky (2006, p. 27) argued that the problem with the 
‘surface structure’ of a sentence is that it ‘generally gives very little indication in 
itself of the meaning of the sentence’. Thus, rather than observing linguistic 
performance, Chomsky suggested that the goal of linguistics should be a direct 
analysis of linguistic competence as ‘a system constituted by rules that interact 
to determine the form and intrinsic meaning of a potentially infinite number of 
sentences’ (Chomsky, 2006, p. 62), which he labelled simply as Generative 
Grammar. In this aspect, Chomsky often refers to Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
defining this generative system as a system which allows the speaker to, in 
Humboldt’s terminology, ‘make infinite use of finite means’(1965, p. 7; 2006, 
p.15).  
Chomsky argues that generative grammar is a system that every speaker of 
language has mastered (Chomsky, 1965). Similarly, Searle (1969, p. 13) argues 
that the knowledge of how to speak a language ‘involves a mastery of a system 
of rules’ which makes the use of the elements of that language regular and 
systematic. However, Chomsky does not imply that the speaker’s intuitive 
knowledge of language renders all utterances accurate and grammatical 
(Chomsky, 1965, pp. 7-8). Namely, the mental processes of such a system are 
‘far beyond the level of actual or even potential consciousness (Chomsky, 1965, 
p. 8).’ As opposed to Saussure and other structuralist approaches, the goal of 
generative grammar is not the study of what the language user reports about 
his knowledge of language use, but to specify the actual knowledge of language 
itself (ibid). Thus, to Chomsky linguistic competence, i.e. this knowledge of 
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language, is not something the language user demonstrates, but the generative 
structure behind the linguistic performance.  
In this sense, an analysis of discourse cannot provide insights into the aspects 
of meaning construction in language, as individual utterances cannot show, 
according to Chomsky’s theory, the true mechanisms of language production, 
and hence observe the processes of meaning construction. Thus, it is 
necessary to review the theories based on Chomsky approach in order to refute 
the arguments against the discursive analysis of meaning. 
In Aspects of a Theory of Syntax, Chomsky (1965, p. 10) argues that the 
analysis of performance can only unveil as much as the understanding of 
competence permits. He supports this with the argument that the most 
significant advances in the analysis of linguistic performance came when they 
were based on investigating some sort of formal structure. He singles out 
‘bracketing into constituents of various types, that is, the "tree structure”’ as the 
most obvious formal property of utterances (Chomsky, 1965, p. 12). To account 
for the difference between structures of performance and competence Chomsky 
introduced the notions of “surface” and “deep structures”. As the name implies, 
surface structure is the observable sentence structure manifested in discourse 
through linguistic performance, whereas the notion deep structure refers to the 
underlying language system, i.e. competence. According to Chomsky, each 
sentence of a language like English will have a deep structure to which the 
surface structure relates (Chomsky, 2006, p. 93). Deep structures are, 
according to Chomsky, universal for all languages, which only differ in their 
surface structures. For Chomsky, analysing performance leads only to the 
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analysis of surface structures, whereas only by applying formal models, namely 
syntactic analysis, deep structures can be discovered. For such analysis there 
is no need to analyse actual linguistic performance, i.e. discourse. 
Emile Benveniste(1971, p. 10) criticises Chomsky’s approach arguing that such 
method cannot lead to an analysis of language: ‘[t]he segmentation of the 
statement into discrete elements does not any more lead to an analysis of 
language than the segmentation of the physical universe leads to a theory of 
the physical world.’ On the other hand, Teubert (2010) criticises the idea of 
transformation of surface structures into deep structures by discussing the 
assertion from Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (Chomsky, 1965) that in terms of 
deep structure all sentences consist of subject noun phrase and a verb phrase, 
offering an example of sentence without subject noun phrase “Mir [dative] ist 
kalt” (German for ‘I am cold’, but literally closer to ‘To me is cold’). For 
Chomsky, this sentence is a transformation of a deeper structure, e.g. “Es ist 
mir kalt” (It is cold to me). However, Teubert (2010, p. 35) argues that 
Chomsky’s deeps structures are effectively arbitrary, since one can transform 
any type of surface structure into any kind of deep structure. 
Although Chomsky argues against the analysis of performance, i.e. discourse, 
like Saussure, he runs into the same problem of separating discourse and 
language system, where the construction of meaning is concerned. Namely, in 
his formulation of value, Saussure had to extend the notion to cover both the 
relations of the system and the syntagmatic relations of the utterance. Similarly, 
Chomsky had to acknowledge that both surface and deep structures are 
involved into construction of meaning: 
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It seems that both deep and surface structure enter into the 
determination of meaning. Deep structure provides the grammatical 
relations of predication, modification, and so on, that enter into the 
determination of meaning. On the other hand, it appears that matters 
of focus and presupposition, topic and comment, the scope of logical 
elements, and pronominal reference are determined, in part at least, 
by surface structure. (Chomsky, 2006, p. 97) 
Thus, context and surface structure, which fall in the sphere of discourse, 
contribute to the determination of meaning. Furthermore, just as Saussure’s 
value had to be defined on two axes, since clearly separating discourse and 
system creates a problem of meaning, Chomsky also cannot separate the 
contribution of discourse and system to the construction of meaning:  
It is not clear at all that it is possible to distinguish sharply between 
the contribution of grammar to the determination of meaning, and 
the contribution of so-called “pragmatic considerations,” questions of 
fact and belief and context of utterance. (Chomsky, 2006, p. 97)  
Although the approaches based on the works of Saussure and Chomsky both 
argue strongly for the analysis of an abstract unconscious system of rules and 
laws, a complete separation from discourse seems impossible, especially where 
the construction of meaning is concerned. Chomsky’s proposal of deep 
structure as a generative mechanism for production of meaning fails almost 
immediately as the key aspects of the meaning of the utterance are completed 
by what he describes as surface structure. Furthermore, Chomsky’s structures 
are mainly focused on the syntax of utterances and do not say much about 
meaning of particular lexical item.  
By comparing the generative grammars of different languages, Chomsky 
argues that one will notice that the similarities are marked and the differences 
are ‘few and marginal’ (Chomsky, 2006). Thus, he argues that under the 
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surface structures of each language lie ‘deeper structures’ that are universal to 
all languages, and more importantly to all human beings within whose minds 
they exist.  
Hilary Putnam (1979) argued that even if languages showed ‘significant 
uniformities’ there could be other explanations for that other than un iversal 
grammar, such as, for example, common origin of languages. However, 
Chomsky rebuffs Putnam’s critique as misunderstanding of the problem. 
Chomsky (2006) is interested in first language acquisition arguing that an 
underlying structure of language is necessary for a child to adopt a language:   
‘it seems that knowledge of a language’s grammar – can be acquired 
only by an organism that is “preset” with a severe restriction on the 
form of grammar. This innate restriction is a precondition, in the 
Kantian sense, for linguistic experience, and it appears to be the 
critical factor in determining the course and result of language 
learning. The child cannot know at birth which language he is to learn, 
but he must know that its grammar must be of a predetermined form 
that excludes many imaginable languages.’  
For Chomsky the problem is to find a hypothesis about initial structure rich 
enough to account for the fact that a specific grammar is constructed by the 
child, but not so rich as to be falsified by the known diversity of language.  This 
concept of innate structure applies also to acquisition of meaning. Specifically, 
as the acquisition of words is based on minimal exposure, both the sounds and 
the meanings children acquire must be in some way pre-determined:  
‘It is hard to imagine otherwise, given the rate of lexical acquisition, 
which is about a word an hour from ages two to eight, with lexical 
items typically acquired on a single exposure, in highly ambiguous 
circumstances, but understood in delicate and extraordinary 
complexity that goes vastly beyond what is recorded in the most 
comprehensive dictionary, which, like the most comprehensive 
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grammar, merely give hints that suffice for people who basically know 
the answers, largely innately.’ (Chomsky, 1995, p. 15)  
Thus, according to Chomsky, we are born with predetermined meanings which 
are merely activated upon encountering the word. Similarly to Lévi-Strauss’ and 
Jakobson’s propositions this inborn structure accounts for the universality of 
underlying structures among various languages and cultures. Without the 
concept of deep structure, Chomsky (2006) argues that language is ‘reinvented’ 
each time it is learned.  
The system of innate meanings is further developed as language of thought 
(Fodor, 1998) or mentalese (Pinker, 1994). These theories take up Chomsky’s 
idea of deep structures and transformational grammar and develop dictionaries 
of concepts which account for the syntagmatic selection of units, and hence 
indirectly the syntagmatic meaning realised in the utterance. Jerry Fodor forms 
his argument on the notion that in order to learn a second language, one must 
possess the ability to speak one language. To Fodor, learning a language like 
English is not to learn what the sentences of the language mean, but to relate 
the sentences to the corresponding thoughts (Fodor, 1998, p. 9). Language of 
thought is thus segmented; it consists of discrete concepts which act as 
categories into which we assign objects through perception. Jackendoff (2011, 
p. 689) conceptualises such language as an ‘asset of stored structures and 
stored relations among structures’. Segmentation of language into concepts is 
vital as it allows formation of new expressions through (re)combinations in 
syntactic structures. For Jackendoff (2011, p. 695) meaning is regarded as a 
mental structure which is linked to other deep mental structures that determine 
its sound-image and its syntactic properties. Thus, the concept ‘cat’ consists of 
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not only conceptual features, such as ‘feline’ and ‘animal’, but also syntactic 
features, such as ‘noun’, ‘singular’, and ‘countable’ (ibid). Selectional rules, 
proposed by Chomsky (1965), which deem his famous example ‘colorless 
green ideas sleep furiously’ as ungrammatical, require mental concepts to 
possess such features to make meaningful sentences.  
Teubert (2010) argues that the proposition of a language of thought brings 
about the issue of the structure of such language, namely the question if it is 
like natural languages – a symbolic system of concept signs or if it is content 
without form? If it is symbolic, it is not unlike Saussure’s langue. In that aspect, 
the language of thought is not at all different from the natural language in terms 
of its structure, but only in the aspect that it is innate and not necessary to be 
learned. But essentially, as a symbolic language it is still subject to 
interpretation. However, the case of content without form corresponds to ‘an 
image that does not represent anything but itself, and thus would have to be 
identical with the object for which it stands’ (Teubert, 2010, p. 49).This image 
would correspond to what Peirce calls ‘icon’ or ‘likeness’:  
‘The likeness has no dynamical connection with the object it 
represents; it simply happens that its qualities resemble those of that 
object, and excite analogous sensations in the mind for which it is a 
likeness. But it really stands unconnected with them.’(Peirce, 1998, p. 
9)  
A photograph is an example of likeness, which is a form, an image, 
representing certain meaning – it is also a sign. Therefore, even a mental image 
is essentially a sign needing interpretation (Teubert, 2010, p. 49). Deferring the 
meaning from a natural language to the language of thought would not result in 
dealing with pure ideas but only with another structure of signs. As Jacques 
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Derrida (cited in Wood, 1992; Wood & Bernasconi, 1988) argued in his 
formulation of différance, there is no such thing as a transcendental signified, 
i.e. content without form, a pure idea, only an endless deferral of signification 
from one sign to another - every attempt to reach the signified is deferred to 
other signifiers.  
Furthermore, from the aspect of the acquisition of symbolic meaning, there is 
criticism that the underlying language of thought is not a necessary assumption. 
For example, Ruth Millikan (2004, p. 133) argues that ‘[t]he infant learns what 
kitties look like in various postures, what they feel like, the sounds they make, 
and what they sound like through language.’ All of these are in a way signs of 
kitties, whether natural or symbolic. For Millikan, there seems no reason why 
this last would require that the infant employ a theory of mind or concepts of 
mental states.  
Chomsky (1995) argues that an underlying structure, as some sort of language 
of thought, is a necessary assumption because of the speed a child acquires 
language. For Chomsky (1995, p. 15), first language is acquired almost under 
minimum exposure and at the speed of roughly one word per hour between the 
second and eighth year of life. However, Martin (1987, p. 32) argues that when 
you consider the huge amount of exposure children have to language and all 
the reinforcement and correction they experience, Chomksy’s argument about 
speed of acquisition is not as convincing. For example, even low-IQ children 
learn language fairly well by the time they are ten years old, but ten years of 
intensive training is long enough to teach anybody anything (1987, p. 32). Thus, 
if the child possesses innate structures of language we would expect it to 
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master the language much quicker than that. Given the huge amount of training 
we give our children before they can master our language, one does not need 
to suppose innate knowledge to start off with (ibid). Furthermore, Teubert (2010, 
p. 57) finds Chomsky’s claim also highly speculative, calculating that if his claim 
was accurate the average 8-year-old would possess a vocabulary of 26,280 
words (12 words × 365 days × 6 years). In that case, Chomsky’s 8-year-olds 
are linguistically competent to determine the meaning of more than 26,000 
words based only on single exposure. Even in a case of an individual with such 
a remarkable vocabulary, Cooper (2003, p. 55) argues that Chomsky’s concept 
of competence is ill formed:  
‘After all, we judge a person’s competence in a language not on the 
basis of a contextless blurting out of statements, impeccably true as 
they may be, but on that of the appropriateness of his statements, not 
only to extra-linguistic situations, but to discursive context.’  
With respect to universal structures, Teubert (2010, p. 36) reports that out of 35 
language universals proposed by Chomsky and his colleagues,  defined as 
unconscious and untaught structures of language, only recursion has yet to be 
refuted. Additionally, the notions of innate structures and mental concepts have 
been shown as unnecessary propositions to account both for the speed of 
language acquisition and for similarities between certain languages. And finally, 
as all languages are subject to interpretation, the proposition of a language of 
thought merely defers the process of meaning interpretation to another structure 
as mental concepts constitute merely another set of linguistic signs that need 
interpretation, rather than ‘pure’ meaning without form. Similarly to the 
structuralist approach, cognitive theories also result with a problem of meaning, 
having to accept that certain aspect of meanings are constructed in 
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communicative event and are not controlled by the structures of the language 
system. This supports the hypothesis that linguistic meaning can be subject to 
construction and negotiation in discourse.  
It has been shown that regarding the construction of meaning, it is not only 
necessary to include the communicative aspect of language, but as we have 
hitherto argued, there is little or no reason to define language as a 
psychological phenomenon. This will be demonstrated in the following section 
(2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon), where it will be argued that 
language and meaning are primarily products of social interactions. 
 
2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon 
The main aspect of the formulation of language as a social phenomenon is that 
the main aspects of language depend on the community of language speakers. 
In other words, the use of language is not considered an innate ability but 
something that is taught interactively. Thus the communicative aspect of 
language, realised as discourse, plays the integral part in the acquisition of 
language. As we have argued in the previous section (2.1.1.2 Cognitivist 
approach) there is no need to assume any kind of innate unconscious language 
mechanisms to explain language acquisition. Language is taught in social 
environment, which preserves the structures and meanings of language and 
passes it onto new generations. 
Defining language as a social phenomenon incorporates its main function, i.e. 
communication, into its very formulation. Without communication there is no 
language acquisition or meaning construction. Thus, although language 
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acquisition implies a psychological aspect of language, in the sense that 
language is learned and memorised, without the social aspect, e.g. other 
speakers of language, the communication and formulation of meaning is not 
possible. On the other hand, the structure of language is realised by the 
conventions of discourse, thus the systematic aspect of language is 
transformed from psychological to the social and collective plane of language. 
Furthermore, as a social phenomenon, meaning is a contingent property which 
can be socially constructed and negotiated.  
This section reviews the reformulation of language as a social phenomenon, 
which can be traced back to Bakhtin’s theories of dialogism and heteroglossia 
which stressed the importance of the communicative aspect of language, but 
also of the ideological influence on meaning. Bakhtin’s work was further 
reformulated by Julia Kristeva, who initially developed the theory of 
intertextuality based on Bakhtin’s heteroglossia, but stated within the framework 
of structuralism. Finally, the complete reformulation of language as social 
phenomenon and the turn towards the study of discourse is credited to Michel 
Foucault. The review of the development of this approach presents the 
arguments for changing the focus of language study towards discourse. The 
arguments are based not only on the inherent social and communicative 
functions of language, but also on the problems of construction formulated in 
the structural and cognitive approaches.  Finally, the formulation of language as 
a social phenomenon is a prerequisite for the theory of meaning construction in 
terms of social construction and negotiation. 
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2.1.2.1 Turning to discourse 
Saussure’s, and Lévi-Strauss ’, but particularly Chomsky’s propositions imply 
that language is, in a way, self-sufficient; once established, language system 
exists independently of discourse. However, as we have discussed in the 
previous chapter, where meaning was concerned, all the system focused 
approaches had to take into account the context of utterance. Since the 
meaning is, at least partly determined by the context, to analyse meaning one 
has to analyse discourse; analysis of a mental system or deep structures, no 
matter how defined and carried through, could not completely account for the 
meaning of an utterance. 
One of the strongest arguments for departing from the focus on the language 
system was proposed by a Russian linguist, Bakhtin who was very critical of 
Saussure’s idea of a language system, questioning whether language can exist 
for the speaker’s subjective consciousness as ‘an objective system of 
incontestable, normatively identical forms ’ (Bakhtin, et al., 1994, p. 32). Bakhtin 
sees in Saussure the product of a long tradition of linguistic and philological 
thought, ‘in which the essence of language has been thought of as a system of 
rules’ (Dentith, 1995, p. 26). This tradition has led linguists like Saussure and 
Chomsky to consider the monologic utterance as the prototype of language use. 
However, Bakhtin argues that this monologic utterance is an abstraction just like 
Saussure’s langue. Saussure’s langue is not a mechanism responsible for the 
understanding of a particular utterance since the process of understanding is 
not merely recognising the elements of the utterance, but rather understanding 
them in the concrete context they occur in (Bakhtin, et al., 1994, p. 33). To 
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understand the meaning of the utterance amounts to ‘understanding its novelty 
and not recognizing its identity’ (ibid). Thus understanding is not the same as 
recognition; only a sign can be understood, what is recognised is the signal 
(signifier). However, one does not hear ‘words’ as signals but as content. To 
Bakhtin, words are always filled with content and meaning drawn from our 
social behaviour or ideology (Bakhtin, et al., 1994, p. 33). We do not hear words 
arranged in structures but statements of what is true or false, good or bad, 
important or unimportant etc. This is probably why we can easily repeat the 
‘message’ but are rarely able to repeat the exact words of even the shortest 
utterances (Olsson, 2004, p. 130). 
Furthermore, any utterance responses to a previous utterance or an event, and 
is calculated to be responded to in turn (Bakhtin, et al., 1994, p. 35). Utterances 
are always dialogic rather than monologic. There is always an intended 
recipient of the message, whom we expect to respond; apart from the purpose 
of communication, there is no need for language. Luhmann (1995, p. 143) in 
this sense writes: '[c]ommunication is made possible, so to speak, from behind, 
contrary to the temporal course of the process.' In other words, communication 
depends on the addressee, his interpretation and response to the utterance. 
According to Bakhtin every utterance responds to previous one, but also to pre-
existing patterns of meaning and evaluation. Thus, the speaker is always an 
addressee first; the speaker is not ‘the biblical Adam’ and his utterance always 
responds to utterances that precede it (Bakhtin, et al., 1986, pp. 93-94). In other 
words, everything that is being said is influenced by what has been said before. 
As such each utterance promotes and seeks to promote further response; thus 
45 
 
one cannot understand an utterance or even a written work as if it were singular 
in meaning, unconnected to previous and future utterances or works (Bakhtin, 
et al., 1986, p. 72). Understanding is a process that happens in the interaction 
between speaker and listener; the meaning is placed in that particular context. 
Therefore, all utterances are inherently dialogic, as their meaning and logic 
depend upon what has previously been said, and on how they will be received 
by others (ibid). Bakhtin calls this phenomenon Dialogism. 
As every utterance is a response to previous one and seeks further response 
itself, there is a multitude of voices in it; it reflects on previous value judgment, 
offers its own, and seeks further value judgment itself. Bakhtin (Bakhtin, et al., 
1994) call this heteroglossia as the meaning of an utterance is inhabited by a 
multitude of voices. Language always represents a ‘co-existence of socio-
ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing 
epochs of the past, between different socio-ideological groups in the present, 
between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth’ (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981, p. 
291). By relating language and society, the struggle of the classes becomes 
effectively a struggle of discourses. In the struggle of discourses, Bakhtin 
(Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981) identified two opposing forces: centripetal, or the top-
down, and centrifugal, or the bottom-up, forces. Centripetal forces represent the 
language controlled by the society’s institutions, which tend to resist language 
change (ibid). Centrifugal forces, on the other hand, represent the language of 
general population and are responsible for the language change (ibid). Just as 
with the struggles of the classes, there is a struggle between discourses, 
between ideologies, schools, viewpoints, etc. Centrifugal forces represent the 
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struggle for one’s voice, which is inevitable: ‘one’s own discourse and one’s 
own voice, although born of another or dynamically stimulated by another, will 
sooner or later begin to liberate themselves from the authority of the other’s 
discourse’ (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981, p. 348) Similarly, Sinclair argues that 
actual utterance ‘shows a curious tension between personal and social 
pressures’ (Sinclair & Carter, 2004, p. 67). The system one has to ‘liberate from’ 
is discourse in the broader sense. As any utterance is produced by a member of 
a culture or civilization, it is always part of the social world, i.e. discourse. Thus, 
as Derrida summarises: ‘everything [is] discourse’ (Derrida & Bass, 1978, p. 
280). Language is never fixed, but it continuously evolves; there will always be 
new utterances, and hence, new value judgments and meanings, language is in 
a ceaseless state of becoming. 
2.1.2.2 Structuralism and discourse – Kristeva and Barthes 
Bakthin’s arguments against the monologic approach to the study of language 
were relatively unknown until they were reported by Julia Kristeva in 1960s. At 
the time, the mainstream approach among the French intelligentsia was heavily 
influenced by Lévi-Strauss’ Structuralism. Thus, Bakhtinian ideas were initially 
reported by Kristeva from a structuralist point of view reconciling the new ideas 
with the mainstream structural approaches.  
Assuming discourse as the realisation of language, it is natural to ask how it can 
be a system responsible for its own production at the same time. As we have 
argued above, Bakhtin did the first necessary step by redefining language as 
dialogic. Kristeva (1986, p. 36) noticed that Bakhtin’s formulation of language as 
dialogue replaced Saussure’s static hewing out of texts, his system of langue, 
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with a model in which structure does ‘not simply exist but is generated in 
relation to another structure’. Thus, Bakhtin replaced Saussure’s synchrony with 
diachrony. Kristeva here refers to text as the totality of spoken and written 
utterances, in other words, as discourse in the general sense.  
Similarly as Bakhtin differentiates between understanding and recognition, 
Kristeva argues that writing (ecriture), in the sense of utterance, is an act of 
production rather than representation. Kristevan texts, i.e. both written and 
spoken discourse, do not represent pre-existing meaning embedded in an 
abstract system of language, but create their own meanings in relation to 
previous ones. Otherwise, she argues, one would be ‘aware’ of all the possible 
meanings and the intellectual exercise would be that of recognising them rather 
than understanding new meanings. Kristeva thus concludes:   
’The text is therefore productivity, meaning that (1) its relation to the 
language in which it is sited is redistributive (destructive-constructive) 
[…]; (2) it is a permutation of texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a 
text, many utterances taken from other texts intersect with one 
another and neutralize one another.’ (Kristeva (1966-7), Le Texte clos, 
adapted from Orr, 2003, p. 27) 
Kristeva’s arguments are significantly influenced by Bakhtin’s work; her text as 
productivity has elements both of dialogism (1) and heteroglossia (2). Similarly, 
for John Sinclair (2004, p. 52) language in use has two aspects: the interactive 
plane, which involves a continuous negotiation and corresponds to Bakhtin’s 
dialogue; and the autonomous plane which is a record of experience, in the 
sense of intertextuality and heteroglossia, and involves recalling and reworking 
previous words ‘in the new contexts provided by the movement on the 
interactive plane’. The autonomous plane of discourse is concerned with ‘the 
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organization and maintenance of text structure’ and does not refer to the world 
outside discourse (Sinclair & Carter, 2004, p. 53); and we can say that the same 
applies for Kristeva’s intertextuality.  Thus, the corpus linguistic approach 
defined by Sinclair forms the language system within discourse; discourse is 
both the system and its product at the same time, since new utterances and 
structures are continuously constructed in relation to the previous discourse.  
However, the notion that discourse generates itself in relation to previous 
discourse does not fit in Bakhtin’s formulation of dialogue, which involves at 
least two participants. Kristeva argues that in an utterance the addressee is a 
construct of the discourse; thus the addressee is a ‘text in relation to which the 
writer has written his text’ (Kristeva & Moi, 1986, p. 37). Furthermore, the 
speaker itself becomes a subject of an utterance, which is product of discourse, 
thus the relation speaker-addressee corresponds to the relation text-context 
(Kristeva & Moi, 1986, p. 37). The speaker is projected as the subject of the 
utterance, but the reader recreates the intentionality of the speaker much in the 
same way as the speaker creates the addressee. As the speaker becomes a 
subject and hence a text, where other texts intersect, it is the reader that uses 
his judgement on the text, bringing about a multitude of texts into the process of 
understanding. Thus the meaning is not fixed into the utterance by the speaker, 
rather it is brought into it by the addressee in the process of understanding; the 
meaning of a text comes from language viewed intertextually.  
The text has a structure of definable elements, and yet its intertextual relations 
can never be stabilized, exhaustively located and listed. The text combines 
structure and infinity of meaning. Since a multitude of other texts and voices 
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make up a text, the meaning is deferred from the author to the reader:  ‘[t]he 
reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a writing are 
inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in 
its destination’ (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 148). This intertextuality should not 
be confused with some origin of the text as an attempt to uncover the 
underlying citations; ‘the citations which go to make up a text are anonymous, 
untraceable, and yet already read: they are quotations without inverted 
commas’ (Barthes & Heath, 1977, p. 160). For Sinclair (Sinclair & Carter, 2004, 
p. 14) this intertextuality necessary for understanding, and hence, 
communication is defined as shared knowledge:  
‘The whole text is present in each sentence. The meaning of each 
previous sentence is represented simply as part of the shared 
knowledge that one is bringing to bear in the interpretation of a text 
at any point.’ 
Similarly, Ene-Reet Soovik argues that Kristevan intertextuality as ’a state of 
already-writtenness is the necessary condition for all discourse‘ (Soovik, 2004, 
p. 59); it is a history of meanings one brings into the act of interpretation and 
against which one creates new meanings.  
The theories of Dialogism and Intertextuality are of major importance for the 
study of meaning construction as they abandon the study of the monologic 
utterance. Thus the synchronic aspects of language are replaced by a 
diachronic structure in relation to which new meaning are constructed. 
Utterances are redefined as reactions to previous discourse and the 
construction of meaning becomes dialogic and diachronic, and the interpretation 
of new meaning is based on the history of meanings. The inclusion of dialogic 
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aspect into the process of meaning construction accounts for the discursive 
aspects of meaning construction, but also necessitates a redefinition of the 
language system. 
2.1.2.3 Discourse as a system 
The shift of focus of linguistic research to discourse does not abolish the notion 
of linguistic system, but rather merges the two. Sinclair (2004) defines language 
by dividing it into interactive and autonomous planes. Interactive plane is 
characterised by the negotiation of meaning (Sinclair & Carter, 2004, p. 52). On 
the other hand, autonomous plane is defined as the record of language 
experience (ibid). In this way, the interactive plane corresponds to the dialogic 
aspect of discourse and the autonomous plane corresponds to the systematic 
aspect of discourse. The autonomous plane represents the shared experience 
of language, without which it would be hard to imagine communication (Sinclair 
& Carter, 2004, p. 53). 
Theories of Dialogism and Intertextuality have led to the replacement of the 
synchronic language system with a form of historical record of previous 
meanings. By replacing the abstract and unconscious language system, 
discourse inherited the role of the system. As discourse is itself is often 
described as the product of a system, the system is described by Maturana and 
Varela (1980, p. 13) as an autopoietic system - a system in which all the 
processes and structures are produced by the system itself. Namely, as long as 
the discourse continues, new structures are perpetually generated in relation to 
the previous ones, which accounts for its diachronic dimension. Replacing the 
synchronic system with the diachronic discourse does not result in discourse 
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becoming the new system of underlying structures that govern the production of 
meaning. On the contrary, building on the theories of dialogism and 
intertextuality, Michel Foucault in Archaeology of knowledge (1972, p. 138) 
concludes that the analysis of discourse does not seek to discover hidden 
structures:  
Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, 
themes, pre-occupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses; 
but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obeying 
certain rules…It is not an interpretative discipline: it does not seek 
another, better-hidden discourse.  
The analysis of discourse does not aim to define ‘underlying’ structures of 
discourse, but aims to define those discourses themselves. In other words, the 
analysis of a notion like ‘verb’ is not seen as an analysis of an underlying 
language system feature, but as an analysis of a discourse construct assigned 
with a particular meaning and function. Thus, Foucault (1972, p. 38) views any 
attempt into the analysis of underlying structures unnecessary as the only 
conclusion will be that these structures are ultimately the constructions of 
discourse:  
‘whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or 
thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, 
positions and functionings, transformations), we will say…that we are 
dealing with a discursive formation.’ 
Everything we observe about language is realised in discourse and all the 
observed features of discourse are formations of discourse itself. Thus, Teubert 
(Teubert, 2010, p. 10) argues that there is no vantage point outside discourse 
from which we can observe it. Namely, for Teubert (ibid) we can be aware of 
only the notions that already exist as discourse constructions. In this sense, the 
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act of interpretation is realised as a reformulation or definition using one’s own 
words, which are inevitably a part of discourse. Furthermore, any attempt of 
interpretation is an act of extending the meaning; any attempt to define and 
narrow down meaning of any term results in new interpretations adding to its 
meaning. Foucault (1972, p. 80) exemplifies this by trying to define the meaning 
of discourse: 
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fluctuating meaning of the 
word ‘discourse’ I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: 
treating it as sometimes the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes 
as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements. 
Because of the intertextual and dialogical relations within discourse, the three 
definitions in the example above, each serving as a separate interpretation of 
the term discourse, all add to the meaning of the term. In this sense, 
interpretations are statements that express what is currently being said, 
whereas meaning is formed of the totality of all interpretations, like in the above 
example where the three interpretations form the meaning of the term 
discourse. This corresponds to Wittgenstein’s argument that ‘the meaning of a 
word is its use in language’ (Wittgenstein, Anscombe, Hacker, & Schulte, 2009, 
p. 62). Furthermore, discourse and meaning have inherently a diachronic 
dimension since any act of interpretation and utterance depends on previous 
discourse.  
Having defined language, that is discourse, as a social phenomenon, we can 
define discourse as an autopoietic system. Namely, as discourse is constantly 
expanded by interpretations formed within discourse, we can argue that 
discourse reproduces itself. However, as soon as this reproduction is finished 
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language becomes dead (Maturana & Varela, 1980). The best examples are 
forgotten languages, e.g. Etruscan, which have become meaningless once their 
reproduction through discourse stopped. For Niklas Luhmann (2002) languages 
are reproduced through communications, which only exist in relation to other 
communications – thus language for him is a system of communications. 
Without communications, we are left only with words, perhaps only even with 
sounds, but those cannot produce further communications, like in the case of 
the forgotten Etruscan language. The agent, i.e. the human being, is not itself a 
part of the discourse system, but is represented in the discourse as the subject; 
and following Kristeva’s (1986, p. 37) argument, the subject is a discourse 
construction. Thus, Luhmann concludes: ‘Only communications can 
communicate’ (Luhmann & Rasch, 2002, p. 169).  
Structures of a discourse system, or in Luhmann’s sense, a system of 
communication, are not predetermined as in structuralist theories, but are 
products of the system itself. As Foucault (1972) states, all structures of 
discourse are discursive formations themselves. For Luhmann (1995) structures 
are formed as ‘expectations’, as every communication predetermines the 
possible further communications. Furthermore, certain expectations are 
perpetually communicated, thus they function as structures. Similarly, Teubert 
(2010, p. 230) argues that communication in each ‘discourse community has its 
own conventions.’ One can, of course, flout these conventions and invent their 
own structures, but if they are not reproduced in further communications they 
will disappear. Discourse conventions ‘provide the necessary continuity and are 
therefore relatively stable’ (ibid). Thus we can see grammatical structures as a 
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form of expectation. The whole structure of language is based on expectations 
and cooperation rather than natural laws; thus the stability of structures is based 
on the desire to be understood rather than innate mental structure. Millikan 
(2004, p. 105), similarly argues that speakers are used to having hearers 
respond to certain forms, which in turn reinforces the production of these forms. 
Millikan compares these forms to Dawkins’ (2006) replicating memes. For 
Dawkins (ibid), it is not only the structures and patterns which we use to 
express ourselves that are matter of convention and acceptance, but also 
meanings. For a particular structure or unit of meaning, it is most important to 
be replicated, i.e. repeated in discourse, as many times as possible since this 
replication ‘affirms continuity and complexity as recipe for long-term success 
and evolution, but with similarity and some difference as the all-important 
leaven’ (Dawkins, 2006, p. 103). In this sense, to express new meanings, the 
utterance will always have to refer to and be composed of similar, previously 
known meanings, showing signs of consistency and repetition, but also a 
degree of variation.  
The discourse as a system is not a system of elements, but a conceptual unity 
that is only divided into parts by discourse itself. All the elements of discourse, 
as Foucault stated, are products of discourse itself. The analytical work of 
Sinclair (1991; 2004) showed that meanings in the text arise from particular 
choices of the component elements. For Sinclair the approach to language has 
to be reversed from the cognitive and conventional grammar models, as ‘[t]he 
flow of meaning is not from the item to the text but from the text to the item’ 
(Sinclair & Carter, 2004, p. 135). In other words, one cannot expect to 
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understand a text by adding up successive meanings of each individual 
linguistic item, rather meaning of individual items is only realised in relation to 
one another. Thus, for example, if the meaning of a word is closely related to 
the words that surround it, ‘then consequences of studying its meaning in 
isolation are unpredictable’ (Sinclair & Carter, 2004, p. 137). Similarly, Millikan 
(2004) argued that if sign is just a sound-image then context must be relevant.  
Another problem with system focused theories comes with words that have 
multiple meanings. For example, Sinclair (1991, p. 103) argues that the problem 
with polysemous words, which if they really stood for several meanings, would 
make communication based on selection of predefined concepts, such as 
described by Chomsky, virtually impossible. Namely, it would be in certain 
situations impossible to know which of the word meanings is meant, particularly 
with monologic utterances taken out of the context. Furthermore, what 
Chomsky’s approach also does not show is that the majority of discourse is 
made of the occurrence of common words in common patterns, or in slight 
variants of those common patterns (Sinclair, 1991, p. 108). In these patterns, 
words, including polysemous words, do not have ‘an independent meaning, or 
meanings, but are components of a rich repertoire of multi-word patterns that 
make up text’, which is ‘totally obscured by the procedures of conventional 
grammar’ (ibid). Thus the ambiguity and polysemy are not usually present in 
discourse, but are rather products of identifying meaning with individual words 
outside the context. The polysemy of meanings is not resolved even when the 
word is observed in the structure of the sentence, when words are viewed as 
individual elements of the structure. On the other hand, multi-word patterns and 
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words observed in context usually have clear unambiguous meanings, 
indicating that delimitation of language into words is an arbitrary and 
conventional rather than fundamental process.   
Without clearly defined elements, a generative language system is an unlikely 
proposition. As the meaning of a word is defined by the words that surround it in 
an utterance and its use in the previous discourses, it is only in the act of 
interpretation that meaning is realised. Thus Luhmann (1995) argues that the 
meaning of a communication is realised only retrospectively through later 
communications. Language and meaning depend on discourse as the place 
where structural forms and meanings are constantly reproduced in relation to 
previous discourses. For this reason, Teubert states that discourse has a 
diachronic dimension and is ‘neither stable nor finite’ (Teubert, 2010, p. 220). As 
discourse always continues, language and meaning are always in the state of 
becoming, rather than a finished product, as in the case of Saussure’s or 
cognitive systems. 
Language as a social phenomenon assigns dialogic and diachronic aspects to 
language, particularly with respect to meaning construction. The focus on the 
communicative aspects of language also redefines the language system, 
necessary to ensure stability and meaningfulness of language, as a fluid self -
generating system. As opposed to the static generative language systems 
defined in the cognitive and structural approaches, discourse as an autopoietic 
system does not encounter the problem of meaning caused by the separation of 
the language system and discourse. This is due to social, rather than cognitive, 
formulation of the system, as well as its fluid formulation as a diachronic 
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system. Furthermore, in the Foucauldian sense, the structures of the system 
are discursive, rather than fundamental, formations; thus, discourse is not a 
system of elements, but a system of communications. The elements of the 
system emerge through repetition in discourse, and the smallest unit of 
meaning will encompass both the morphological elements such as plural suffix 
‘–s’ as well as phraseological expressions e.g. ‘kick the bucket’. These 
meaningful expressions are not fundamental elements of a generative system, 
but rather elements that have emerged out of discourse through repetitions. The 
structures and meanings of such system are generated in relation to previous 
discourse, thus such system exists only in a discourse community. Although the 
language also ‘exists’ in the memory or minds of the speakers, its meaning is 
realised in communication, or rather in the act of interpretation. Thus, Roland 
Barthes (1977) famously announced the ‘death of the author’, claiming the 
meaning depended on the interpretation of the reader. Discourse system is thus 
a system and a history, or memory, of communications. Meanings are 
interpretations realised by reformulations of the known. Like with translations, 
the utterance is always rephrased in the known language.  
The analysis of social construction and negotiation of meaning is based on the 
formulation of language as a social phenomenon with discourse defined as a 
system of communications. Cognitive theories focus on the unconscious 
generative mechanism of language, where meaning construction precedes the 
communicative event, thus excluding the possibility of meaning negotiation. On 
the other hand, structural approaches lack the dialogic and diachronic elements 
necessary to observe the process of negotiation, focussing instead on the 
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contextless discourse and synchronic aspect of language.  Thus, only by 
assuming that meaning is constructed and realised in discourse it is possible to 
analyse the social construction and negotiation of meaning. This is only 
possible by observing acts of interpretation, realised in discourse in the form of 
paraphrases, which are defined in detail in the following chapter ( 
2.2 Constructing meaning and reality).  
 
2.1.3 Summary 
In this chapter, approaches to language as a psychological and a social 
phenomenon have been reviewed and contrasted with respect to the 
implications on the construction of meaning in language. Theories that define 
language as a psychological phenomenon include structural and cognitive 
theories, which are characterised by the formulation of a generative language 
system that governs the production of all discourse. In both approaches this 
system is defined as synchronic, meaning that the structural system is 
unaffected by historical changes of language. Structural approaches account for 
historical changes by defining the changes merely as new forms replacing the 
old, but keeping their systemic function. On the other hand, historical change, or 
any other aspect of discourse, is not in the scope of analysis of cognitive 
approaches which focus rather on deeper unconscious structures of language. 
In a sense, the two approaches both focus on synchronic structures of 
language, which users are unaware of and which resist historical change shown 
in discourse. With such formulation, the analysis of language change realised in 
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discourse cannot lead to analysis of meaning construction, since discourse 
shows forms that merely fulfil a function defined by the system. 
Both the structural and cognitive approaches argue that the diachronic and 
dialogic aspect of language is irrelevant compared to the underlying structures 
that govern the production of language, and hence construction of meaning. 
However, in the definition of the process of meaning construction, both 
approaches admit that certain aspects of meaning are constructed within the 
scope of discourse. Thus the theory of language system as an underlying 
generative mechanism cannot fully account for the meaningfulness of 
discourse.  
Although the system focused theories ignore discourse, and hence the 
communicative aspect of language, the reasoning for such approach lies in the 
ability to detach the observer from the analysed object. In other words, the 
analysis of abstract systems is justified by the prospect of analysing a system of 
laws and rule, not unlike the laws of physics and universe which are the focus of 
natural science. For this reason, both approaches are focused on the analysis 
of subconscious or unconscious structures of language which govern the 
production of meaning. However, not only that these structures are not directly 
observable but they are themselves constructions of discourse. Thus, as 
Teubert (2010) argues, one cannot have a vantage point from which to observe 
discourse independently as all observations and interpretations are formed in 
discourse. 
Since Saussure, the work on discourse has ‘rejected the belief that a single and 
general system lies behind all discourses’ (Macdonell, 1986, p. 9). The most 
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important conclusion about the nature of language is that meanings are to be 
found only in the concrete social communication and institutional practices (see 
Barthes, 1988; Barthes & Heath, 1977; Cooper, 2003; Kristeva & Moi, 1986; 
Millikan, 2004; Sinclair & Carter, 2004; Teubert, 2005).  
Meaning as a product of discourse has quite different formulation than in the 
case when it is attributed to abstract mental systems. Namely, the linguistic 
meaning is realised in communicative situations; thus, in Bakhtin’s words  
(Bakhtin, et al., 1986; Bakhtin, et al., 1994), language is dialogic. This does not 
limit the language to the actual dialogic situations, but rather defines meaning 
as dependant on both the speaker and the addressee.  Dialogic formulation of 
language led to the conclusion that meaning is realised in the act of 
interpretation. Specifically, the meaning of an utterance is interpreted by relating 
it to the previous meanings known to the addressee. Meaning is, thus, based on 
a multitude of utterances one has encountered before; in that sense, Teubert 
(2010, p. 216) argues: ‘[m]eaning is the result of adding, over time, one 
interpretation on top of the other.’ The interpretations have to be realised in 
discourse to constitute meaning, they have to be uttered, but most importantly 
they have to be (re)interpreted.  
Defining discourse as a system based on the accumulation of interpretations, 
meanings and structures used in concrete communication supports the 
empirical approach to the analysis of social meaning construction and 
negotiation. Such system accounts for both the dialogic and diachronic, and 
structural aspects of language. Furthermore, without the dichotomy between the 
system and discourse, there is no problem of meaning construction being 
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attributed to different planes of language. Also, the formulation of meaning as a 
totality of interpretations allow for the analysis of meaning construction, change 
and negotiation through the analysis of paraphrases. The definition of 
paraphrase as an act of interpretation is reviewed in the following section. 
2.2 Constructing meaning and reality 
In this chapter main aspect of discursive meaning construction will be reviewed, 
namely the notion of social construction of meaning, definition of meaning as a 
totality of interpretations and the definition of paraphrase as an act of 
interpretation.  As all of these aspects of meaning construction can be observed 
in discourse they are key theoretical formulations for the empirical analysis of 
meaning construction. 
In the first section it is argued that meaning is constructed socially through the 
process of negotiation, which is also closely related to the social construction of 
reality, since shared meanings can form shared realities. The second section 
explores the relation between interpretation and meaning in more detail. Here 
meaning is defined in the Foucauldian sense as everything that has been said 
about a particular notion, thus meaning is made up out of a totality of 
interpretations. Finally, the third section deals with the mechanism of the social 
construction of meaning, namely the notion of paraphrase, which is defined as a 
realisation of interpretation, but also as a realisation of intertextuality. These 
three premises will form an important theoretical framework for the analysis of 
meaning construction in discourse. 
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2.2.1 Social construction by negotiation 
Language theories focussing on discourse, as discussed in the previous 
chapter (in Section 2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon), argue that 
meaning is realised in the acts of actual communication. As such, meaning is 
not based on mental concepts but on negotiation and interpretation in discourse 
and the shared experience of such interaction. The relation of meaning to the 
language external reality is realised in the acts of interpretation, when the 
perception of the world is reinterpreted in discourse. As with Saussure’s 
formulation, the relation between the world and language is one of reference.  
This chapter aims to present theories which argue that within the scope of 
language, all meanings are products of the language itself, by means of social 
construction and negotiation. Linguistic meaning is thus a product of the 
autopoietic system. Only such formulation of language allows for the analysis of 
meaning construction by negotiation in discourse. 
On the other hand, in cognitive theories (See Section 2.1.1.2 Cognitivist 
approach), linguistic meaning is a representation of mental concepts, which are 
by some authors even described as innate. The argument for innate concepts is 
based on the universality hypothesis, which argues that the structures and 
concepts are universal among cultures. For cognitive linguists, concepts can be 
rearranged in any order to create new meanings in language, but are essentially 
mental constructs detached both from the language external reality and the 
discourse. Cognitive concepts presuppose a natural pre-linguistic categorisation 
of the world, on which the meaning is based. Such pre-linguistic categories 
imply either that all humans have the same mechanism for pre-linguistic 
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categorisation of the world, or that this categorisation is based on true natural 
categories found in the world itself. In either case, such categorisation, and 
hence perception of the world, and ultimately the meanings of language, are not 
constructed or negotiated in discourse.  
However, the discourse oriented approach, taken in this thesis, argues the 
reverse, i.e. that meanings divide and categorise reality where language is 
concerned. Thus, as meaning is imposed on reality, language effectively 
creates its own reality by interpreting the reality using symbols it has created. In 
this sense, Benveniste (1971, p. 25) argues that words are not reflections of the 
world, but tools that categorise and organise the linguistic reality.  
Meanings, categories and symbols are all contingent constructs which we use 
to refer to the world that surrounds us. However, the social reality does not 
replace the objective reality of the world we live in, but only provides the means 
of categorising and organising our perception and understanding of the world. 
Discourse theories do not presuppose any kinds of pre-linguistic 
categorisations, but see all categories as contingent constructs of language.  
There is no natural, immediate, and direct relationship between man 
and the world or between man and man. An intermediary is 
necessary: this symbolizing apparatus which has made thought and 
language possible. (Benveniste, 1971, p. 26) 
The symbolic meaning is realised by adding layers of interpretation on top of 
one another. Thus meanings of words grow as they are used in different 
contexts expressing new interpretations of world that surrounds us. Since there 
is no supposition of an innate structure, our interpretations are based on the 
history of interpretations of our linguistic community. In this sense, Durkheim 
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(1983) argues that our reason, and hence what we think to be true, is based on 
our collective understanding of the world: ‘[a]ll that constitutes reason, its 
principles and categories, has been made in the course of history.’ This 
corresponds with the theories of dialogism and intertextuality, discussed in the 
previous chapter, in the sense that any interpretation of the surrounding world 
will be formed in relation to the shared history of all such interpretations. 
Interpretation and understanding as such cannot be ‘strictly separated from the 
construction of new realities’ (Teubert, 2010, p. 239).  Namely, as 
interpretations are based on previous interpretations, language imposes itself 
on reality by defining the ways we interpret the world. Thus Benveniste (1971, 
p. 46) concludes that for ‘the speaker there is a complete equivalence between 
language and reality. The sign overlies and commands reality; even better, it is 
that reality’.  
As society presupposes language, and language presupposes society, meaning 
is a phenomenon of culture. Assigning meaning to objects is of pragmatic 
nature because of the function they serve. Thus, an object is converted into a 
sign, when it starts performing a certain function, e.g. a rock becomes a 
paperweight, which gives the appearance that rock carries meaning. Barthes 
describes this as a ‘conversion of culture into pseudo-nature which can define 
the ideology of our society’ (Barthes, 1988, p. 190). However, the meaning still 
resides in the culture, i.e. linguistic community, where it is realised in 
communication.   
As meaning arises in communication, meaning and language are collective 
phenomena, and in turn ideas, thoughts, and concepts are collective 
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representations of the world (Durkheim & Allcock, 1983). Thus, meanings, 
categories and truths are effectively collective phenomena on which society is 
formed.  As a collective phenomenon, meaning tends to be fixed and tries to 
resist historical change, much in the sense Bakhtin described as centripetal and 
centrifugal forces (see Section 2.1.2.1 Turning to discourse). However, 
collective meanings also impose themselves upon us (Durkheim & Allcock, 
1983); we think and communicate only through words and meanings imposed 
on us. As all interpretation is based on the meanings imposed on us, the 
change of meaning is a rare and slow process. Meaning consists of a multitude 
of interpretations, thus as Bakhtin argued, it is inhabited by many voices, 
interests and ideologies.  
Interpretation of nature creates discourse objects which can be operated in 
language. It is not an act of representation, but an act of construction because 
the interpretation is based on the known meanings. As Paul Ricœur (1981, p. 
68) states: ‘[h]istory precedes me and my reflection; I belong to history before I 
belong to myself.’ Thus, for Ricœur ones understanding of the world, the reality 
one lives in is the product of discourse. Reiner Keller (2011) describes this as 
sociology of knowledge, where collective stocks of knowledge appear as 
institutions, like language itself, which form a historical apriori; members of the 
collective interpret the world based on the knowledge at hand, not as 
transcendental subjects. Thus, collectivity maintains ideas and representations 
and imposes them on individuals; for Durkheim (1983) that is the base for truth 
conditions.  In this sense, Nietzsche concludes that truth is also a product of 
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collectivity, an illusion similar to the illusion of the sign as a pseudo-natural 
object described by Barthes above: 
‘What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and 
anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations, which have 
been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after a long use seem firm, canonical, and 
obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has 
forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors, which are worn out 
and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and 
now matter only as metal, no longer as coins’  (Nietzsche “On truth 
and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense”  inOrmiston & Schrift, 1990, p. 43) 
Nietzsche’s argument above indicates that all the discourse about the truth and 
reality is merely a set of rhetorical functions that are so deeply immersed in our 
culture, or discourse, that they appear as facts. Thus, with respect to linguistic 
meaning, language creates its own reality based on its own traditions and rules. 
In this sense, Durkheim (1983, p. 74) states that ideas are nothing more than 
words ‘which we can twist as we like when there is no objective reality (provided 
by sensations) which prevents us from doing so’. However, as we have argued 
thus far, the reality preventing us from ‘doing so’ is rather the shared reality of 
discourse; the restriction is based on language and history of interpretation not 
language external objects.    
Hey (2001, p. 38) offers an interesting example of a discourse construct 
showing independent meaning from the external world, namely the term gene. 
When the term was coined it ‘had an unambiguous precise meaning, although 
that meaning was entirely theoretical’ (ibid). What happened next, Hey 
describes as an ironic, although common, ‘switch’ that comes with the 
development of understanding: 
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‘As we learn more about something, the more our word for that 
something becomes ambiguous. We do not suffer the ambiguity, 
generally, for we have a broader understanding. We can explain 
phenomena, but if pushed for a precise definition that is also widely 
applicable, we may be stuck.’ (Hey, 2001, p. 38) 
Thus, discovering the natural object that is supposed to stand for the term gene 
resulted in blurring of the meaning of the term. Namely, such a discovery has 
prompted new discourses and interpretations of the terms, which made its 
discourse meaning expand and become more complex. Extending the 
knowledge of the notion inherently implies extending the discourse about the 
notion. However, ironically, Hey (2001, p. 39) argues that the formulation of the 
term is not as important as its reference: 
 ‘words are important, but not that important. I would conjecture that 
there is not a single context, wherein one of these words is 
ambiguous, that biologists cannot provide an explanation and an 
understanding of the processes therein.’  
 As we have argued so far, it is precisely the different contexts the word gene is 
used in that formulates its meaning through interpretation by various discourse 
communities; ambiguity only results when the word is taken out of its context. 
Furthermore, Hey even explicitly states that it is the biologists who will provide 
the explanation of meaning, which will resolve any ambiguity in a particular 
context. Thus, we can observe that discourses of particular subdisciplines have 
developed their own precise interpretations of terms standing for the same 
natural object, indicating that their meanings are defined more by the particular 
discourse than by the objects’ natural properties.  
As we have discussed so far, any object that signifies anything in the world is 
mixed up with language; language always intervenes between objects and 
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meaning (Barthes, 1988, p. 180). In this sense, Barthes argues that meaning is 
always imposed on objects of the world; ‘there is no object which escapes 
meaning, […] when they feign to have none, then precisely they end up having  
the meaning of having no meaning’ (Barthes, 1988). Words refer to the objects 
in the world, but do so on their own terms. There is no truth that imposes itself 
on meaning that is not itself a product of discourse. 
 
2.2.2 Interpretation and meaning 
Thus far we have argued that linguistic meaning is the product of negotiation in 
discourse. As such, meaning is formed of a multitude of interpretations. This 
aim of this section is to clearly define the difference between the notions of 
interpretation and meaning, and also to review the literature supporting such 
formulation. 
The proposition that meaning is defined as a multitude of interpretations is 
deeply immersed with the theories of dialogism, intertextuality and the 
formulation of discourse as an autopoietic system of communication. The first 
formulation of meaning and discourse as a totality of interpretation can be 
attributed to Michel Foucault. In relation to the development of the notion of 
intertextuality within the scope of structuralism, Foucault concluded that: 
 ‘There is nothing primary to interpret, because at bottom everything 
is already interpretation. Each sign is in itself not the thing that 
presents itself to interpretation, but the interpretation of other signs.’ 
(Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx" 59-67 in Ormiston & 
Schrift, 1990, p. 64) 
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Theories of dialogism and intertextuality define all signs, language and 
meanings as formed in relation to previous discourse. By defining language as 
a self-generating system in which meaning are formed in relation to one 
another, there is no primary meaning to interpret, only elements that point one 
another. In this sense, Foucault concludes that interpretation only leads to other 
interpretations. 
By defining discourse as a dialogic system in which all utterances are formed in 
relation to one another, linguistic meaning is formed of a totality of interpretation 
realised in discourse. This view is taken by Teubert (2010, p. 216) who argues 
that: ‘[m]eaning is the result of adding, over time, one interpretation on top of  
the other.’ As all interpretations are formed in reaction to previous discourse, 
meaning has a diachronic dimension (ibid).  
Interpretation, on the other hand, is the act of making sense (Teubert, 2013, p. 
275) and declaring what is meant at the particular moment in time. Similar view 
can be observed in Berger and Luckmann’s (1990, p. 33) formulation of social 
reality where ‘[e]veryday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men and 
subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world.’ In this sense, 
interpretation is an act of relating the perception of reality to the meaningful 
experience.  
An interesting example of the relation between interpretation and meaning can 
be observed in the correspondence of Charles Darwin. Namely, in a letter to the 
translator of his manuscript, Darwin reports the complexity of meaning of the 
term ‘natural selection’ as a good thing since it prevents other men from 
formulating their own interpretations of the notion: 
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Several scientific men have thought the term ``Natural Selection'' 
good, because its meaning is not obvious & each man could not put 
on it his own interpretation, …[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
2698] 
As the meaning of Natural Selection was hard to relate to other meanings, the 
notion has effectively become hard to interpret in one’s own words. 
Interpretation becomes part of the meaning once it has been uttered. As an 
intentional utterance interpreting the meaning of a particular aspect of 
discourse, interpretation can be defined in concrete discourse as an act of 
paraphrase. Thus, interpretation is formed as a sentence that represents reality 
for the speaker and recreates that reality for the hearer (Benveniste, 1971, p. 
22). As a reaction to previous meanings, the interpretation does not involve any 
kind of repetition but always a re-creation of meaning; that is the essence of 
interpretation and language. Similarly, Barthes (1988, p. 134) argues that 
language as such arises from ‘the necessity to vary and transcend the first form 
available man, i.e., repetition: a sequence is essentially a whole at the heart of 
which nothing is repeated.’ By reformulating the ‘original’ meaning in one’s own 
words, the act of interpretation corresponds with the discourse act of 
paraphrase.  
 
2.2.3 Paraphrase as Interpretation 
Thus far it has been argued that meaning is a product of social negotiation, 
formed as a totality of interpretations, which are realised in discourse as 
paraphrases. This section reviews the literature that supports such formulat ion 
of the notion of paraphrase as well as other definitions of the notion. The aim of 
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the section is both to support the definition of paraphrase as an act of 
interpretation, but also to review the literature on the formulation and function of 
paraphrases in discourse. 
In discourse, in the Bakhtinian sense, every utterance is regarded as a 
response to previous utterances, acting to refute, affirm, supplement or 
somehow take it into account (Bakhtin, et al., 1986, p. 91). As such, these 
utterances have an interpretative function. Furthermore, as we have argued 
thus far, interpretations form meanings, thus utterances that act as an 
explanation meaning of a particular notion at a given point in time can be 
defined as paraphrases of a particular meaning. 
The formulation of the notion of paraphrase as an act of explanation of 
meaning, which essentially encompasses all utterances in discourse due to 
their relation to previous utterances, can be attributed to Wolfgang Teubert 
(2005, 2010, 2013). The most prototypical example of an explanation in the 
form of paraphrase can be found in dictionary definitions. Teubert (2010, p. 219) 
argues that lexicographic definitions are usually generalised so they can be 
applied to virtually all discourse occurrences. He gives the example of an 
explanation of meaning one would not usually find in a dictionary – ‘a heron is a 
huge target. Hard to miss’ – arguing that such explanations are abundant in 
discourse (Teubert, 2010, p. 219). By analysing discourse we can observe such 
explanations in the form of paraphrases, which allow us to observe various 
interpretations of the meaning of particular discourse objects. In this sense, 
Wittgenstein argued that: 
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For a large class of cases — though not for all — in which we employ 
the word “meaning” it can be defined as thus: the meaning of a word 
is its use in language. (Wittgenstein, et al., 2009, p. §43) 
Wittgenstein’s argument is that for most words in language, their meaning can 
be interpreted from their use in discourse. As such every utterance presents an 
interpretation of meaning, and being related to previous discourse, it acts as a 
paraphrase, i.e. reinterpretation of previous meanings. For Teubert this makes 
the definition of utterance as paraphrase of meaning essential for the analysis 
of meaning: 
This is what makes paraphrases so essential: they tell us what has 
been said and can be said about a discourse object. For a corpus-
driven theory of meaning, they are crucial. They may contradict each 
other, they may describe something in such irreconcilable features 
that it is hard to see it as the same thing, but taken together in all 
their chaotic diversity they are the very material meaning consists of. 
(Teubert, 2005, p. 12)  
As paraphrases essentially rephrase the words and meanings of others, such 
formulation corresponds both with the dialogic and diachronic formulation of 
language. Stahl (2006) argues that discourse is continuous interpretation and 
as soon as a paraphrase as an explanation of meaning is introduced, it is being 
interpreted and likely re-interpreted in new paraphrases. In this sense, 
interpretation are shared and developed collaboratively over a period of time. 
Thus, meaning in discourse, like discourse itself, is thus ‘neither stable not finite 
(Teubert, 2010, p. 220). 
The importance of paraphrase is not only in their formulations of meaning, but 
also the manner this is achieved. As the formulation of the notion of paraphrase 
is based on the theories of dialogism and intertextuality, the realisation of 
paraphrase in discourse can be used to analyse the intertextual processes in 
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language. The notion of intertextuality and the formulation of paraphrase as 
reinterpretation of others’ words allows us to observe how meanings are 
constructed in relation to previous meanings. Thus, Koteyko (2006) concludes 
that the study of paraphrases in a corpus ‘allows a detailed and documented 
diachronic analysis of intertextual links that uniquely characterise any text 
segment in the focus of analysis.’ In other words, by analysing corpora it is 
possible to observe the intertextual links between paraphrases and thus 
observe the process of meaning negotiation. Paraphrase thus also performs an 
intertextual function, by incorporating previous texts into the act of 
interpretation.  
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2.3 Terminology 
Observing language from the perspective of social construction and negotiation 
of meaning requires special attention to the notion terminology. Terms are 
regarded as having clear and well-defined singular meaning thus showing 
virtually no ambiguity regardless of the context they occur in. As such, they are 
considered distinct from general words of language, which usually require 
context to resolve their polysemous meanings and ambiguities. Furthermore, 
terms are characterised by being linguistic objects of specialised languages. 
Thus, only words having a special reference within a specific domain are 
considered to be the terms of that discipline (Sager, 1990, p. 19).  
Hitherto it was argued that meanings of most of the words are ambiguous and 
realised only in contexts, rather than abstract systems. However, terminology 
appears as an exception to the rule with the formation of conceptual ontologies. 
The aim of the section is to demonstrate that even terms are subject to the 
same laws that words are subjected to, in discourse oriented approaches, and 
are not in any way equated with the concepts defined in cognitive theories. The 
chapter also demonstrates the meanings of terms are just as dialogic and 
diachronic as of ‘normal’ words. 
 
2.3.1 Special features of terms 
Having a singular meaning, i.e. representing only one concept or meaning, 
terms are most often found in specialised texts, such as scientific and technical 
writings. This so-called ‘univocity principle’ is one of the cornerstones of 
75 
 
traditional terminology (Bertaccini, Massari, & Castagnoli, 2010). Terms thus 
usually refer to single concepts, which in turn are represented solely by that 
term; as such, in their use, they correspond to proper names (Pearson, 1998, p. 
11). In other words, they act as names, or rather labels, for particular well-
defined concepts. In this sense, terms are defined in the same manner as 
Saussure’s linguistic sign, with the label as signifier and concept as the 
signified.  
However in terminology, terms are only considered as labels for the abstract 
concepts, and the primary goal of terminology is defining the concepts, i.e. 
standardising the meaning before the label (Pearson, 1998, p. 2). The 
description of the concept is formed by subject specialists, which thus ‘becomes 
the definition of the term’ (ibid). Thus, the task of terminology is opposite to the 
task of linguistics; where linguistics observes the empirical evidence of 
language use to determine the meaning of a lexical unit, terminology defines the 
meaning by setting the norms for the formulation of the term in discourse in 
order to standardise the meaning.  
Similarly to Saussure’s approach, terminology is not concerned with the 
formulation, i.e. the definition, of terms in discourse, but rather in establishing 
structures of knowledge for specific subject domains. Rather than focussing on 
definitions, terminologists focus on ‘comparing and contrasting related concepts’ 
and examining the vertical and horizontal links between them (Pearson, 1998, 
p. 2). This fully corresponds to Saussure’s language system, and is realised in 
terminology by developing conceptual ontologies: ‘[a]ll concepts, together with 
their relationships to each other, are called a conceptual ontology’ (Teubert, 
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2010, p. 68). However, Teubert (ibid) argues that these concepts are not the 
same as mental entities as described in the works of structuralists and 
cognitivists; they are the tools of terminology as a science. Conceptual 
ontologies are models that define terms, or rather the concepts, in specialised 
language. They have an important role in the translation of terms in technical 
and scientific texts, but these ontologies do not apply language in general. 
Teubert (ibid) exemplifies this by arguing that there would not be so many 
different translations of Shakespeare if conceptual ontologies worked for 
everyday language, as they would all be identical with all the meanings clearly 
defined. However, we know well that is not the case as the meanings of 
Shakespeare’s works are still debated among modern scholars and 
continuously reinterpreted in new translations.  
  
2.3.2 Paraphrases of terms 
As it was argued above, the meaning of terms is standardised by setting the 
language norms such as syntactical structures and lexical context they occur in 
in order to fix and standardise meanings (Pearson, 1998, p. 11). This results in 
limiting the scope of formulation of paraphrases which thus become 
standardised. As argued earlier in this chapter, limiting the possible 
paraphrases effectively limits the possible interpretations, thus fixing the 
meaning of terms. Terms are thus words that have become ritualised in use, 
giving the impression that their meaning has become fixed.    
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Terms, in this sense, are discourse created lexical objects with a special 
restriction on their use and interpretation in specialised discourses. They are 
negotiated and contingent lexical objects, formulated to appear as fixed and 
language independent objects. Terms are invented by scientists and specialists 
and their meaning is fixed by an agreed definition, which is explicitly formulated 
and strictly adhered to (Bloomfield, 1969, p. 38). According to Pearson (1998, p. 
22), terms are products of collaboration between terminologists and subject 
specialists and as such have prescribed meaning. In terminology, this meaning 
is defined through conceptual ontologies, which may create an illusion that their 
meaning is not dependant on context and negotiation. However, both the 
context and social negotiation are necessary for formulation and understanding 
of terms – the negotiation is implied in the process of creation of terms, whereas 
the context plays an important role in differentiating terms from ordinary words.  
As Pearson (1998, p. 8) argues, in the field of terminology ‘there is no usable 
definition of term and no adequate communication model which allows us to 
identify when words are being used as terms.’ Thus, without context it is hard to 
distinguish terms from words in general. Arguing that terms have meaning 
regardless of the context would be to disregard the fact that they occur almost 
exclusively in highly specialised domains and contexts, usually in scientific and 
technical texts. The definition of terms as lexical items used in specialised 
language requires that specialised, scientific context in order to construct these 
lexical items as terms; outside that context they are just signs with a potential 
for meaning, which is ultimately realised in context.   
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2.3.3 Summary 
Taking the concepts and conceptual ontologies, as tools of terminologists, 
aside, the conclusion is that meanings, both of words and terms, are defined 
and negotiated in discourse. To set a definition of a term is to paraphrase the 
term, offering an interpretation that defines its meaning. Whether that definition 
is offered in the mode of ontology or paraphrase is not relevant, as both act as a 
form of discourse interpretation of meaning. This is the social process of 
construction and negotiation of meaning.  
The purpose of terms is to stabilise and fix meaning; thus Sinclair concludes 
that terms ‘do not adapt to their verbal environments; the words are as isolated 
as the sentences, and the phraseology is in constant danger of becoming 
ritualized’ (Sinclair & Carter, 2004, p. 159). Thus, the purpose of terms is to 
have constant unchanged meaning regardless of the context they occur in. 
However, this definition can be reversed by arguing that terms have fixed 
meaning exactly because of the fixed contexts they occur in. The context of 
specialised language, such as those of particular subject disciplines, is 
restricted and characterised by its own language norms, thus restricting the 
formulation of the paraphrase to a specialised discourse and giving terms the 
illusion of fixed facts. Outside the discourse of subject disciplines, terms can be, 
and often are, used as any other words. Furthermore, apart from context, there 
is no methodology that can differentiate between words and terms. Thus, to 
conclude, the meaning of both terms and words is constructed in the process of 
social negotiation and realised by the contexts they occur in.  
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2.4 The Species Problem 
This section reviews the historical context of Charles Darwin’s research with the 
aim to demonstrate why an analysis of his correspondence focussing on the 
word species is a suitable approach for the study of meaning construction. The 
section will also present an overview of the interpretation of the meaning of the 
word species at the time and review the development of the notion of species 
since the publication of Darwin’s theory. The aim of this review is to support the 
argument that regardless of scientific discoveries, the meaning of the word 
species will always be open to reinterpretation.  Thus this section aims to argue 
that the analysis of Darwin’s correspondence can be viewed as an analysis of 
negotiation of meaning regardless of whether or not species exist as natural 
kinds. 
The analysis of the word species is important not only because species were 
the focal point of Darwin’s research, but also because of the historical context 
his research was conducted in. Namely, Darwin did not publish his theory on 
transmutability of species until decades after first considering the notion (Ruse 
& Richards, 2009). Rather, he discussed it with a small group of young 
researchers, whom he deemed more likely to agree with him. Thus, Darwin’s 
correspondence is the best source for the analysis of how his interpretation of 
the meaning of the word species was formed.  
The study of the word species is important because demonstrating whether the 
meaning of the word species is based the physical properties of ‘species as 
natural kinds’ or is the product of social interactions reflects the theoretical 
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discussions presented earlier in this chapter. In other words, if there is a ‘truth’ 
about species, then the meaning of the word is not so much a product of 
negotiation but rather the product of uncovering the ‘facts’ about species. 
However, with more than a century and a half of scientific progress since the 
publication of Darwin’s theory, the meaning of the word species is still a matter 
of scientific debates. Discovering new ‘facts’ about species only increased the 
number of interpretations of the meaning of the term species (Hey, 2001, p. 6). 
Thus I will argue that the problem of species is a problem of meaning. 
This problem existed already in Darwin’s time, which is evident in his 
correspondence. Many naturalists had different interpretations of what species 
are, which often reflected in their work. This was particularly evident in the 
different approaches to natural classification. For example, in one of his letters, 
Darwin reports on opposing classifications made by fellow naturalists: 
Taking J. D. Hooker & Jordan as representative men for the opposite 
factions in botany,—‘lumpers & splitters’, the former would reduce 
the species of Vascular plants to three score thousand, or perhaps 
much fewer;—while Jordan would raise them to three hundred 
thousand. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1740]  
Until Darwin, the problem was considered merely of finding the right 
classification; there was a general consensus that species are unique and 
distinct, but also fixed and immutable (Hey, 2001, p. 7). However, Darwin’s 
assumptions not only contradicted the interpretation of what species were, but, 
more importantly, they clashed with the creationist views held by many of his 
clerical mentors. Thus it is understandable why Darwin was very cautious in 
expressing his assumptions.  
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Finally, Darwin developed his theory in relation to the context, or discourse, 
which he was a part of. His research was based on the knowledge and theories 
some of which he later disproved. Thus Darwin’s research can be interpreted as 
the product of Victorian society, as much as a reaction to it. For these reasons, 
it is important to review the context of his research in order to gain a better 
understanding of the connotations of his correspondence.  
 
2.4.1 Historical context of Darwin’s theory 
Darwin’s career as a naturalist effectively started with him setting out on the 
Beagle voyage. During his studies at Cambridge, Darwin became an avid beetle 
collector and a close friend of his botany professor, John Henslow (Desmond, 
Moore, & Browne, 2007, p. 13). Henslow taught Darwin natural science and the 
principles of Linnaean classification, and referred him to Adam Sedgwick, a 
professor of geology at Cambridge, whom Darwin accompanied to north Wales 
where he gained field experience in geology. Upon graduation, Darwin was, on 
Henslow’s recommendation, invited to join the Beagle expedition by the captain 
Robert FitzRoy. He was to join the expedition, at his own expense, more as a 
gentleman scholar and companion to the captain, since the ship had already 
had a naturalist assigned (for further details about his life see Desmond, 2007).  
Although, at the beginning of the voyage, Darwin was practically unknown in 
naturalist circles, he quickly started making a name for himself. He collected 
and described innumerable amount of specimens and made important 
geological observations, which he regularly reported to Henslow or Sedgwick. 
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Some of his letters were shared among other naturalists by Henslow and 
Sedgwick; thus after many years on the voyage, Darwin returned to Britain as a 
young, aspiring naturalist.  
Soon after his return from the Beagle expedition, Darwin was invited to present 
his findings to the Zoological Society museum on 4 January 1837 (Desmond, et 
al., 2007, p. 32). For Darwin, at the time, this was a common scientific practice 
where scholars would meet at their respective societies and present their 
papers to a group of peers. Apart from society meetings, Darwin often 
discussed science at gentlemanly dinners and soirees on a more informal level. 
With his father’s financial support, Darwin fulfilled the conditions and his 
reputation as a gentleman scholar was quickly advancing. He regularly 
presented papers at the meetings of Zoological, Geological, Linnaean and other 
relevant societies, even taking up different roles within them (Desmond, et al., 
2007, p. 31). With the publication of his Beagle journals, which proved very 
popular, Darwin fully established himself as a gentleman scholar.  
After John Gould identified the supposedly different species of birds from 
Galapagos Islands as closely allied species of finches, Darwin started to 
question some the ideas on immutability of species his mentors at Cambridge 
had instilled in him (Desmond, et al., 2007, p. 33). Darwin set out on a quest of 
proving transmutation, initially viewing it as a form of natural law akin to 
Newton’s Laws (Ruse & Richards, 2009, p. 3). Thomas Robert Malthus’ Essay 
on the Principle of Population directed Darwin on the path to his theory of 
natural selection. But at this stage his theories were neither fully formed nor fully 
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supported with evidence; thus he continued to present papers on other topics 
keeping his theories to himself. 
Darwin was reluctant to publicly express his views not only because they 
contradicted the mainstream interpretations, but also because they had 
religious connotations. Thus he feared offending ‘precisely the leaders of his 
scientific set – those very men who had nurtured him and made his early career 
possible’ (Ruse & Richards, 2009, p. 8). Since people like Adam Sedgwick and 
William Whewell controlled his science set (Ruse & Richards, 2009, p. 9), 
Darwin felt the need to move from the more ecclesiastical scientific circle in 
Cambridge to London, where he found himself in a more secular milieu, which 
was more ‘conducive to his private musings on extinction and repopulation’ 
(Desmond, et al., 2007, p. 33). 
Although Darwin started developing his theory not long after the Beagle 
expedition, there was a delay of more than 20 years before the Origin was 
published. Darwin was very cautious about expressing his ideas fearing they 
would undo all his hard work to be recognised as a man of science. The 
publication of his Journal gave him a worldwide reputation in scientific society; 
‘animals and plants were now named after him; among London’s savants he 
was also rated highly – he served as a Geological Society vice-president in 
1844’ (Desmond, et al., 2007, p. 49) – all that would be at risk had he published 
his ideas without sufficient evidence. More than just evidence, Darwin felt that 
he would need supporters before publishing his controversial ideas. Thus he 
started sharing his ideas on transmutation with ‘potential supporters and who, 
although they may have been cowed by people like Whewell, certainly did not 
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necessarily agree with them’ (Ruse & Richards, 2009, p. 9). He approached the 
subject of transmutation cautiously ‘like confessing a murder’3, fearing the 
rejection of his ideas. In London, Darwin managed to establish himself in in a 
growing secularist network, ‘which was to make the world safe for Darwin’s 
theories’ (Desmond, et al., 2007, p. 56). There he met Thomas Huxley and 
Herbert Spencer, who relaunched the Westminster Review, ‘seeking to claw 
power from a church establishment’ (ibid). Darwin saw men like Huxley and 
Hooker as potential key supporters for publishing his theory.  
By 1854, it was widely suspected that Darwin was an evolutionist (Ruse & 
Richards, 2009, p. 4) having discussed the issue with several young researcher 
privately and encouraged them to follow their research in this direction. When  
Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation was anonymously published in 1844, 
some people attributed it to Darwin, which made him read its reviews uneasily 
(Desmond, et al., 2007, p. 49). The book was a popular account of a theory of 
evolution and received severe criticism from the leading scientific and 
theological scholars. This made Darwin even more cautious about sharing his 
views, but also more adamant to gather more evidence to support his theory, 
further delaying the publication of his essay.  
On 18 June 1858 Darwin received a letter from Alfred Russel Wallace outlining 
a seemingly identical theory of natural selection to his own (Desmond, et al., 
2007, pp. 63-64). Darwin and Wallace corresponded previously on the species 
problem, but not in such detail. Wallace requested his paper presented at the 
                                              
3
 [http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-729] 
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Linnaean society via Charles Lyell, who, not willing to take away the originality 
of Darwin’s theory, proposed that they present a joint paper (Desmond, et al., 
2007, p. 64). On 1 July 1858, both papers were presented at the Linnaean 
society, with Darwin presenting excerpts from his essay followed by Wallace’s 
paper. Both papers were soon jointly published, and, with his ideas finally 
publicly expressed, Darwin felt the urge to complete and publish the full account 
of his theory as quickly as possible (ibid). 
Although having some supporters at the time of publishing the Origin, Darwin’s 
theory remained a very controversial issue for years to come (Wilkins, 2009, pp. 
135-165). After 1866 Darwinism ‘began to dominate the relevant sections of the 
British Association where Darwin’s chief supporters, Hooker and Huxley, were 
presidents respectively in 1868 and 1870’ (Desmond, et al., 2007, p. 72). 
Nevertheless, it took much time and effort for Darwin to convince people to his 
ideas. Darwin’s financial wealth helped him with promoting his theory by 
subsidising translations around the world and financing the publication of 
favourable reviews from abroad, notably those of Fritz Mueller and Asa Gray 
(Desmond, et al., 2007, pp. 72-73). 
For the development and success of his theory, Darwin relied much on the 
correspondence with the more liberal researchers of the time. Not only did 
Darwin use correspondence to find supporters for his assumptions, he also 
discussed and further developed his ideas in the process of convincing them to 
his views. With his ideas kept secret from much of the scientif ic community, his 
correspondence represents the account of the development of his theory and 
the context in which the meaning of the word species was negotiated. 
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2.4.2 Historical overview of the Species Problem  
The species problem is a problem of meaning, or rather different interpretations 
of the meaning of the word species. As Hey (2001, p. 5) argues, the problem is 
not caused by the shortage of answers to the species problem, but rather the 
‘awkward shortage of consensus.’ Similarly, Richards (2010, p. 4) argues new 
information on species ‘seems to have resulted in the multiplication of species 
concepts.’ The multiplication of species concepts becomes the species problem 
when the term species is applied; this is exemplified by Hey (2001, p. 20) who 
shows an example of classifications of birds which according to one definition 
produced 9,000 different species, and based on another it can easily amount to 
20,000. In essence, this is the so-called species problem. 
2.4.2.1 Species before Darwin 
The argument that species are immutable was based on a tradition of discourse 
on species dating back to Plato and Aristotle who argued that species are 
defined by their essences (Wilkins, 2009, p. 102). Thus, species were 
essentially considered natural, eternal and unchanging entities, a notion that 
had been widely accepted until Darwin.   
For medieval philosophers Peter Abelard and William of Ockham species were 
defined as mental concepts, which nevertheless reflect ‘real features of the 
world’ (Richards, 2010, p. 114). In that sense, Linnaeus’ developed his 
classificatory framework on the assumption that species are natural and 
immutable kinds. Linnaeus accounted for variation between different kinds by 
designating the term species as the second lowest category in natural 
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classification and designating the lowest category to the term varieties (Sloan, 
2009, p. 69). The classification was based on the observation of the natural 
features of the specimens and grouping of the specimens exhibiting the same 
features as the same species. This was in philosophical aspect a turn from 
Aristotelian and Platonic species defined by their intension, i.e. their essence of 
being species, to an extensional set to which members exhibiting the same 
qualities or features are included. 
Although not challenging the nature of species as natural kinds, Georges-Louis 
Leclerc, comte de Buffon redefined the Linnaean approach to the classification 
of species arguing that it was artificial and arbitrary  (Sloan, 2009, p. 70). 
Buffon’s species had two dimensions: synchronic, or horizontal, where the 
membership was defined by relationships of interfertility’; and diachronic where 
the members of the same kind are connected by descent from common stock 
(Sloan, 2009, p. 71).  
Darwin was much inspired by Buffon’s ideas and based his work on 
classification mostly combining the Linnaean and Buffon’s approaches, thus 
analysing species for similarities and differences, but also considering their 
descent. However, Darwin came to the conclusion that ‘reproduction and 
sterility, ecological functioning, geographic distribution and similarity’ although  
relevant, were not the core of the definitional structure (Richards, 2010, p. 199).’ 
Darwin focused more on the distinction between varieties and species, and by 
applying Linnaean classification, defining the former as ‘a group of organisms 
that were largely similar, but not distinct from each other’ and the latter ‘as 
groups of organisms that were distinct from other groups’ (Richards, 2010, p. 
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199). However, when taking Buffon’s approach to distinguish different lineages, 
Darwin realised that there were different ways of drawing boundaries between 
species and varieties (Richards, 2010, pp. 199-200). Darwin frequently 
expressed his inability to distinguish between the two terms, for example, in a 
letter to Hewett Cottrell Watson he states: ‘The difficulty to know what to call 
vars & what species,—hopeless—.’4 More importantly, developing his ideas of 
mutation and evolution of species, Darwin created the notion of ‘incipient 
species’ as a form of varieties on the verge of becoming new species. With 
species being formed out of varieties and new varieties formed from species, 
Darwin’s conclusions were that there could not be a clear boundary between 
the two. This conclusion of Darwin’s changed the foundations of the 
understanding of species. As species were not deemed permanent, the 
questions were asked if they were real or just mere categories of classification. 
2.4.2.2 Species after Darwin 
The debate on the nature of species has continued since Darwin to this day. As 
the science of species evolved, further sub-disciplines emerged and with them 
further definitions of species. Just the number of sub-disciplines and their 
aspects of studying species is too long to be listed here, not to mention the near 
infinite discussions and definitions of the term. However, from the more 
philosophical aspect, several major formulations of the nature of species have 
been developed since Darwin. In their abstraction, these formulations touch on 
the nature of species without forming a specific definition, unlike practical 
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approaches to the notion which will adapt the definition to the specific aspects 
of the research. 
Hey (2001, p. 104) describes that species in such formulations are 
’quintessential natural kinds and they exist as categories in our minds, complete 
with prototypes’. Further adding that ‘many of … our mentally constructed 
natural kinds of organisms, actually do correspond to real entities in nature’ 
(2001, p. 105). This proposition is in agreement with the cognitivist description 
of language meaning, discussed earlier (see Sections 2.1.1 Language as a 
psychological phenomenon and 2.1.1.2 Cognitivist approach). The implication 
of this approach is of existence of species as natural kinds, even as mutable, 
and proposing that human mental capabilities are perfectly able of 
distinguishing different and similar objects to create a corresponding concept in 
the minds of individuals. However, from the aspect of meaning construction and 
its realisation in discourse, it has been thus far argued (see Sections 2.1.2 
Language as a social phenomenon and  
2.2 Constructing meaning and reality) that the conceptual formulation of 
meaning is an unlikely hypothesis. 
Another formulation of species as kinds is described by Richards (2010) as 
pragmatic pluralism. According to this approach ‘we group some plants into 
houseplants, and others into weeds. We group some animals into pets, others 
into wild animals, and yet others into farm animals’ (original emphasis) 
(Richards, 2010, p. 115). Thus, in each case categorisation is based on real 
features of the observed objects, but the groupings are made in an arbitrary 
fashion. Essentially, this is how Darwin perceived Linnaean classification, 
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deeming the difference between species and varieties arbitrary. This approach 
corresponds with the theory of social construction of meaning, since social 
functions of these objects are included into the definition of the notion. 
Ontological pluralism is another formulation of species mentioned by Richards 
(2010). According to this proposal species category is heterogeneous ‘and 
includes different kinds of things’ (Richards, 2010, p. 117). Thus, according to 
this view, a plurality of definitions of species in not only acceptable, but also 
necessary. For example, Hey (2001, p. 10) reports how in field-biology a set of 
terms was developed to categorise various groups of closely related plants 
(e.g., gamodeme, topodeme, ecodeme). He further reports that these words 
‘were created with clear meanings, and they are sometimes used to 
considerable effect, vastly clarifying  discussion that would be more muddled if 
only species were used.’  
A similar formulation describes species on two separate levels: as theoretical 
and operational concepts. Richards (2010, p. 119) describes this approach as 
hierarchical pluralism. This view does not see species as necessarily a category 
of different kinds, as in ontological pluralism, but rather differentiates theoretical 
and practical definitions. This exemplified by applying working definitions of the 
term species for particular analysis while assuming that all different definitions 
of the practical concept define together the theoretical concept. This approach 
has similarities with discourse construction of meaning (see Section 2.2) where 
the meaning of a word is seen as a totality of its uses in discourse.  
From these different formulations of species, we can observe that the goal of 
most of these approaches was to establish a unifying definition. Hey (2001, p. 
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12) argues that there ‘is a partially hidden consensus that we are all trying to 
explain the same thing and that we can only partly see that thing.’ Regardless of 
their ‘true reality’, species certainly exist as categories in language, which we 
can focus on in our analyses. In this sense Hey (2001, p. 107) states that the 
definitions of species:  
‘whether or not any or all of them match up well with real evolving 
entities out there in nature, they are all categories, each and every 
one has been devised by a person or persons as a way to help 
organize our understanding about biological diversity.’  
From the history of the debate on the species problem, we can argue that the 
meaning of the term species has hitherto been a product of negotiation in 
discourse. Some of the problems and interpretations that Darwin faced may 
have been lost from the debate, but the principle of reaching a consensus to 
form a working definition of species has remained to this day. All the advances 
in science did not help to resolve the issue and unify the definitions, but rather 
added new interpretations to the debate.  
 
2.4.3 Summary 
The aim of this section was to review the historical contexts of Charles Darwin’s 
research and the species problem in order to support the argument for the 
analysis of the process of meaning negotiation using the word species.  
The review of the historical contexts of Darwin’s research and the species 
problem demonstrated that the meaning of the term species has been 
negotiated for centuries. The purpose of reviewing the history of the species 
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problem was to show that scientific progress on the matter did not end the 
debate on the meaning of the term nor brought it closer to resolution. Hilary 
Putnam (1979) argued that the authority for the meaning of certain terms in 
discourse is assigned to the relevant specialist, whom we come to for 
explanation. However, questioning a multitude of experts will often, if not 
always, result in a multitude of interpretations. Scientific discoveries and 
attempts at reformulating the definition of the word species has always resulted 
in new interpretations added to the discourse. As Hey (2001, p. 9) summarised: 
‘Darwin has left us stranded on a word, and modern biologists are semantic 
castaways, trapped with a word of little common meaning, struggling to fix the 
situation by puzzling their way out of it.’ Thus, the history of the species problem 
has shown that the meaning of species is not contained in any single 
interpretation, but rather in the sum of these interpretations. In other words, to 
study the meaning of a word like species it is necessary to study its 
interpretations in discourse.  
On the other hand, the review of the historical context of Darwin’s research 
demonstrated that Darwin’s theory of species was formed gradually over two 
decades before its publication. As his ideas contradicted the main 
interpretations of species, Darwin negotiated his theory with fellow-minded 
researchers in order to find supporters before publicising his ideas. However, 
due to his health problems, much of the discussion was confined to written 
correspondence, which makes it a significant resource for the study of meaning 
negotiation.  
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To conclude, the focus on the word species is justified by the fact that the notion 
was central to Darwin’s theory. Focusing on Darwin’s correspondence to 
observe the negotiations of meaning is justified by the extensive discussions 
spanning more than two decades before Darwin published his theory. For these 
reasons, the study of Darwin’s correspondence is a valid approach to observe 
how Darwin’s own interpretation of the meaning of species was negotiated.  
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3 Research Framework 
3.1 Introduction  
The theoretical position and the research framework presented in this thesis are 
based on the conclusions drawn in the literature review. Specifically, the 
research framework is based on the theoretical assumption that linguistic 
meaning is both constructed and realised in discourse.  
The first part of this chapter focuses on combining the conclusions of the 
literature review with the approaches in Corpus Linguistics and its practice of 
investigating discourse with the aim of analysing various aspects of language.  
In this section, the theoretical assumptions of discursive meaning construction 
are related to the theoretical positions and research practices of investigating 
large amounts of discourse data with the purpose of analysing various aspects 
of language.  
The second part focuses on developing a research framework based on specific 
approaches and methods used in Corpus Linguistics which support the 
theoretical assumptions developed in the literature review. In particular, this 
section addresses the practical aspects how the meaning of words can be 
analysed in discourse, how the processes of meaning negotiation and 
construction can be observed, and how to observe the diachronic dimension of 
meaning. 
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3.2 Theoretical position 
The general theoretical and methodological approach in this thesis is based on 
the British approach to Corpus Linguistics, particularly the Birmingham 
approach to the study of language. The approach is characterised by the 
corpus-driven analysis (Hunston, 2002), its focus on the relation between lexis 
and grammar (Hunston & Francis, 2000), questioning the use of corpus 
annotation and the focus on collocation in the study of contextual meaning 
(Sinclair, 1991; Sinclair & Carter, 2004; Teubert, 2005; Teubert & Cermáková, 
2007) (for a general overview of different approaches in corpus linguistics see 
McEnery & Hardie, 2012).  
The theoretical position positing the construction of meaning through 
negotiation in discourse is largely influenced by the theories of dialogism and 
intertextuality (See Section 2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon), and is 
mostly compatible with corpus linguistics theory and methodology. Namely, the 
analysis of large amounts of linguistic data makes no assumption on discourse 
external meanings and facts, with the only aspect of the analysis being what is 
and can be observed in discourse. This is the theoretical approach outlined by 
Teubert (2005) with the purpose of applying corpus methodology in the study of 
meaning.  
As discussed in Section 2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon, it has been 
demonstrated by corpus analysis that the meaning of words is determined by 
the linguistic contexts they occur in (Sinclair, 1991; 2004). Furthermore, corpus 
linguistics has managed to observe meaningful patterns and relations between 
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lexis and grammar (Hoey, 2005; Hunston & Francis, 2000). Such developments 
in corpus linguistics allowed linguists to analytically approach the issue of 
meaning and make significant developments in the field of lexicography. Thus, 
as Teubert states (2001, p. 136) the assumption that meaning of texts ‘can be 
found solely in discourse’ became the basic tenet of corpus linguistics. 
With respect to meaning construction, the theoretical framework is based 
dialogic theories of language, such as Bakhtin’s (1986; 1994) notions of 
dialogism and heteroglossia, as well as Kristevan and Barthesian notions of 
intertextuality (Barthes & Heath, 1977; Kristeva & Moi, 1986) (see section 2.1.2 
for a detailed overview). Specifically, as corpus linguistics is an analytical 
discipline, for a theory of meaning construction it was necessary to review the 
philosophical formulations of meaning construction. The main aspect of these 
theories is that they abandon the monologic approach of traditional grammarian 
where the utterance is always considered in isolation. For Bakhtin, Kristeva and 
Barthes meaning is realised in dialogic encounters in which the interpretations 
of meaning are constantly exchanged and through which new meanings arise.  
Thus language has not only a dialogic, but also a diachronic dimension, leading 
Teubert (2010, p. 216) to conclude that ‘[m]eaning is the result of adding, over 
time, one interpretation on top of the other.’  
To conclude, the propositions of dialogic and intertextual theories are 
complemented by current corpus methodologies and discoveries. For example, 
Teubert (2010) argues that the process of reinterpretation of previous meanings 
can be observed in discourse as an act of paraphrase. Furthermore, as 
paraphrases imply a degree of lexical repetition, the more common and 
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accepted meaning will be easily identified through the analysis of collocation. 
Also, apart from the lexical repetition, intertextual relations of interpretations can 
be identified in discourse through reference markers. And finally, the diachronic 
dimension can analysed by observing all of these elements of meaning 
construction in historically or diachronically marked data sets. 
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3.3. Research framework 
3.3.1 Collocation and Paraphrase 
As stated in the theoretical position, collocation and paraphrase are for corpus 
linguists key elements for the study of meaning in discourse. Collocations show 
which words typically co-occur together and thus in a way identify contexts, in 
the sense of immediate textual environment, in which these words occur in. 
Collocations in Sinclair’s (1991) terms are simply words that frequently co-occur 
with one another. They are usually identified using statistical methods, since the 
most frequent words in a language are usually the so-called ‘grammar words’ 
(Hunston, 2002), which make up the most frequent collocates of almost any 
word. For this purpose a variety of statistical methods are used; for example, t-
score statistics is used to measure the ‘certainty’ of a collocation  (Hunston, 
2002, p. 73), meaning that the selected words co-occur together more 
frequently than it is statistically expected; on the other hand, Mutual Information 
(MI) score measures collocations that tend to co-occur exclusively, giving a 
measure of the strength of collocation (ibid). Although there are other statistical 
measures which are employed in calculating collocations, t-score and MI score 
are the only ones included in this thesis. 
Apart from identifying context in which words frequently occur, the study of 
collocations can also unveil ‘hidden’ meanings of particular lexical combinations 
which are realised as semantic preference (Stubbs, 2001:65) or semantic 
prosody (Louw, 1993). These are essentially interpretational cues that ascribe 
certain implied and hidden meanings to particular word combinations. For 
99 
 
example, Sinclair (1991) discusses the collocation ‘break out’, which usually 
denotes negative meanings, e.g. ‘fire broke out’, ‘disaster breaks out’, etc.  Thus 
a study of collocations in context can unveil meanings which may be beyond the 
intuition of the speaker and it is only through the analysis of large amounts of 
discourse data that these meanings can be observed.  
Teubert (2005, p. 5) argues that statistical approaches play an important role in 
identifying the recurrent features in language allowing linguists to make general 
statements about language, however, on their own, statistics are not sufficient 
to study the linguistic meaning. Instead, Teubert (2005) suggests that the study 
of meaning can be achieved in terms of analysing paraphrases as 
interpretations of meaning. The most prototypical examples of explanation in 
the form of paraphrase can be found in dictionary definitions (Teubert, 2010, p. 
219). Thus, paraphrase acts as a form of explanation, explication or 
(re)interpretation of particular lexical items (Teubert, 2005). Discourse is 
abundant with such paraphrases where speakers will explicitly state their 
interpretations of certain meanings. Furthermore, in the dialogic encounter 
these interpretations will be negotiated in the act of paraphrase where the 
agreed notions will be repeated and new information added into the discourse. 
Thus, Hunston (2002, p. 38) argues that paraphrases, as statements which 
express interpretations of meaning, can sometimes be more useful in corpus 
linguistics than the traditional statistical approach.  
Paraphrases, being utterances made in relation to previous discourse, 
necessarily have a diachronic dimension, which makes them ideal objects for 
the study of the diachronic change of meaning. Furthermore, the dialogic aspect 
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of paraphrase implies that the paraphrased content is often intertextual, i.e. 
modifying other interpretations. This is supported by Koteyko (2006, p. 150) 
who argues that the study of paraphrase allows a ‘detailed and documented 
diachronic analysis of intertextuality.’  In this sense, Teubert (2005, p. 12) 
concludes that paraphrases are the crucial element for the corpus-driven theory 
of meaning.  
3.3.2 Intertextuality 
Formulation and negotiation of meaning in discourse takes the form of 
paraphrase which involves reformulation of previous discourse in a new 
utterance. In other words, negotiation and interpretation of meaning can only 
occur as reactions to previous formulations. Thus, as Bakhtin (1986, p. 72) 
argued, one cannot understand an utterance as unconnected to previous 
utterances or works. In this sense, paraphrase implies intertextuality, since only 
the previous and known discourse can be paraphrased.  
For this reason, the research on negotiation of meaning is inherently based on 
intertextual and dialogical theories (see Section 2.1.2 Language as a social 
phenomenon for a detailed review) which define discourse as the place or 
process where meaning is realised. Namely, the theory of dialogism (Bakhtin, et 
al., 1986; Bakhtin, et al., 1994; Dentith, 1995) argues that meaning is only 
realised in concrete utterance between discourse participants. Specifically, 
meaning is realised by the interpreter of the message rather than the speaker. 
As any utterance makes response to a previous utterance and is calculated to 
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be responded to in turn (Bakhtin, et al., 1994, p. 35), meanings are perpetually 
reinterpreted and renegotiated in discourse. 
The notion of dialogism is adopted and further developed by Julia Kristeva 
(1986) and later by Roland Barthes (1968; 1977) into the theory of 
intertextuality, which defines all utterances in discourse as interconnected to 
one another. Simplified, the theory implies that meaning is formed of a totality of 
interpretations in discourse.  
This view is taken by Teubert (2005), who argues that meaning of individual 
words can be observed as a totality of their uses in discourse. Thus, any 
utterance can be viewed as a definition of meaning since it presupposes that it 
is an interpretation of the previous meanings. In other words, any utterance is 
effectively a paraphrase of meaning (Teubert, 2010).  
By observing paraphrases of previous meanings, it is implied intertextual 
relations can be observed too. Namely, as intertextuality is realised in 
paraphrases, it is usually marked by lexical repetitions of some form. In this 
sense, Stubbs (2005, p. 21) argues that intertextual relations can be discovered 
by recurrent phrasal patterns. Since, lexical collocations are products of 
repetition in discourse, they are inherently intertextual constructions. A similar 
conclusion is made by Cheung (2009, p. 111) who argues that implicit 
intertextuality is realised in lexical collocations.   
The theoretical position in this thesis is that intertextuality is the cause of lexical 
repetitions and that all paraphrases are inherently intertextual. Intertextuality is 
realised in, and hence marked by, both the paraphrase and lexical repetitions 
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realised as collocations. Alternatively, intertextuality can be marked by so-called 
intertextuality markers, which explicitly identify intertextual links to other 
discourse. For example, Cheung (2009, p. 103) lists the following intertextual 
markers in her analysis: (I) agree with (X), same as X, according to X, as/what 
X (said), as/what X (mentioned), all of us, (I) share as (X), and other than. In my 
research, the markers of intertextuality were identified manually by analysing all 
the paragraphs and lines in which the term species appeared.  
3.3.3 Diachronic analysis 
The study of the construction of meaning based on the theory of intertextuality 
inherently has to include a diachronic analysis. Teubert (2010, p. 216), in this 
sense, argues ‘[m]eaning is the result of adding, over time, one interpretation on 
top of the other. The discourse has of necessity a diachronic dimension. ’  
Different interpretations gain on importance by being accepted and repeated by 
the members of the discourse community. Items of meaning that are repeated 
act like ‘memes’ as described by Dawkins (2006), and like successful genes, 
they remain successful as long as they are repeated. This repetition is realised 
in a paraphrase, thus it is characterised by an admixture of new interpretation. 
Intertextuality assures that there is no true repetition only re-interpretation, 
which brings out the diachronic dimension of meaning.  As Dawkins (2006) 
argued, in terms of evolution, fecundity is the most important aspect. Thus 
meaning evolves through reinterpretation. Once the reinterpretation stops, no 
matter how successful the gene or meme was up to that point it quickly 
disappears and gets replaced by another (Dawkins, 2006). Dawkins’ meme 
103 
 
theory forms an important aspect of the diachronic dimension of meaning. 
Namely, the notion of meme corresponds with the notion of interpretations, thus 
interpretations which have formed the meaning of a term at one point in time, 
may no longer be a part of the discourse. In that aspect, linguistic meaning is 
never stable or finite. 
There has been little work on the study of diachronic change of meaning, 
particularly on the processes that drive that change, i.e. the negotiation of 
meaning. Partington (2013) reports on several analyses which essentially 
compared historical corpora, but in terms of a more fluid approach to diachronic 
analysis there has been little research done, particularly in the field of corpus 
linguistics. 
Cheung’s (2009) research is closely related to this one as her research focuses 
on analysing the paraphrases of meaning in a diachronic dimension and 
observing the types of paraphrases that cause the diachronic meaning change. 
However, Cheung’s (2009) diachronic approach is realised as a sequential 
analysis of meaning negotiation and does not observe if any of the 
interpretations get abandoned by the community.   
An alternative approach to a diachronic analysis is to observe how and when 
certain paraphrases enter discourse, how they are interpreted and how long 
they remain in the focus of discourse. This approach takes a cue from Maturana 
and Varela (1980) who argue that once an autopoietic system like discourse 
stops reproducing it naturally ceases to exist. When this is applied to the 
interpretation of meaning, the diachronic dimension has to include in its scope 
the fecundity of interpretations.  
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The cue for the diachronic analysis comes from Ute Römer’s (2010) approach 
to the study of phraseological patterns in terms of their distribution in textual 
segments. Namely, by applying the same empirical approach in a diachronic 
corpus and the analysis focusing on the negotiation of meaning, it is possible to 
observe the ‘life’ of interpretations in discourse. The study of paraphrases in a 
corpus “allows a detailed and documented diachronic analysis of intertextual 
links that uniquely characterise any text segment in the focus of analysis” 
(Koteyko, 2006, p. 150). 
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the issue of meaning construction is 
addressed by using corpus linguistic analyses of collocation, paraphrases and 
intertextual markers. As the theoretical framework clearly places the meaning 
construction in discourse and context, and the analytical work in corpus 
linguistics has so far demonstrated the dependency of meaning on context, 
corpus linguistics is the ideal method to approach the analysis of the 
construction of meaning in discourse.  
This chapter describes in detail the method of collecting and organising data for 
the analysis, the methodology used to analyse the data as well as the 
computational tools used to perform the analysis. Thus, the first section of this 
chapter describes the methods used to collect the data and build the corpus of 
correspondence, the organisation of the corpus as well as the statistical 
information about data included in the corpus. The second section describes in 
detail the methods used in the research and how they were adapted for the 
diachronic analysis. Finally, the third section discusses the tools and 
procedures used in the research.  
 
4.2 On the Corpus 
Thus far, corpus linguistics methods have been generally applied to observe 
language from a synchronous perspective. On the other hand, the diachronic 
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approaches in corpus linguistics were usually limited to comparing different 
historical corpora in order to analyse how language changed (See Section 3.3.3 
Diachronic analysis). However, for the purpose of this research, it is not 
necessary to develop completely new methods for a diachronic approach to 
discourse, but rather to compile the corpus in a way that will represent a 
diachronic account of discourse. Thus, a corpus of correspondence was ideal 
for such purpose. 
The Darwin Correspondence Corpus was compiled using resources on the 
Darwin Correspondence Project (Cambridge, 2013) which has made most of 
the correspondence of Charles Darwin available online. The corpus used for 
this analysis contains a significant proportion of these letters with a focus on 
Darwin’s scientific work rather than personal letters. This selection was 
achieved by searching only for the letters containing the key terms of Darwin’s 
scientific work, namely: species, varieties, natural selection, evolution and 
descent, as well as their lemma and verb forms, e.g. vary, variety, descend, etc.  
The whole corpus consists of 40,002 word types amounting to 1,167,555 word 
tokens, thus making it as large as some general language corpora, e.g. Brown 
and Lancaster–Oslo–Bergen (LOB), each of which is consists of one million 
word tokens. The corpus comprises 2,096 letters both written by and addressed 
to Charles Darwin, which date from June 1828 to late December 1852. The 
letters are mostly ordered in chronological order and are coded in the same 
manner as on the Darwin Correspondence Project website. In particular, each 
letter is numbered in a way that corresponds with its chronological order in the 
correspondence. Occasionally, the numbering of the letters does not match the 
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date; however, the size of the corpus is sufficiently large to account for that 
issue. For example, the key term, species, occurs more than 5,000 times; thus, 
a few inconsistently placed letters will not influence the analysis significantly.  
In addition to the main corpus, a smaller sub-corpus consisting of only the 
paragraphs containing the word species has been complied for the purpose of 
investigating the markers of intertextuality. The whole corpus, which is in size 
comparable to general language corpora, contains a very high frequency of 
intertextual markers, most of which are not relevant to this research as they 
refer to numerous aspects of Darwin’s life. On the other hand, eliminating all the 
intertextual markers which do not have the word species as part of their 
sentence would eliminate many relevant intertextual markers, which in their 
immediate context are related to the negotiation of the meaning of the term. For 
these reasons, paragraph was chosen as the relevant unit for this analysis. 
Furthermore, by choosing paragraphs which contain the word species, the main 
aspects of the research have remained comparable as the number of 
occurrences of the term species is identical in the main and the sub-corpus. 
 
4.3 Research tools  
As the analytical tool for analysing corpus in terms of concordances, collocation 
analysis and paraphrase analysis, AntConc 3.2.3w (Anthony, 2011) corpus 
access software is used. AntConc has all the features necessary for the 
analysis in this thesis built into the default software package. Furthermore, it 
allows for the search of the corpus using an extensive list of wildcards as well 
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as regular expressions which makes the search for particular paraphrases more 
efficient.  
Apart from the methods of analysis used in this research, presented above, 
AntConc supports several other methods for corpus analysis, such as n-gram 
viewer, labelled as ‘clusters’ function in the program, file view, keyword analysis 
and concordance plot. File view is a function allowing, as the name suggests, 
the search of within the data file, thus allowing the observation of the whole 
context rather than just observing concordances. Keyword analysis allows for 
the calculation of keywords by including a reference corpus in the search. 
Finally, concordance plot shows the distribution of the search terms in the data 
files, presented as a white long bar representing the file, on which vertical black 
lines represent occurrences respective to the location in the file.    
 
4.4 Methods 
This section describes the methods and procedures used in the analysis, most 
of which are firmly grounded in corpus linguistic methodology and include the 
most ubiquitous methods such as key-word-in-context (KWIC) concordances 
and collocation analysis.  
The key-word-in-context concordance is one of the oldest and most common 
tools in corpus linguistics and is realised as a line of text with the search term, 
also known as the node, centred so that context can be observed on either side 
of the node (Sinclair, 1991, p. 115). This is particularly useful for observing the 
immediate context of the search term, which allows for quick observations of 
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general patterns the search term occurs in. For example, just by searching for 
the word species in the corpus and sorting the concordances by the 
alphabetical order of the words occurring immediately to the left of the node, we 
can have a quick glance at the most frequent adjective modifying the node. 
Thus, this type of concordance is efficient for probing the text or refining search 
terms which produce too many irrelevant concordances. 
Collocation analysis can be defined as statistical analysis of key-words-in-
context concordances with the goal to determine which words co-occur with the 
node word most significantly within a set search span. Thus, Hoey (1991, pp. 6-
7) defines collocation as a statistically significant co-occurrence of two or more 
words. The most ubiquitous statistics used to calculate the strength of 
collocations in corpus linguistics, also used in this thesis, are the t-score and 
Mutual Information, or MI-score.  
T-score analysis is described by Hunston (2002, p. 73) as ‘a measure of 
certainty of collocation’, in comparison to MI-score which was described as a 
‘measure of strength of collocation’ (ibid). Hunston’s definition is based on the 
fact that t-score is more affected by the size of the corpus, or more accurately 
the frequency of the words calculated, since the most frequent words in 
language tend to occur more often in larger than in smaller corpora. As t-score 
is calculated based on the frequency of the item within a corpus, in larger 
corpora this value will be disproportionately higher thus affecting the t-score 
value. Thus, Hunston (ibid) describes it as a measure of certainty, since the 
higher value indicates that particular node frequently co-occurs with the 
collocate.  However, if the node and the collocate were swapped, the t-score 
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would become inversely proportionate, as the very frequent word would be 
compared with a word it does not co-occur with as often. On the other hand, MI-
score is calculated proportionate to the relative frequency, which indicates 
which words ‘strongly’ collocate with one another, but it does not show the most 
frequent collocates of the node.  
In addition to these methods, as this research focusses on wider contexts 
needed for the study of paraphrase, which cannot be always easily observed in 
KWIC concordances, the research also uses sentences and paragraphs as 
concordances. Simply put, these are extracted sentences, and sometimes 
whole paragraphs, which contain one or more search terms though they are not 
centred around the node word, as the focus is on wider rather than immediate 
context. For simplicity, I will use the term ‘paraphrase’ to refer to these types of 
concordances since they coincide with the theoretical definition of paraphrase 
defined by Teubert (2007, 2010) (see Section 2.3.2 Paraphrases of terms for 
more details).  
These corpus methods are applied in four main methodological procedures 
necessary to answer the research question outlined in the introduction to this 
thesis, which include: collocation analysis, paraphrase analysis, analysis of 
intertextual markers and diachronic analysis of paraphrase. 
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4.4.1 Collocation Analysis 
The first analysis essentially consists of comparing the collocations of the terms 
species and varieties. All collocation analyses in this thesis have been 
conducted using the 5x5 word span with a minimum required frequency of at 
least five instances of collocation, thus ensuring the comparability of the results. 
Furthermore, in all analyses all the characters were treated as lowercase to 
avoid distinguishing the capitalised forms as separate.  
One important aspect of this comparison is in the nature of these two terms. For 
the term species the singular and the plural form cannot be distinguished. On 
the other hand, that is not the case with the term varieties which also exhibits 
the singular form variety. Although both variants were included in the analysis, 
only the plural variants will be presented in the collocation. The reason for this 
omission is that the analysis using the singular form variety identified examples 
usually referring to a particular variety of some plant or animal, e.g. a variety of 
the garden pea.  
The collocations of the terms are calculated, first for t-score values then for MI-
score. From the results of the collocation analysis based on t-score calculation, 
the twenty top ranked ‘content’ words are extracted for the purpose of 
comparing the meaning of the terms. Function words, e.g. the, of, that, are not 
included in the analysis because, outside the context of the utterance, i.e. as 
items with a statistical value, they cannot give any insight into the kind of 
particular meaning they may form in context. Furthermore, as both search 
species and varieties are likely to collocate frequently with function words, there 
is no reason to compare their values.  
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For the calculation of Mutual Information (MI) score there were no function 
words to exclude from the results; only in the results for the term species, a 
contraction ‘Compos.’ was removed from the list of twenty highest ranking 
collocations, as it is a proper noun indicating the name of the species 
(Composite – a type of flower).  
Furthermore, the results of collocation analyses are examined in detail and 
compared in the contrastive analysis, where collocates of one node were tested 
against the contrasting node. For example, distinct as a strong collocate of 
species was used as the node to test its co-occurrence with the lemma 
variety/varieties.  
The contrastive analysis has been conducted using regular expressions as 
queries accounting for the same span as collocation because the AntConc 
collocation query tool does not list the concordances of identified collocations 
automatically, rather when choosing a specific collocate it makes a new 
concordance line of all its instances in the corpus. Fortunately, the program 
supports regular expressions and counts the instances of all concordances 
found, thus performing the same task.   
For the purpose of contrastive analysis the exhaustive list of collocations, 
included in Appendices 1 and 2, have been examined, not just the twenty 
highest ranking results from the first two analyses. This is because the aim of 
the analysis is to contrast the meanings of species and varieties, hence a more 
exhaustive list is needed. Finally, the results of the analysis are tabulated to 
stress the differences between the meanings of the two terms. 
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4.4.2 Paraphrase analysis 
Observing meaning in general language is too broad to be comprehensive, 
thus, Römer (2010) argues, taking cue from Firth (1968), that meaning should 
be only analysed in specialised or restricted discourse. The correspondence of 
Charles Darwin can be described as relatively restricted and specialised 
discourse. However, as mentioned previously (see section 4.2 On the Corpus), 
the corpus of Darwin’s correspondence is comparable in size to some general 
language corpora. Using the definition of paraphrase as all instances of the use 
of a particular linguistic item implies a manual analysis of 5,375 instances of the 
term species. 
To avoid manually reading through all 2,096 letters, a sub-corpus of all the 
paragraphs containing the word species has been examined for the explicit 
definitions of the word. This includes utterances expressing definitions of  
meaning, disagreements on the definition or different interpretations, joint or 
individual attempts at defining the term etc., which have been extracted for the 
analysis. This interpretation of the notion of paraphrase focuses only on the 
explicit attempts of defining and negotiating the meaning. The aim of this 
analysis is to illustrate that language is abundant in, and depends on definitions 
of meaning. On the other hand, paraphrases in the broader sense are observed 
in the analyses of intertextual relations between the interpretations of species.   
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4.4.3 Intertextuality Markers 
As mentioned in the previous section, all the paraphrases of the term species 
had to be manually analysed in order to identify the paraphrases expressing 
explicit definitions of meaning. The same process was applied to identify the 
recurrent markers of intertextuality. However, unlike the paraphrases 
expressing the definitions of meaning, for the purpose of extracting frequent 
markers of intertextuality, the paraphrases were merely sampled for recurrent 
intertextuality markers. Once an exhaustive list of markers had been identified 
they were extracted automatically from the corpus using regular expressions.   
After examining the paraphrases of the term species, several markers of 
intertextuality have been observed:  
 (aware* + with| about| on| which| whether| that| of),  
 (agree*| disagree* + with | about| on| which | whether |that),  
 (what + say* | say* + about| on| that),  
 (object + to | objection to),  
 (in regard to | regarding),  
 (to hear about| that|of|),  
 (heard of + the| a| an| some| that| those| these),  
 (according to),  
 (ask* + that| if| about| whether |which| how),  
 (state*| mention* + that),  
 (discussion| proposal| hypothesis| assertion + on | about).  
As described in the previous section, for this purpose a sub-corpus of 
paragraphs containing the word species was used for this purpose. After all the 
markers had been identified, they were extracted into separate files which are 
included in the Appendices. However, it is important to stress that in the 
appendices included in this thesis, all of the longer paragraphs have been 
shortened, for the sake of brevity. In certain cases that resulted in the word 
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species being omitted from the paragraphs included appendices.  Finally, the 
intertextuality markers were then analysed separately for their function in the 
process of meaning negotiation. 
  
4.4.4 Diachronic analysis 
Diachronic analysis has been implemented using collocations based on the MI-
score calculations. Thus it represents a corpus driven approach to the study of 
diachronic meaning negotiation. It is based on the theoretical framework that 
interprets all collocations and paraphrases as products of intertextuality.  
The analysis is conducted using AntConc concordance plot tool and observes 
the distribution of lexical collocation throughout the correspondence.  
The first step of the analysis is based on the results of the MI-score analysis, in 
which collocates with a high MI-score were chosen for the diachronic analysis. 
T-score analysis has not been used for collocate selection because these 
collocates include very frequent words that are usually evenly distributed in 
discourse.  
Ten collocations were chosen for the analysis and analysed for their distribution 
in the corpus. Points of high concentration were defined as ‘topic hotspots’ and 
these were investigated for possible marks of intertextual relationship.  
Apart from identifying intertextual relations and evidence of meaning 
negotiation, this analysis also allowed for a full overview of the ‘life’ of a 
particular collocation. That is, using concordance plot it was possible to observe 
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exactly at which point in discourse particular collocation entered discourse, the 
number of times it was discussed, the already mentioned ‘topic hotspots’ which 
indicate a higher rate of a particular interpretation possibly signalising 
interpersonal discussion, and finally when the collocation stopped being 
discussed in the discourse.  
A similar analysis has been conducted by Kehoe and Gee (Kehoe & Gee, 2009) 
who have observed the diachronic distribution of the phrase ‘credit crunch’ in 
Google News from 1985 to 2008. They have identified collocates of the phrase 
using z-score and analysed the values diachronically to identify collocational 
‘heat maps’ using heat ‘as a metaphor for collocational strength’(Kehoe & Gee, 
2009, p. 267). Similarly to their research, this analysis observes particular 
interpretations as they occur and disappear from discourse. However, the 
difference between the two approaches is that the focus of the analysis 
presented in this thesis is not to provide a diachronic overview of which 
collocates occurred at a particular time in language history, but rather to 
observe the process they were negotiated. 
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5 Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the linguistic analysis of meaning 
construction. The chapter is divided into sections focussing on the collocation 
analysis, paraphrase analysis and the diachronic analysis of meaning 
negotiation.  
The goal of the first analysis is to identify the most common interpretations of 
meaning of the terms species and varieties. These interpretations will be used 
in subsequent analyses to observe the processes of diachronic change and 
negotiation of meaning. The methodology used in this section corresponds to 
the traditional methodology used in corpus linguistics and lexicography. 
Namely, the section presents the analysis of collocation of the search terms for 
the purpose of analysing the contextual environments that define their meaning. 
This analysis is supported by a contrastive analysis of the key collocations with 
the aim of demonstrating how even the closely related terms can be clearly 
distinguished in discourse. 
The goal of the second analysis is to demonstrate that paraphrase as an act of 
interpretation is a collective phenomenon. In other words, the goal of the 
analysis is to demonstrate that meaning is a product of negotiation in discourse. 
Building on the theories of dialogism and intertextuality, the analysis aims 
demonstrate that paraphrases which define the meaning of the term are 
phrased in relation to one another and in a way that they incite further response, 
i.e. further paraphrases.  
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The third analysis focuses on the so-called intertextual markers, which are 
words that explicitly invoke other texts in the process of formulation of new 
meaning through paraphrase. The aim of this analysis is to observe the manner 
in which other texts are invoked in the act of paraphrase and the function these 
intertextual links perform. 
The final analysis observes the diachronic aspect of collaborative negotiation of 
meaning. This analysis focuses of the diachronic distribution of the key 
interpretations of the term species identified by the collocation analysis. The aim 
of this analysis is to observe how and when particular interpretations enter 
discourse, how they are negotiated in the discourse, and how long they remain 
in the discourse. 
 
5.2 Collocation analysis 
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, this section covers the analysis of 
collocations which are used to demonstrate that meaning of words can be 
determined from the context in which they occur. In particular, the analysis is 
focussed on the meaning of the term species as the central concept in Charles 
Darwin’s correspondence and scientific work.  
In addition to the term species, the analysis of collocation, presented at the 
beginning of this section, includes the term varieties, and its singular form, with 
the aim to distinguish the meanings of these terms by comparing and 
contrasting their collocation patterns. For Charles Darwin, the meaning of these 
terms was not always clearly distinguished, which can be observed both in his 
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publication and his correspondence. Thus, by comparing the collocation 
patterns the meaning of both terms will be contrasted. 
The analysis is conducted in two stages; firstly the collocations of both terms 
are tested for their frequency, t-score value, and Mutual Information value. 
These statistical values offer us insight into most frequent and most 
characteristic collocations respectively. Thus we can immediately make 
observations of both the similarities and differences between these two terms.  
This is followed by a contrasting analysis of collocations which consists of 
analysing how frequent collocates of one term collocate with the other. In other 
words, the aim is to identify and group collocates that tend to collocate more 
with only one of the terms.  
 
5.2.1 Frequency collocations 
Regarding frequency and t-score values, the most frequent collocates usually 
consist of so-called grammatical terms, such as determiners ‘the’ and ‘a’, 
various prepositions and pronouns. These usually occupy the first 10-20 most 
frequent collocates of virtually all words in English language. As species and 
varieties are very close in both the meaning and the structures they appear in, 
these grammatical and generally ubiquitous words do not contribute much to 
this particular collocation analysis. Thus, the twenty most frequent lexical items 
are included in the frequency list, whereas grammatical words are omitted. The 
results shown below in Table 1 present a list of the most frequent lexical items 
that collocate with the term species with their rank in the full list of collocations 
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indicated in the second column (for the full list of collocations see Table 1 in 
Appendix 1). 
Table 1: Twenty most frequent lexical collocations of the word species calculated in a 5x5 word span 
No. Rank Collocate Frequency t-score MI-score 
1  25 same 313 17.22498 5.24406 
2  27 genera 284 16.5936 6.02554 
3  28 some 281 15.74253 4.0379 
4  33 origin 254 15.74586 6.37883 
5  37 genus 221 14.6366 6.01758 
6  40 varieties 199 13.83848 5.71664 
7  44 distinct 188 13.53571 6.28693 
8  45 new 174 12.74488 4.88628 
9  50 different 166 12.55966 5.3115 
10  61 common 123 10.73065 4.94564 
11  62 each 121 10.67189 5.06716 
12  64 number 117 10.52554 5.21552 
13  67 found 113 10.12128 4.38474 
14  69 several 110 10.16722 5.03064 
15  72 allied 107 10.23905 6.62183 
16  80 few 94 9.09328 4.00926 
17  85 plants 88 8.4911 3.39828 
18  87 large 86 8.90031 4.63469 
19  90 work 84 7.33126 2.32125 
20  92 good 81 8.14219 3.39119 
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From Table 1 we can observe the words most frequently co-occurring in the 
span of five words to the left and right of the word species. These collocates 
define some of the most frequent uses, and hence meanings, of the term 
species.   
The results presented in Table 1 can be compared to the list of most frequent 
collocates of the word varieties in order to observe the difference in their 
general use. As with the term species, grammatical terms are omitted from the 
list, thus Table 2 below presents the list of the most frequent lexical collocates 
(the full list of collocates is included in Appendix 2). 
Table 2: Twenty most frequent lexical collocations of the word varieties calculated in a 5x5 word span 
No. Rank Collocate Frequency t-score MI-score 
1  5 species 199 13.83848 5.71664 
2  27 some 44 6.23884 4.07196 
3  30 same 37 5.87512 4.87255 
4  31 many 35 5.67676 4.62765 
5  33 domestic 34 5.79473 7.33071 
6  35 more 32 5.24167 3.76816 
7  42 different 29 5.26646 5.5035 
8  45 marked 28 5.25545 7.19727 
9  49 plants 27 4.95051 4.40279 
10  51 genera 27 5.06784 5.33973 
11  57 distinct 24 4.82382 6.02636 
12  63 forms 21 4.4569 5.18842 
13  65 intermediate 20 4.44112 7.17194 
14  70 several 18 4.12134 5.12826 
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15  72 new 18 4.03057 4.32232 
16  73 local 18 4.21891 7.48212 
17  74 crossing 18 4.20746 6.91407 
18  85 large 16 3.86764 4.91748 
19  86 cultivated 16 3.98187 7.78556 
20  87 crossed 16 3.96832 6.98021 
 
We can observe from Tables 1 and 2 that the words species and varieties 
collocate quite frequently with each other. Furthermore, the terms share 9 out of 
20 most frequent lexical collocates. Although the two terms appear to frequently 
collocate with one another, it seems that the contexts they generally occur in 
are sufficiently distinct to determine some specific differences in their meaning. 
For example, from Tables 1 and 2, we can observe that varieties are often 
described as ‘domestic’ and ‘local’; whereas species are described as ‘common’ 
or ‘allied’. We will examine these differences in more detail later in this chapter.   
Comparing the collocations solely on the basis of frequencies leads to the risk 
of unbalanced comparison since the word species is significantly more frequent 
in the corpus. Thus, the results can also be compared statistically in order to 
account to their general frequency, which is done by testing the collocations for 
their t-score (included in Tables 1 and 2). T-score analysis largely corresponds 
to the raw frequency rankings, where lexical words are concerned, as it can be 
observed in the Tables 1 and 2. This is largely due to the fact that lexical words 
follow a more normal distribution than grammatical words which tend to make 
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up most of the discourse. Thus, specific focus on the t-score values will not be 
discussed in this analysis.  
 
5.2.2 Mutual Information 
Mutual Information (MI) score describes the most characteristic collocations, i.e. 
ones which form the most ‘peculiar’ combinations and meanings. Specifically, 
MI-score ranks the words that most exclusively collocate with the search term. 
Thus, frequent words in discourse rarely occur on this list, as they tend to 
collocate with many other words. For the comparison of meaning of closely 
related terms such as species and varieties, MI-score is a very effective tool.  
The analysis of the collocations of species according to MI-score results in a 
much more specific list of words. The ranking of these words does not 
necessarily indicate that they are frequent collocates, but that these words 
collocate more frequently with the word species than other words in the corpus. 
The top twenty ranked collocates of the word species, according to MI-score, 
are shown in Table 3, below (for the full list consult Table 3 in Appendix 1). 
Table 3: Twenty highest MI-score ranked collocations of the word species, calculated in a 5x5 word span 
Rank Collocate MI-Score 
1  mutability 7.42197 
2  disjoined 7.3845 
3  immutability 7.26825 
4  representative 7.19911 
5  undescribed 6.83701 
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6  derivation 6.83701 
7  immutable 6.76301 
8  quasi 6.65609 
9  allied 6.62183 
10  inhabiting 6.54062 
11  identical 6.49998 
12  trimorphic 6.48999 
13  origin 6.37883 
14  endemic 6.32244 
15  distinct 6.28693 
16  presenting 6.17805 
17  ranges 6.1441 
18  describing 6.09316 
19  genera 6.02554 
20  genus 6.01758 
 
From Table 3 we can identify the most exclusive collocates of the term species, 
such as ‘(im)mutability’, ‘disjoined’, ’representative’, ‘undescribed’, ‘derivation’, 
etc.  
In the same fashion, the meaning of the term varieties can be further examined 
by observing the collocations of the term ranked on MI-score. Table 4 shows 
twenty highest ranked words on MI-score (for the full list consult Appendix 2).  
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Table 4: Twenty highest MI-score ranked collocations of the word varieties, calculated in a 5x5 word span 
Rank Collocate MI-Score 
1  quasi 8.47206 
2  maize 8.47206 
3  verbascum 8.27942 
4  abnormal 8.15014 
5  cultivated 7.78556 
6  presenting 7.62407 
7  fertility 7.48855 
8  local 7.48212 
9  station 7.43644 
10  wheat 7.41317 
11  modifications 7.39678 
12  domestic 7.33071 
13  marked 7.19727 
14  intermediate 7.17194 
15  peas 7.17089 
16  differently 7.01263 
17  crossed 6.98021 
18  crossing 6.91407 
19  normal 6.7496 
20  sterile 6.73871 
 
With the MI-score indicating the most characteristic collocates of each term, a 
comparison of the collocations of each of the terms contrasts their most specific 
usage. From Tables 3 and 4, we can observe that even with MI-score rankings, 
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there are certain similarities between these terms. However, the similarity is 
restricted to the prefix ‘quasi-‘ and the verb ‘presenting’. Thus, MI-score results 
provide us with collocates which define the meaning of these terms more 
narrowly. For example, we can conclude that particular species may be 
described as ‘distinct’, whereas varieties are more likely to be described as 
‘marked’. However, the analysis of collocations does not provide us directly with 
negative values, i.e. the words which do not occur frequently or score highly in 
the collocation span. Knowing that a particular collocation is not only strong for 
one term, but also non-existent with the other, provides a stark contrast of the 
meaning of these terms. In other words, such analysis will contrast how a 
particular word collocates both with the word species and varieties, thus 
allowing for a more critical analysis of their meanings. Such an analysis is 
comparable to keywords (Scott, 1997) analysis which compares the values of 
collocates between two corpora, whereas in this thesis the focus is on 
contrasting specific terms not corpora. . 
 
5.2.3 Contrasting Collocations 
In the previous section we have observed that the terms species and varieties 
are defined by a range of collocates. For example, species are realised as 
allied, close and true and are often discussed how they are descended, differed 
and described. Varieties, on the other hand, are described as crossed, mere, 
intermediate, etc. Furthermore, the results of the collocation analysis show a 
difference in the meaning which, in some aspects, exhibits a binary distinction 
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between the two terms. For example, ‘representative’ and ‘typical’ referring to 
species contrasts the ‘distinct’ and ‘marked’ of varieties. Here, species are 
described as being akin to the prototype, whereas varieties are marked for their 
difference from it. However, without contrasting these two patterns we cannot 
observe whether varieties can also be representative or typical and vice-versa.  
By examining the collocations of each of the terms in more detail (see Appendix 
1 for the list of all the collocations observed), we can observe several other 
binary distinctions which clearly separate the meaning of the two terms. The 
first of these binary distinctions to be analysed is the group of collocates that 
demonstrate varieties as a local phenomenon, in contrast to the more general 
and wider ranges of species. The second binary distinction distinguishes 
species as ‘natural’ and ‘wild’ phenomena in contrast to ‘domestic’ and 
‘cultivated’ varieties. The third distinction, which we have briefly discussed 
above, relates to species having typical and representative forms in contrast to 
distinct and marked varieties.  
The aim of this analysis is to demonstrate that closely related terms can be 
distinguished by contrasting their strongest collocates. This allows one to 
establish which collocates are mostly contrasted thus identifying the difference 
in the meaning of such closely related terms. Furthermore, this analysis will 
demonstrate that certain collocations are also semantically restricted to their 
respective terms. In other words, the analysis will show that words of similar 
meaning tend to collocate with the same nodes.   
 
128 
 
5.2.3.1 Contrasting collocations: wide and narrow 
Collocation analysis showed that species and varieties collocate contrastively 
with words denoting geographical ranges and locations.  The term species, for 
example, often collocates with adjectives denoting large geographical areas, 
such as continents and countries. For example, in Table 5 we can see that  
adjectives such as ‘African’, ‘American’, ‘Australian’, ‘European’, but also 
‘British’, ‘English’, ‘Galapageian’, and ‘Mediterranean’ are often found modifying 
the term species but not varieties. On the other hand, in the whole corpus, there 
is only one example each of adjectives ‘American’, ‘European’ and ‘Indian’ 
modifying the term varieties. Table 5 below shows the characteristic use of 
geographical adjectives modifying the terms species and varieties respectively. 
 
Table 5: Geographical expressions modifying the terms species and varieties 
 Collocation frequency 
Geographical modifier Species Varieties (lemma) 
African 7 0 
American 14 1 
Australian 7 0 
British 23 0 
English 8 1 
European 38 1 
Galapageian / Galapagan 5 0 
Indian 16 1 
Northern 17 0 
Southern 16 0 
129 
 
Apart from the examples presented in the table, adjectives ‘Californian’, 
‘Norwegian’ ‘Saharan’, ‘Sicilian’ and a few others can be found occasionally 
modifying the term species but not varieties. This implies that the meaning of 
species is related to larger geographical ranges. 
In contrast to the example above, the collocation analysis showed that varieties 
collocate frequently with geographical adjectives denoting narrower 
geographical ranges. For example, adjectives ‘domestic’, ‘garden’, and ‘local’ 
frequently collocate with the term varieties, but not as frequently with the term 
species. This is summarised in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Localised geographical adjectives modifying the terms species and varieties 
 Frequency 
Modifier Species Varieties (lemma) 
Domestic5 5 26 
Garden 1 9 
Local 4 24 
 
From the examples in Table 6 above, we can observe that the more localised 
geographical adjectives co-occur with the term varieties, five to nine times more 
frequently than with the term species. This has an even greater significance 
since the term species occurs in the corpus almost five times as often as the 
term varieties. Although there are a few examples where the term species 
collocates with the adjectives ‘local’ and ‘domestic’, generally the tendency is to 
                                              
5
 Used in the sense of local or national 
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collocate more frequently with adjectives denoting wider ranges, as noted in 
Tables 5 and 6 above. 
Furthermore, the term species collocates much more frequently with the phrase 
‘wide range(s)’ with a total of 19 co-occurrences, whereas the same phrase 
collocates only once with the term varieties. Even that one occurrence is a false 
positive as it relates to a ‘scope of variety’ rather than ‘ranges in which varieties 
are found’, as it can be observed in the example below: 
Example: 
1) Is it meant that Man found several canine species just on the 
verge of passing from permanent varieties into species & before 
they had diverged from some anterior ancestral type so far as to 
make frequent interbreeding impossible they were blended so as 
to produce a wider range of variety than would otherwise have 
come about. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2508f] 
Even when the adjective wide and its lemmas are removed from the query, the 
only other example we encounter where varieties collocate with ‘range’ is a 
question about their geographical distribution, as it can be seen in the example 
below. 
Example: 
2) Do you know whether anyone has ever published any remarks on 
the geographical range of varieties of Plants in comparison with 
the species, to which they are supposed to belong. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2218] 
Considering examples from Tables 5 and 6, as well as the examples relating to 
the expression of ‘wide range(s)’, we can conclude that generally in the 
discourse of Charles Darwin’s correspondence, the term species is used to 
refer to more widely distributed natural kinds than the term varieties. Thus, 
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although Darwin frequently described the distinction between the meaning of 
species and varieties as arbitrary and difficult to determine, the discourse of his 
correspondence indicates some significant patterns of their use in discourse. 
5.2.3.2 Contrasting collocations: natural and domestic  
In the previous section, we have observed that the term varieties is used to 
describe natural kinds that occur in narrow geographical areas. However, the 
adjective ‘domestic’, which was associated with the term varieties, also carries 
the connotation of ‘cultivated’ or ‘domesticated kinds’, which is contrasted to 
‘natural’ and ‘wild kinds’. This distinction is also confirmed in the corpus, where 
the term species tends to collocate with adjectives denoting ‘wild’ and ‘natural’ 
states or origins, and the term varieties denoting ‘domesticated’ and ‘cultivated’ 
kinds. Table 7 summarises these differences.  
Table 7: Adjectives denoting natural or domesticated states modifying the terms species and varieties 
 Frequency 
Modifier Species Varieties(lemma) 
natural 45 14 
wild 58 6 
domestic6 13 38 
cultivated 5 16 
 
From the examples shown in Table 7, we can see that the tendency for species 
to be described as ‘natural’ and ‘wild’ and varieties as ‘domestic’ and ‘cultivated’ 
                                              
6
 Meaning cultivated or domesticated 
132 
 
is not as definitive as the previous contrast between local and more global 
geographic description. However, if we take into consideration the paraphrases 
in discourse, we can notice from the context that some of these numbers are 
false positives. Take the following examples of ‘natural + varieties’ collocations 
into consideration: 
Examples: 
1) I have been comparing all the evidence which I can collect on the 
natural crossing of the varieties of cultivated Leguminosæ; 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2003] 
2) I have been lately collecting all the evidence which I can get from 
the observation of others and my own, on the natural crossing of 
varieties of plants. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2012] 
3) we still cannot but admit that, as a very general rule, species do 
not intermix in wild nature, as varieties of the same species 
(descendants from a common stock) we have every reason to 
think would do. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1760]  
 
In these examples we can observe that relying simply on calculating 
collocations can produce a few false positive results. Thus, in the Examples 1 
and 2 above ‘natural’ does not directly modify the term varieties and similarly, in 
the third example, ‘wild’ does not modify varieties. Similarly, although there are 
examples of ‘domestic species’ in the corpus, some of the collocates, when 
looked in more detail, do not modify the term species but coincidentally occur 
within the collocation span of the term.  
Examples: 
4) Besides this the close resemblance of at least three kinds of 
American domestic dogs, to wild species still inhabiting the 
countries where they are now domesticated, seems to almost 
compel admission that more than one wild Canis has been 
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domesticated by man.— [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
2543] 
5) In these mountains the domestic fowl is much more like the 
original jungle cock (possibly from intermixing) than the fowls of 
the plains are. The domestic will always breed with the 
Chittagong (itself a domestic race of species unknown) 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1203] 
 
Examples 4 and 5 represent another case of misleading collocation value where 
the words co-occur in the collocation span, but the modifier domestic is 
attributed to another word, in these cases to dogs and race respectively. 
Finally, the collocation ‘cultivated’ indicates further that varieties stand for 
domesticated kinds in contrast to species, which usually stand for the natural 
and wild prototype kind to which varieties are associated.  By observing these 
collocations in detail, we can observe that species are meant to be ‘wild’ and 
‘natural’, whereas varieties arise mostly through domestication. Specifically, we 
can observe the interpretations that species are not a product of domestication 
but of evolution, whereas varieties arise in relation to the wild and natural 
species. Consider the following examples: 
Example: 
6) This species is curious as being only known in the domestic state! 
no wild prototype of it having as yet been sent to our Collection. 
The Animal is the Japan Pig   It is very different in its osteology 
from any of the Wild or Domestic Swine of Europe or Asia 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3416] 
7) nearly all our domestic races descended from a multitude of wild 
species now commingled. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
2565] 
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8) This work will be my biggest; it treats on the origin of varieties of 
our domestic animals and plants, and on the origin of species in a 
state of nature. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2276] 
9) I am even inclined to suspect that there is a tendency to a return 
to primordial wildness in hybrids between two domestic 
species.— [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4033] 
 
The discourse meaning of species indicates here that species as objects 
originate in the wild nature, which is in contrast to the meaning of varieties, 
which are deemed as descended from natural species, usually in a cultivated 
and domesticated fashion. This also implies that species are discussed for their 
features as prototypes for the natural kinds, whereas varieties are discussed on 
their distinctions from the prototype. This contrastive feature is analysed in more 
detail in the following section.   
5.2.3.3 Contrasting collocations: prototype and variation 
The terms species and varieties differ in the way the distinctiveness of the kind 
is expressed in discourse. Namely, although both species and varieties are 
discussed as ‘distinct’ and ‘marked’, prototypical nature is only discussed in 
relation to species. Table 8, below summarises the difference. 
Table 8: Collocates of species and varieties expressing distinctiveness of kinds 
 Frequency 
Modifier Species Varieties (lemma) 
individual 39 3 
representative 46 2  
typical 15 0 
characteristic 3 0 
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distinct 188 36 
marked 25 35  
 
From the table above, we can observe that only species are discussed for the 
‘typical’ and ‘representative’ examples. There are no examples of ‘typical’ or 
‘representative varieties’ in the whole corpus, either in the singular or the plural 
form. The results shown in Table 8 include a few false positive examples which 
increase the collocation of ‘marked’ and species. When searching for the 
instances of ‘marked species’ only  7 matches are found, in comparison to 22 
‘marked varieties’. When we take into consideration that the occurrences of 
species in the corpus amount to more than four times7 that of varieties, both in 
singular and plural form, we can conclude that in relation to species, varieties 
collocate significantly more often with ‘marked’. 
From this contrastive analysis, we can observe yet another distinction in the 
use, and hence the meanings of terms species and varieties. Specifically, 
species tend to be individualised for having all the typical features of the kind, 
indicated by the collocations representative and typical. On the other hand, 
varieties tend to be described as ‘marked’ at best. A possible reason for 
varieties not being singled out in discourse is that their typical example is the 
form described as the species, and the variety, as the name suggests, is 
considered a variation from the prototype. This conclusion leads us to our final 
analysis; that of modification, mutability and change of species. 
                                              
7
 In the corpus there are 5375 instances of species & 1230 of variety and varieties 
136 
 
5.2.3.4 Contrasting collocations: modification and mutability  
The aim of the final contrastive analysis is to demonstrate another aspect in 
which semantically related words collocate with the same term almost 
exclusively. This analysis examines the collocations semantically related to the 
changes of species. From the results presented in Table 9 we can observe that 
meaning related to any kind of change or modification of natural kinds is 
strongly collocated with the term species.  
Table 9: Collocates of species and varieties expressing changeability of kinds 
 Frequency  
Modifier Species Varieties (lemma) 
modification 40 7 
mutability 38 0 
change 64 6 
variation 67 7 
descend 45 7 
 
The collocations shown in Table 9 show that on all accounts the term species 
collocates strongly with words expressing change. Conversely, the term 
variation shows little or no tendency to collocate with these words. A possible 
explanation is that being variations of species, as the name suggests, varieties 
are not discussed with respect to their modification, mutability or change.  
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5.2.4 Summary 
This analysis has demonstrated that by observing collocation patterns it is 
possible to distinguish meanings of closely related terms, such as species and 
varieties. The analysis focussing on the Mutual Information score was 
particularly successful in uncovering the specific differences in the collocation 
patterns, and hence in the meanings of the two terms. In this analysis only two 
of the twenty top-ranking collocates were shared between the terms, thus 
providing insight into many differences in the meaning of these terms. 
Furthermore, the analysis also showed that words of similar meaning tend to 
collocate with the same terms. 
Although these analyses are commonplace in corpus linguistics, they are an 
important part of this thesis. The results of collocation analyses indicate 
consistent differences in the use of these terms, indicating a difference in 
meaning which Darwin himself often struggled to identify. This indicates that 
meaning of these terms was not determined by ‘facts’ about species and 
varieties, since then Darwin and his fellow naturalists would not have debated 
so extensively on the particular specimens being species or varieties. Despite 
labelling the differences between the two terms ‘arbitrary’ and ‘unclear’, in 
Darwin’s correspondence, we can observe a conventionalised use of these 
terms which shows a clear distinction of their meaning and uncovers Darwin’s 
interpretation of these terms.  
The collocation analyses contributed significantly to uncover the meaning of the 
terms species and varieties, but they also showed that the interpretation of 
discourse meaning cannot be reduced to frequency and statistics. In other 
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words, observing the frequency of words occurring together cannot account for 
how these words are actually used. This was exemplified by several examples 
we labelled as false positives in the collocation analysis, since the interpretation 
of statistical data did not correspond to the actual meanings formed. Thus, 
when analysing the meaning of any word, it is necessary to analyse its use in a 
paraphrase.  
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5.3 Construction of meaning by paraphrase 
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section analyses the meaning of the term species in the context of an 
utterance. Specifically, the analysis focuses on the explicit definitions of 
meaning of the term species, occurring as part of the process of constructing 
and negotiating meaning. In other words, the analysis focuses on the 
paraphrases, which explicitly or implicitly define the meaning of the term 
species. The aim of the analysis is to support the argument that the meaning of 
species is determined through discourse rather than extra-linguistically. 
To demonstrate this, the analysis will focus on presenting the examples which 
best illustrate the problem of species. Thus the aim is not to create an 
exhaustive list of explicit definitions or analysing discourse markers of such 
definitions, but rather to present examples in groups which demonstrate that: a) 
the meaning of species is difficult to define because different people will employ 
different definitions; b) the meaning of species is not determined by the extra-
linguistic facts; and c) the meaning of species is negotiated in discourse. 
 
5.3.2. Analysis 
5.3.2.1 Multiple definitions and interpretations 
Defining the meaning of the notion of species was one of the main goals of 
Charles Darwin and his fellow naturalists. Although the notion is frequently 
used, Darwin and his correspondents struggled to define it clearly. We can 
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observe this in Example 1 below where species is defined as the object of 
natural classification. 
Example: 
1) ‘I beg you, however, to think clearly & define, or at least say you 
cannot define, (as others have done) what they are searching for 
by a natural classification’ 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-685] 
From Example 1, we can observe that in a letter to a fellow naturalist, George 
Robert Waterhouse, Darwin states that certain naturalists have been unable or 
unwilling to define the notion. This indicates that among scientists of Darwin’s 
time there was a lack of a generally accepted formulation of the term. The 
inability or unwillingness of some of Darwin’s peers to produce a definition 
certainly implies that the meaning of the term was interpreted differently among 
scientists. This is shown in Example 2 below, where botanist Hewett C. Watson 
reports to Darwin the contentious issue of what to call species and what 
varieties.  
Example: 
2) But what is a close species? Those which Botanist A would call 
the closest species, Botanist B would deny to be species at all; 
deeming them varieties. Those which Botanist A would deem 
species of only secondary closeness, would by Botanist B be 
pronounced the closest species he could admit. On which of these 
Two would you rely’ [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1758]  
In Example 2, Watson stresses to Darwin that due to different interpretations of 
the term, and hence different classifications of species and varieties, there is no 
point in requesting definitions of the term close species as they will vary from 
person to person.   
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In the following example form a letter to the American botanist Asa Gray, we 
can observe Darwin’s acceptance that the definition of the term cannot be 
stated in a way to be universally accepted. 
Example: 
3) By the way I met the other day Phillips, the Palæontologist, & he 
asked me “how do you define a species?”— I answered “I cannot” 
Whereupon he said “at last I have found out the only true 
definition,—‘any form which has ever had a specific name”! 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2176] 
In Example 3 above, it can be observed that the definition expressed by Phillips 
corresponds to the notion of meaning defined in our theoretical framework, i.e. 
that the meaning of species corresponds to all the instances of its use. In the 
words of Phillips from the above example, all that which has been at some point 
called species corresponds to the definition of the term.  
The difficulty in formulating definitions of species, shown in Examples 1-3, 
indicates that multiple definitions and interpretations of the meaning of species 
were used in Darwin’s time. Thus, as different naturalists applied different 
definitions and interpretations of the term species, they described and 
categorised species and varieties differently. This implies that the definition of 
the term affects the empirical approaches of scientists as well as the 
interpretation of the results, which is the focus of the analysis presented in the 
following section. 
5.3.2.2 Definitions and extra-linguistic features 
The problem of species is not only the product of a lack of a unified definition of 
the term, but also a product of different interpretations of empirical data. This is 
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clearly stated in a letter to Darwin from H. C. Watson in which he stresses that 
the question of distinguishing species from varieties is perhaps not one that can 
be addressed empirically, especially without prior agreement on the definition: 
Example :  
1) All investigations have an interest in my eyes, which bear upon 
the grand question, whether species are or are not absolutely & 
always distinct […]even supposing Botanists better agreed than 
they are likely to be in our day, as to what (or which) are species & 
what are varieties. Really, they can neither define what species 
are, nor can they empirically agree in selecting species from 
varieties, or varieties from species.— Jordan would make a 
million species. J. D. Hooker would perhaps allow 50,000. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1775]  
In Example 1, it is implied that there is a multitude of interpretations of the 
meaning of species, as well as a multitude of different approaches to their 
empirical description. In a sense, one implies the other, since the empirical 
approach will depend on the interpretation of the term. Example 2 below shows 
more clearly a case where the interpretation of the meaning of species 
influences the definition and description of specimens. 
Example: 
2) In all other respects but this genital hooklet, the two species are 
absolutely identical. They are, with this single exception, as like as 
two peas. After personally comparing the two, I cannot see how 
any sane man can infer that each was separately created. Yet 
they must be distinct species now, (according to my 
interpretation or definition of that term) for otherwise they 
would intercross & produce races having intermediate genital 
hooklets and intermediate periodic times, 16 years, 15 years &c 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6332a] 
In Example 2, it is explicitly stated by the writer that his interpretation of the 
meaning of species influences the classification of the specimens, which he 
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might otherwise classify differently: ‘I cannot see how any sane man can infer 
that each was separately created. Yet they must be distinct species now, 
(according to my interpretation or definition of that term).’ From Example 2 we 
can notice that interpretation is based on a certain definition of the term which is 
implied in the hypothetical statement at the end of the example ‘for otherwise 
they would intercross & produce races having intermediate genital hooklets and 
intermediate periodic times.’ This implies that the definitions of species stated in 
the discourse influence the interpretations of whether specimens are distinct 
species at least as much as the empirical observations.  
In this sense, as noted before, a multitude of definitions implies a multitude of 
approaches to empirical studies which can be observed in Example 3 below. 
Example: 
3) It is really laughable to see what different ideas are prominent 
in various naturalists minds, when they speak of “species” in 
some resemblance is everything & descent of little weight—in 
some resemblance seems to go for nothing & Creation the 
reigning idea—in some descent the key—in some sterility an 
unfailing test, with others not worth a farthing. It all comes, I 
believe, from trying to define the undefinable. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2022] 
In Example 3 we can observe that empirical approaches are largely defined by 
the interpretations of the meaning of species. Resemblance, descent and 
infertility of species hold different weight among Darwin’s peers where 
describing species is concerned. This multitude of interpretations and empirical 
approaches prompts Darwin’s scepticism on the possibility of defining the notion 
as stated at the end of Example 3: ‘trying to define the undefinable.’ 
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Nevertheless, history has shown that this realisation did not stop Darwin from 
making his own contributions to defining the meaning of species.  
Finally, the multitude of interpretations of which physical properties are 
important for determining what species are indicate that species, as well as 
other classificatory terms such as orders and genera, are constructs of 
discourse. Hewett Cottrell Watson expressed this view to Darwin long before 
the publication of the Origin.  
Example: 
4) I look upon the words ‘Orders, genera, species (of books), & 
varieties,’ only as terms to indicate passably well the grades of 
resemblance between objects. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1764] 
In the above example, Watson carefully chooses his words to express that 
these words are merely terms used by naturalists to indicate the degrees of 
resemblance between objects. This is particularly expressed with the phrase 
‘species (of books)’ which indicates the discursive construction of the notion, i.e. 
species as defined in books, rather than as an abstract idea of natural kinds. 
Thus what is considered species is a matter of the formulation of the term in 
discourse rather than identifying its physical properties.   
5.3.2.3 Negotiation of meaning 
Although the analysis presented here focuses on the narrowed-down notion of 
paraphrase, i.e. the explicit definitions of meaning, the general implication that 
each definition is a paraphrase of previous formulations still applies. In other 
words, new definitions are constructed by adding new interpretations to 
previous ones.  
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This is evident in Darwin’s earlier letters when he first decided to share his 
theory with select correspondents. In two letters letter to Joseph Dalton Hooker, 
Darwin excitedly expressed his definition of species, and soon after he reported 
similar conclusions to Leonard Jenyns. Examples 1 and 2 show the two 
definitions expressed in the letters to Hooker, which were followed up by a 
definition sent to Jenyns, shown in Example 3. 
Examples: 
1) At last gleams of light have come, & I am almost convinced (quite 
contrary to opinion I started with) that species are not (it is like 
confessing a murder) immutable. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-729] 
2) The general conclusion at which I have slowly been driven from a 
directly opposite conviction is that species are mutable & that 
allied species are co-descendants of common stocks. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-782]  
3) I am a bold man to lay myself open to being thought a complete 
fool, & a most deliberate one.— From the nature of the grounds, 
which make me believe that species are mutable in form, these 
grounds cannot be restricted to the closest-allied species; but 
how far they extend, I cannot tell, as my reasons fall away by 
degrees, when applied to species more & more remote from each 
other. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-793] 
From these examples we can clearly observe how Darwin’s definition of species 
was gradually developed. This development is realised almost as a direct 
paraphrase of preceding definitions, gradually expanding and refining the 
meaning of the term. Thus, firstly in Example 1 we observe the definition that 
‘species are not immutable’ which contrasts Darwin’s previous beliefs. This is 
then in Example 2 paraphrased and refined into ‘species are mutable & that 
allied species are co-descendants of common stock.’ Here Darwin adds a 
statement to the original definition regarding allied species being co-
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descendants. Finally, the definition shown in Example 3 is extended to ‘are 
mutable in form, these grounds cannot be restricted to the closest-allied 
species’ where the restriction of co-descent to allied species is removed from 
the definition. Thus, these examples illustrate a diachronic dimension to 
Darwin’s definition of the meaning of species.  
Definition, once expressed in the discourse, can be either accepted and further 
reinterpreted by the discourse community, or ignored or rejected, in which case 
it is not repeated or paraphrased and its meaning does not take up in discourse. 
In Example 4, we can observe how Darwin’s definition (shown in Example 1) 
was temporarily ignored and did not excite his correspondent, Joseph Dalton 
Hooker, to engage in discussion.  
Example: 
4) At present I endeavor to hold aloof from all speculations on the 
origin of species, & wish to till at any rate this part of my flora is 
finished. When that is the case I should like to have much talk 
about it with you, at present I go on the old assumption that 
each species has one origin is immutable & migrates. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-947] 
From the example above, we can see that Hooker refused to acknowledge 
Darwin’s assertion maintaining the interpretation of immutability of species. 
Thus, by refusing to engage in the debate, Hooker effectively suspended 
Darwin’s definition from their shared discourse.    
The evidence that meanings depend on the discourse communities can be 
observed in the letter from Darwin to Albert Jean Gaudry (Example 5) in which 
they discuss the general acceptance of Darwin’s theory in France. 
Example: 
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5) Your belief will, I suppose at present, lower you in the estimation 
of your countrymen; but, judging from the rapid spread in all parts 
of Europe, excepting France, of the belief in the common descent 
of allied species, I must think that this belief will before long 
become universal.  How strange it is that the country which gave 
birth to Buffon, the elder Geoffroy & especially to Lamarck shd 
now cling so pertinaceously to the belief that species are 
immutable creations.   
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5794] 
From the example above we can notice a whole discourse community of French 
scientists, apart from Darwin’s correspondent, adhering by the definitions 
Darwin so strongly criticised and ignoring his own propositions. Darwin even 
suggests that he fears his correspondent’s reputation is at stake for agreeing 
with him, probably in the same manner he feared for his reputation prior to the 
publication of his theory. Examples 4 and 5 illustrate the importance of 
paraphrase for the proliferation of meaning in the discourse community.  
Similarly, in Example 6, we can observe a proposal by Alfred Russel Wallace 
who, having himself reached similar conclusions, wished to build on Darwin’s 
theory, suggesting the interpretation survival of the fittest as an accurate 
definition of Darwin’s ‘natural selection’. 
Example: 
6) Natural selection, is, when understood, so necessary & self 
evident a principle, that it is a pity it should be in any way 
obscured; & it therefore occurs to me, that the free use of 
“survival of the fittest”,—which is a compact & accurate 
definition of it,—would tend much to its being more widely 
accepted and prevent its being so much misrepresented & 
misunderstood. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5140] 
Example 6 shows Wallace adding a new interpretation of the notion of ‘Natural 
Selection’ to clarify its meaning more accurately, i.e. the notion of the “survival 
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of the fittest”, in order to prevent ‘misunderstandings’. Here Wallace expresses 
the belief that the theory would be more widely accepted if it was more 
accurately and compactly expressed. On the other hand, in Example 7, Darwin 
reports that the obscurity of meaning of the notion of natural selection can be 
seen as positive by preventing too “liberal” interpretations of the term.  
Example: 
7) Several scientific men have thought the term “Natural Selection'' 
good, because its meaning is not obvious & each man could not 
put on it his own interpretation, … 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2698] 
Examples 6 and 7 illustrate meanings are open for interpretation and 
reformulation once they become part of the discourse. In Example 6, Wallace 
adds the interpretation of ‘survival of the fittest’ to the meaning of natural 
selection, which was possible due to Wallace’s understanding of Darwin’s 
proposition. However, in Example 7, some degree of intellectual prestige is 
attributed to Darwin’s proposal – the example implies that by making the 
definition not very accessible to wider audiences, Darwin protects his own 
interpretation from being reformulated.  
To summarise, Examples 1-3 show how meaning is expanded by added 
interpretation. Examples 4 and 5 illustrate the importance of paraphrase for the 
proliferation of meaning in the discourse community. Finally, Examples 6 and 7 
show that the meaning of species is always subjected to reinterpretation. Thus, 
this analysis shows that the meaning of the term species depends on the 
discourse, in which it is constantly renegotiated.  
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5.3.3 Summary 
The analysis of explicit definitions of the meaning of species has shown that the 
meaning of the term species was not universal in the scientific community of 
Darwin’s time. This is exemplified by the multiple definitions of the meaning of 
the term species employed by different researchers. By applying different 
interpretations of what constitutes a species, they described and categorised 
species and varieties differently (see Section 5.3.2.1). At times the interpretation 
of the meaning of the term species was important than the physical attributes of 
specimens in the classification of species (see Section 5.3.2.2). Additionally, 
different definitions put emphasis on different physical features and attributes. 
This indicates that the meaning of species depends more on the definitions of 
meaning than extra-linguistic phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the analysis of has shown that the definitions of the meaning of 
species and natural selection are not fixed or property of their authors, but 
definitions open for interpretation and reformulation (See Section 5.3.2.3). Thus, 
definitions of meaning are not laws or facts, but rather statements that one may 
accept, ignore or argue against. Finally, having demonstrated the negotiability 
of the meaning of species, it was evident that meaning is the exclusive property 
of the discourse.   
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5.4 Intertextuality 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on the use of intertextuality 
markers as markers of paraphrase. Paraphrase as an act of definition and 
interpretation of meaning has been analysed in its most explicit sense of direct 
definitions in the previous section (See Section 5.3.). However, the analysis 
presented this section focuses on the analysis of discursive markers of 
intertextuality. These markers are phrases that explicitly invoke and discuss 
meanings from other texts, thus they are effectively markers of paraphrase. The 
aim of this section is to identify these explicit markers of intertextuality and 
analyse them for the manner and frequency they invoke other texts and 
meanings in the observed texts.  
 
5.4.2 Markers of Intertextuality  
Charles Darwin Correspondence Corpus is abundant with explicit markers of 
intertextuality because of its epistolary nature which naturally tends to refer to 
previous texts, i.e. received letters. In fact, it is so rich in intertextual markers 
that a sub-corpus consisting of only the paragraphs containing the word species 
had to be created especially for this analysis (see Section 4.2 On the Corpus). 
By focusing on the paragraphs containing the word species, most of the 
intertextual markers unrelated to the negotiation of the meaning of species have 
been automatically excluded from the analysis. 
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The markers of intertextuality have been identified manually during the 
collocation and paraphrase analyses and the complete list of the markers of 
intertextuality used in the analysis is listed in Table 10 below. Furthermore, all 
the instances of these markers are included in the Appendices 3-12. 
Table 10: Markers of intertextuality 
Marker Frequency 
aware* + with| about| on| which| whether| that| of 67  
agree*| disagree* + with | about| on| which | whether |that 61 
what + say* | say * + about| on| that 50 
object* + to | objection to 47 
in regard to | regarding 44 
to hear* about| that  
heard of  + the| a| an| some| that| those| these 
43 
according to 38 
ask* + that| if| about| whether |which| how 36 
state*| mention* + that 34 
discussion| proposal| hypothesis| assertion + on | about  23 
Total: 402 
 
5.4.3 Markers: aware, unaware 
The intertextual markers aware and unaware are usually used in the collocation 
with that and of and make the most frequent intertextuality marker linked to the 
word species in the abridged correspondence sub-corpus. These markers are 
used to alert the reader to a particular theory, publication or a specimen the 
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author’s statement refers to. Thus, they act as a form of citation or reference 
expressions.  
Examples: 
1) 4th. I am not aware that the genera which it is difficult to 
hybridize are slow to sport. Up to this day, tho’ I am still trying, I 
have failed in all attempts to cross Crocuses, yet there is a 
different either species or vary of Crocus in almost every part of 
S. Europe, & the garden varieties of Crocus vernus & versicolor are 
very numerous.  [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-503] 
 
2) I am not aware of any fossil bats or rodents in Australian caves, 
so the small antiquity of rodentia may be a reason for their not 
having given origin as yet to Gyrencephala & does there not seem 
some connection between the low grade of Lyssencephala as the 
only occupants of that vast Australian continent? 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2920c] 
  
3) I was not aware that varieties occurred more in large genera than 
in small ones,—except from the a priori certainty, that where 
there are more species to vary, there must naturally be more 
varieties. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2133 
 
In Examples 1-3 we can observe how aware + that/of construction invokes 
previous interpretations, expressed or referred to by the correspondent. Thus 
the marker acts almost as a form of citation invoking previous content in relation 
to which a statement is made. The marker is usually followed by a reference to 
the original statement which is then commented on. However, the marker can 
also be used to draw attention to other texts, as shown in the examples below:  
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Examples:  
4) Have you ever thought of G. St. Hilaire “loi du balancement”, as 
applied to plants: I am well aware that some zoologists quite 
reject it, but it certainly appears to me, that it often holds good 
with animals.— You are no doubt aware of the kind facts I refer 
to, such as great development of canines in the carnivora 
apparently causing a diminution—a compensation or 
balancement—in the small size of premolars &c &c.—
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-996] 
  
5) As a general rule you are aware that throughout the Aculeate 
Hymenoptera the male is much smaller than the female, 
whenever the reverse occurs it is for a special purpose; as far as 
my observation has extended, in the following species it is a 
beautiful adaptation to a singular point in the economy of the 
insects; [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6534] 
 
6) You are I daresay aware of the fact that there is no reason to 
believe that plants can be artificially acclimated to any extent— 
Gardeners have hardly made any plant hardy, either by growing it 
from seeds of an introduced live specimen which did but just 
ripen, or by grafting on allied hardier species. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734] 
 
Examples 4-6 show how this construction can be used to introduce new texts 
into the discourse. However, whether or not the reader is actually aware of 
these texts is not relevant. The function is to introduce either a statement from 
another text, or, as in Example 6, make the author’s statement appear as such, 
thus giving it an illusion of objectivity by disguising the statement as a fact.  
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5.4.4 Markers: agree, disagree 
Intertextuality markers under this category include the following constructions: 
agree* + with | about| on| which | whether| that. The list includes all the lemmas 
of the word agree, as well as the construction with the negative prefix dis-. 
These markers play an important role in collaborative construction of meaning 
as they regulate the discussion on various theories presented by the 
correspondents offering both the positive and negative responses. They are 
also one of the most frequently used intertextuality markers in the sub-corpus. 
We can observe their use in the following examples. 
Examples: 
1) To us who theorise I am sure the case is very important. Do the 
S. American Carabi differ more from the other species, than do, 
for instance, the Siberian & European & N. American & Himalayan 
(if the genus exists there); if they do, I entirely agree with you 
that the difference would be too great to account for by the 
recent Glacial period. I agree, also, with you in utterly rejecting 
an independent origin for these Carabi.— 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3532] 
 
2) You ask for criticisms, I have none to give only impressions.— I 
fully agree with “your skimming-of pot-theory” & very well you 
have put it.— With respect contemporaneity, I nearly agree with 
you, & if you will look to the d—d— Book 3d Edit p. 349, you will 
find nearly similar remarks. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3542] 
 
3) Another Paper which concerns you is one of Lecoq’s on the 
migration of plants wh special reference to the mountain flora of 
Auvergne nearly identical with those of the Alps & Pyrenees— He 
disagrees with you as to the glacial epoch and its effect in 
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producing the present distribution of plants […]—but while 
disagreeing with you on most points he shares your views as to 
Origin of Species and has anticipated you—
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5062] 
 
4) All analogy makes me quite disagree with the Duke that the 
differences in the beak, wing & tail are not of importance to the 
several species. In the only two species which I have watched, the 
difference in flight & in the use of the tail was conspicuously 
great. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4752] 
From these examples we can observe somewhat similar use of this intertextual 
marker to aware of/that marker presented in the previous section. Namely, it is 
used to invoke other texts in the current one. The difference is that a value 
judgement is added to the invoked proposition. It is used to strengthen or 
weaken the invoked proposition, hence propagating or negating the proposed 
interpretation in discourse, while functioning as a form of evaluation.  
 
5.4.5 Markers: say that, say about 
This intertextuality marker is most simply defined as a form of citation and 
reference. It is used to invoke other texts in relation to which, usually, a question 
or a new statement is made. 
Examples: 
1) It has been said (apparently with litte foundation) that amongst 
birds, species originally coming from distant parts of the world, 
are more likely to breed together, than those from nearer 
countries.— Has Mr. Herbert observed anything of this kind in 
plants? [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-502] 
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2) You say there are about 37 new species of Acanth. & according to 
this proportion there would be about 21 in the other orders. Now 
do you think it very desirable that all these should be engraved? 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-538] 
 
3) (In p. 4. of your letter you say you give up many Book-species as 
separate creations; I give up all, & you infer that our difference is 
only in degree & not in kind. I dissent from this; for I give a distinct 
reason how far I go in giving up species; I look at all forms, which 
resemble each other homologically or embryologically as certainly 
descended from the same parents.) 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2922]  
 
4)  You say that all Botanists would agree that many tropical plants 
could not withstand a somewhat cooler climate. But I have come 
not to care at all for general beliefs without the special facts. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5020] 
 
From the above examples we can observe that the invoked statements can be 
agreed or disagreed on (Examples 3-4), but also that further questions can be 
posed in relation to these (Examples 1-2). Thus these markers are usually 
followed by either a request or a form of evaluation. 
 
5.4.6 Markers: object to, objection  
Intertextuality markers included in this category consist of the forms: object to, 
objecting to and objection. The markers are used in the negative sense, 
indicating a contentious proposal which the author disagrees with.   
Examples: 
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1) What I should, according to my small proportion of knowledge, 
object to, would be the putting the monotremata into the same 
group with the Marsupiata, not from their resemblance but from 
the Monotremata consisting of only two species. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-685] 
 
2) I had also written to Forbes, before your letter, objecting to the 
Sargassum, but apparently on wrong grounds; for I could see no 
reason, on the common view of absolute creations, why one Fucus 
shd not have been created for the ocean, as well as several 
confervæ for the same end. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-961] 
The markers can be negated thus stating that there is no direct disagreement 
with the invoked proposal, as shown in the Example 3 below. 
Example: 
3) Certainly there is no objection to the hypothesis of a Sargassum 
being an absolute creation, though I see no reason to call for such 
an aid in this case, the species being in my opinion decidedly the 
littoral Atlantic one. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-964] 
Additionally, when the marker refers to a statement made by the addressee, it 
indicates a form of ‘double-intertextuality’ in the sense that invokes a value 
judgement of another text or even the author’s original proposition. This can be 
observed in Examples 4 and 5 below. 
Examples: 
4) II. I have next to notice your second objection—that retaining the 
name of the first describer in perpetuum along with that of the 
species, is a premium on hasty & careless work. This is quite a 
different question from that of the law of priority itself, and it 
never occurred to me before, though it seems highly probable, 
that the general recognition of that law may produce such a 
result. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1216] 
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5) A friend objected to my title that word “Varieties” ought to stand 
before “Species”.— Another friend objected (but illogically) that 
“genera” & “orders” ought to be inserted.— This has led me to 
think that word “Varieties” had better be altogether omitted. The 
case of Species is the real important point; & the title, as now, is 
rather too long.— So if you do not object, I will omit word 
“Varieties”; but if on any account you do object, I do not care.— 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2488] 
 
From the examples above, we can observe that this intertextuality marker is 
used to invoke a statement which is then evaluated, usually in the form of 
disagreement. However, as Example 3 above shows, agreement with the 
proposal can be also expressed by negating the marker itself. Furthermore, the 
marker can stand for an already expressed objection, in which case both the 
objection and the original statement are invoked in the text. 
 
5.4.7 Markers: regarding, in/with regard to 
Regarding and with / in regard to are common intertextual markers used to 
introduce citations of other texts, which are usually then followed by evaluation. 
Their common function is to organise the content of a text by organising the 
change of topics and relating the text to previous discourse, which can be 
observed in examples 1-3. 
Examples: 
1) With regard to the dissimilarity between the Flora of the several 
Islds of the group, that is too extraordinary a circumstance for me 
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to offer any remarks upon, until the florula is drawn up, the 
further I proceed the more I wonder. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-737] 
 
2) With regard to the value of the pliocene species—identical with a 
living one—to be of any value the instances must be sound, and 
unquestionable: and if a sufficient number of good cases is 
adduced, there is a very wholesome basis for a generalization. 
With regard to the Badger, I cannot say. As soon as I get back to 
London I will send you Suess paper. I was not a little surprized to 
find myself so precisely formulated for so decided a Conclusion. 
Had I not thought that Suess must have sent it to you, I should 
have forwarded it to you. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
4284] 
 
3) I shd. have liked to have seen several examples proving truth (or 
showing its probability) of some of your remarks; as of best 
marked vars. being on confines of the range. Or again in regard to 
your remark of a species remaining for many generations 
constant under culture & then suddenly commencing to vary.— 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2450] 
Another function of these markers is to specify the meaning of another 
expression invoking intertextuality. Thus, in Example 4 the expression ‘What 
you say about extinction’ already creates an intertextual link, which is then 
specified using ‘in regard to.’ 
Example:  
4) What you say about extinction, in regard to small genera & local 
disjunction, being hypothetical seems very just. Something direct, 
however, could be advanced on this head from fossil shells; but 
hypothetical such notions must remain 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2125]   
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The primary function of this marker is to organise the text, by indicating the 
change of topics. In addition to that, the marker can be used to specify an 
already established intertextual link. 
 
5.4.8 Markers: hear 
Although its main function is the formulation of a link between different texts, the 
verb hear forms a few distinct intertextuality markers. 
Examples: 
1) Of Course you have heard of the new species of wild Swan, 
discovered in England, by Mr. Yarrell. I have bad stuffed specimen 
of it, for 10s.— bad as it is, you may think yourself, lucky in 
getting. Yarrell himself, has pronounced it to be the new sort, so 
there can be no doubt.— [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
81] 
 
2) Every one has heard of the discoloured streaks of water in the 
Equatorial regions.— One I examined was owing to the presence 
of such minute Oscillaria that in each square inch of surface there 
must have been at least one hundred thousand present. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-178]   
 
3) I have heard of some analogous facts, though on the smallest 
scale, in certain insects being more variable in one district than in 
another; & I think the same holds with some land-shells. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-789] 
In the above examples, have heard of is used in a similar way marker aware is 
used, that is, to introduce a text with the illusion of the already known.  In this 
manner, other texts are presented as facts rather than as statements by others. 
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Another function this intertextuality marker performs is promoting further 
response in discourse, as demonstrated in the following examples: 
Examples: 
4) There may in my opinion have been a series of productions on 
different spots, & also a gradual change of species. I shall be 
delighted to hear how you think that this change may have taken 
place, as no presently conceived opinions satisfy me on the 
subject.— [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734] 
 
5) I am very much obliged for your interesting letter written in such 
wonderfully good English about climbing plants. The case of 
Haplolophium is new to me & I am glad to have seen the tendril of 
Strychnos. I do not suppose I shall attend any more to climbing 
plants, but I shd like to hear if you ever meet with 2 species of the 
same genus, twining in opposite directions   I should further like 
much to hear whether any twiners can ascend thick trunks. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4895] 
 
From Examples 4 and 5 we can observe that the marker can be used to request 
an opinion or a report on a particular topic, thus promoting further responses on 
particular issues. Although in this case the marker does not indicate 
intertextuality per se, it is used to prompt a response on a particular issue, 
making that future statement intertextual. 
 
5.4.9 Markers: according to 
The use of the intertextual marker according to is characterised by reference to 
other texts, either from the correspondence or external texts. One way it is used 
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is to attribute the statement to a particular source, effectively acting as a form of 
reference or citation, which is illustrated in Examples 1 and 2. 
Examples: 
1) Parrots according to Mr Ehrenberg have moved south in Nubia 
since Roman times.— [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
534] 
 
2) Wallace has, I think, put the matter well; and according to his 
theory, the various domestic races of animals have been fairly 
developed into species. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
1792] 
The marker itself has no implications on evaluation, carrying neither negative 
nor positive prosody. Its main function is not evaluation but rather incorporating 
others’ discourse into the text. 
However, the marker is also used to express logical conclusions, or rather 
interpretations that are made in relations to particular statements. This can be 
observed in Examples 3 and 4 below.  
Examples: 
3) By way of illustration I will suppose I am called upon to point out a 
type of the order Carnivora. According to the first definition I 
should select a Cat because in the Cat tribe some of the more 
striking characters of the Carnivora are most strongly developed; 
but, were I to adopt the second definition I should choose a 
Viverra because it may be said to possess most evenly developed 
the greatest number of characters which are found in the species 
of its order; [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-748] 
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4) You say there are about 37 new species of Acanth. & according to 
this proportion there would be about 21 in the other orders. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-538] 
In this sense, the meaning of ‘according to’ is similar to the meaning of ‘based 
on.’ Nevertheless, the marker still indicates an intertextual relation, as 
interpretation is attributed to a particular definition.   
 
5.4.10 Markers: ask 
The intertextuality markers included in this category include all the lemmas of 
the verb ask in combination with particles that, if, about, how, whether and 
which. These markers are usually used to link the answer to a particular 
question and are likely to be typical of written correspondence, since in other 
types of discourse it is unlikely that the questions would repeated when 
providing the response. Examples of their use in the corpus are listed below. 
Examples:  
1) You ask me whether I suppose the small proportion of sp to 
genera in Coral Islets, arises from chance of seeds &c? I cannot 
answer this, I should say perhaps not:— if genera or small groups 
are truly natural they are supposed to contain many characters in 
common, it is but right to assume that the character of 
transportable seeds should hence be common to some groups 
above others, the inference I need not state. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734] 
 
2) You ask whether the uniformity consists in species or forms. I am 
inclined to consider that uniformity of species is to a certain extent 
a sequitur to a uniformity of forms, & that it is a corollary to our 
Theorem. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-739] 
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3) You ask what effect studying species has had on my variation 
theories; I do not think much; I have felt some difficulties more; on 
the other hand I have been struck (& probably unfairly from the 
class) with the variability of every part in some slight degree of 
every species: [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1339] 
 
5.4.11 Markers: mention, state  
The intertextual markers in this category attribute the statements to other texts, 
thus functioning as citation markers. They are not used only for expressing what 
is stated in other texts, but rather to state what these texts do not mention. This 
is achieved by questioning the statements (Example 1), reformulating them in 
new contexts, linking them with or comparing to other interpretations (Example 
2), etc. In other words, these markers are used to reinterpret and 
recontextualise these texts in order to form new meanings. 
Examples: 
1) Mr Herbert incidentally mentioned in a letter to me, that the 
Heaths at the C. of Good Hope were very variable, whilst in 
Europe they are (?) not so (?); but then the species here are few in 
comparison, so that the case, even if true, is not a good one. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-789] 
 
2) I traced its etymology distinctly in old Fryer’s work (1698), where 
these little birds are stated to be brought to Sarat from 
“Amidavad”; meaning Ahmedabrsquo; in Guzurat, where they still 
abound! And so the name of that town has become transferred to 
themselves, as in the more familiar instances of Canary & 
Bantam! N.B. You will find “avadavats” mentioned in Sheridans 
‘School for Scandal’, 1777—act. V, sc. I; so that at that time the 
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name must have been familiar. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1735] 
 
5.4.12 Markers: discussion, hypothesis, assertion 
The markers in this category are essentially nominalisations of their respective 
verbs which also function as intertextuality markers themselves, e.g. say, 
mention, state, etc. However, they are presented in a separate category as the 
nominalisation form allows these markers somewhat different function. Namely, 
as nominalisations these markers present other texts as objects in the new text, 
allowing them to be discussed and evaluated in single utterances. 
Examples: 
1) Mr Knight seems to have found this variation in mongrel apples 
&c &c common, whereas Mr Herbert makes in the Hort. 
Transacts. an opposite assertion with regard to the hybrid 
Criniums.— [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-502] 
 
2) I have thought that I ought to state to you the ground for my 
assertion on page 602, that Geology has not afforded facts that 
sustain the view that the system of life has been evolved through 
a method of development from species to Species.— There are 
three difficulties that weigh on my mind, and I will mention them. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3969] 
 
3) When looking over some grass a species of Bromus from the 
North Western coast of America—with a friend & botanist we 
noticed some oats that were producing ears of barley   this led to 
the assertion made by Elihu Burritt in his “Walk through the 
Eastern Counties” that a farmer at St. Ives Hunts had for years 
“transmuted” oats into barley. doubting this I wrote to the writer 
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of the enclosed a farmer of 1600 acres a Member of the Council of 
the Royal Agricultural Society & above all a good & truthful 
gentleman. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5242] 
 
4) I will trouble you with only one other question. In discussion with 
Mr Gould, I found that in most of the genera of birds, which range 
over the whole or greater part of the world, the individual species 
have wider ranges: thus the Owl is mundane, & many of the 
species have very wide ranges. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-736] 
 
5) Your discussion on connecting & separating forms seems to me so 
philosophical, that I much hope that someday you will be as good 
as your word & write an “Essay on Species”. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1725] 
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5.5 Diachronic analysis of intertextuality 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The diachronic analysis of intertextuality is based on the analysis of specific 
collocations of species, identified in Section 5.2, with the aim to observe when 
particular collocations first enter discourse and when they are most frequently 
discussed. For example, a high concentration of instances in a narrow 
diachronic span indicates an intensified discussion of the notion. Furthermore, 
the analysis will observe whether the specific collocations are consistently 
discussed throughout the corpus or whether they stop being discussed at some 
point. This will demonstrate the diachronic dimension of a particular set of 
interpretations by showing how these interpretations enter discourse; at what 
moments they are intensively discussed; and if they are abandoned from the 
discourse at any stage.  
The collocations of species from the MI-score analysis (Section 5.2.2) are used 
for this purpose and include the following collocations: mutable + species, 
disjoined + species, modification + species, describe + species, derived + 
species, allied + species, origin + species, range + species, variable + species, 
and close + species. 
These collocates have been chosen as a result of a corpus driven analysis and 
are based on the list of strongest collocations according to MI-score. The list 
based on MI-score was used rather than the list based on t-score because the 
top collocates according to t-score are generally frequent words evenly 
distributed in discourse. For example, the twenty highest ranked collocates 
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according to t-score are all function words, whereas the MI-score list includes 
only the content words (see Appendix 1 – List of collocates of the term species 
for details). Collocates selected for the analysis represent the highest ranked 
collocations according to MI-score which are related to Darwin’s theory. Thus 
words like quasi, identical, trimorphic, etc. are not included in the analysis, 
despite ranking highly on MI-score. All collocates have been analysed as 
described in methodology section, Chapter 4 – using the same 5x5 word span 
as in the initial collocation analysis presented in Section 5.2 Collocation 
analysis.  
In addition to observing the diachronic distribution of the interpretations of the 
term species, the aim of the analysis is also to identify ‘topic hotspots’ which 
indicate a more prominent discussion, or negotiation, of particular paraphrases. 
Thus while observing the diachronic dimension, we can also observe the 
intertextual dimension, i.e. when the terms have been most actively negotiated. 
This is done using the concordance plot tool in AntConc (Anthony, 2011) and 
searching for collocations using regular expressions to define the 5x5 word 
span. The results shown in concordance plots show all the occurrences of the 
search term in the correspondence arranged chronologically. Thus, a 
concordance plot can be compared to a kind of a timeline representing the 
discourse of Darwin’s correspondence and demonstrating when each instance 
of the search term occurred. 
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5.5.2 Mutable + species 
This analysis includes four forms denoting the mutability of species, all of which 
have ranked highly on MI-score list; namely: mutability, immutability, immutable 
and mutable. As we can see from Figure 1 below, this collocation occurs in the 
correspondence in intervals, when it is used more frequently, thus indicating the 
topic hotspots.  
Figure 1 Distribution of collocation (mutable + species) 
 
The first two hotspots, which we can observe at the left of the plot, are the most 
interesting to observe in detail as they represent instances at the early stage of 
Darwin’s correspondence, around the time when he started questioning the 
notion of immutability of species. In the examples below, we can observe the 
first instances of the collocation mutable + species in the discourse. 
Letter 782: Darwin to Jenyns on 12 Oct 1844  
1) The general conclusion at which I have slowly been driven from a 
directly opposite conviction is that species are mutable & that 
allied species are co-descendants of common stocks. 
[http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-782] 
In the following example Darwin hedges his argument stating that he only 
proposes an alternative interpretation and does not argue against the canonical 
interpretation of the immutability of species. Furthermore, Darwin here repeats 
his interpretation that allied species have descended from common stock. 
Letter 789: Darwin to Hooker on 10 Nov 1844 
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2) I must have been cracked to have written it, for I have no 
evidence, without a person be willing to admit all my views, & 
then it does follow; but in my most sanguine moments, all I 
expect, is that I shall be able to show even to sound Naturalists, 
that there are two sides to the question of the immutability of 
species;—that facts can be viewed & grouped under the notion of 
allied species having descended from common stocks. 
[http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-789] 
The following two examples are from a letter to Leonard Jenyns. In the first 
instance, Darwin expresses the same argument about his intentions as in the 
letter to Hooker, shown in the previous example, even using the same exact 
words ‘that there are two sides to the question of the immutability of species ’: 
Letter 793: Darwin to Jenyns, 23 Nov 1844 
3) With respect to my far-distant work on species, I must have 
expressed myself with singular inaccuracy, if I led you to suppose 
that I meant to say that my conclusions were inevitable. They 
have become so, after years of weighing puzzles, to myself alone;; 
but in my wildest day-dream, I never expect more than to be able 
to show that there are two sides to the question of the 
immutability of species, ie whether species are directly created, 
or by intermediate laws, (as with the life & death of individuals). 
[http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-793] 
However, in the second part of the letter, Darwin slightly alters the definition he 
expressed to Hooker in the previous letter, and initially also to Jenyns, stating 
that his arguments ‘cannot be restricted to the closest-allied species’: 
Letter 793: Darwin to Jenyns, 23 Nov 1844 
4) I am a bold man to lay myself open to being thought a complete 
fool, & a most deliberate one.— From the nature of the grounds, 
which make me believe that species are mutable in form, these 
grounds cannot be restricted to the closest-allied species; but how 
far they extend, I cannot tell, as my reasons fall away by degrees, 
when applied to species more & more remote from each other. 
[http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-793] 
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Although the corpus does not include responses sent back to Darwin, they can 
be inferred from Darwin’s subsequent letters. This is particularly evident in the 
letter to Jenyns where Darwin apologetically states: ‘I must have expressed 
myself with singular inaccuracy, if I led you to suppose that I meant to say that 
my conclusions were inevitable.’ 
Thus by analysing the collocation mutable + species, several intertextual 
features have been observed: 1) paraphrase – Darwin’s reformulations 
gradually remove the restriction of only closely-allied species descending from 
common stock; 2) lexical repetition – (re)formulations have a similar 
phraseology; and 3) diachronic dimension of meaning – strength of intertextual 
links correlates with diachronic proximity, i.e. the closer the two utterances are 
to one another the more likely they will paraphrase one another and thus use 
similar phraseology. 
 
5.5.3 Disjoined + species 
The case of disjoined + species exemplifies the main goals of diachronic 
analysis as it demonstrates clearly how one particular interpretation enters 
discourse, establishes clear intertextual relations then suddenly disappears  
from the discussion. Figure 2 shows the topic hotspot in the correspondence. 
Figure 2 Distribution of collocation (disjoined + species) 
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The discussion on disjoined species was exclusive to Asa Gray and Darwin, 
thus showing a strong intertextual relation. From the corpus we can observe 
that Gray initiated the discussion and then upon accepting Darwin’s views 
ended it. Disjoined species are discussed only in a few letters, but we can 
observe how they evolve as a concept below. 
Letter  2089 May 57 Darwin to Gray: 
1) I want to know to see more clearly in proportion to your whole 
Flora how large the proportion of monotypic genera is in the 
disjoined species. This subject interests me very much: I began to 
try to work out this point in all the cases of much disjoined species 
which I met with; but I failed from want of knowledge: I tried also 
to make out whether the disjoined species would not on average 
belong to small Families, but here again I failed from want of 
knowledge; though the cases in which I could find out something, 
confirmed my very strong expectation that species having 
disjoined ranges would belong to small genera; so you may 
imagine how much interest I felt in coming on your note on this 
very subject.— .[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2089] 
Letter  2098 June 1857 Gray to Darwin 
2) I did not know at all that you suspected disjoined species to 
belong to small genera & small orders, as a general thing. … My 
76 disjoined species belong to 34 families,—and I cannot see that 
they incline to belong to small families. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2098] 
In the following examples, Darwin introduces the notion of extinction as the 
cause of disjoined species, which is later further developed by Gray. 
Letter 2109 June 1857 Darwin to Gray: 
3) The notion was grounded on the belief that disjoined species had 
suffered much local extinction & therefore (conversely with the 
case of genera with many species having species with wide 
ranges.) I inferred that genera & Families with very few species (ie 
from Extinction) would be apt (not necessarily always) to have 
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narrow ranges & disjoined ranges. You will not perceive, perhaps, 
what I am driving at & it is not worth enlarging on,—but I look at 
Extinction as common cause of small genera & disjoined ranges & 
therefore they ought, if they behaved properly & as nature does 
not lie to go together!— .[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
2109] 
2120 Gray to Darwin July 1857 
4) I accept it as best explaining disjoined species. I see that the same 
cause must have reduced many species of great range to small, 
and that it may have reduced large genera to small, and so of 
families. But why is it not just as likely that there were as many 
small genera (nearly) at first as now, and as great a disproportion 
in the number of their species? 
.[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2120] 
Although in these examples the phrase disjoined species is not itself modified, 
the contexts in which it occurs in do, until the moment agreement is achieved 
and discussion ended. To summarise, the example of disjoined species has 
demonstrated the same intertextual features as mutable + species; namely the 
use of paraphrase and lexical repetition to reformulate, negotiate and create 
new meanings. In addition to that, this collocation has illustrated a strong 
diachronic dimension of meaning by showing how a particular interpretation of 
species can arise and disappear from discourse.  
 
5.5.4 Representative + species 
‘Representative + species’ is another collocation which is distributed in the 
correspondence in such a way as to form topic hotspots. From these hotspots 
we can observe when in the correspondence was this formulation an important 
aspect of discourse on species. The collocation appears to form topic hotspots 
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in the early years of the correspondence, then after a period of time it was 
restarted, only to disappear from the discourse soon after.  
Figure 3 Distribution of collocation (representative + species) 
 
From Figure 3 we can identify two major topic hotspots, and in the leftmost, 
earliest, one we have identified intertextual relations. Figure 4 shows the 
relevant concordances. 
Figure 4 Concordance output of (representative + species) indicating intertextual relations 
1 
 Archipelago, with 
the separate 
islands possessing 
distinct  
representative 
species 
? I have always 
intended, (but have 
not yet done so) to 
exam 
Letter 736: 
Darwin to 
Hooker on 
23 Feb 1844 
 2 
the separate islds 
of the Sandwich 
Arch: possessed 
distinct  
representative 
species 
 of the same genera 
of Labiatæ: would 
not this be worth 
your 
3 
 appears to me, 
whether any two or 
three islands have 
close  
representative 
species 
 of the same genus; 
the simple fact of 
one isld having a 
spe 
Letter 740: 
Darwin to 
Hooker on 
11 Mar 1844 
4 
 may aid you in 
observing, whether 
the different islds 
have  
representative 
species 
 filling the same 
places in the 
œconomy of nature, 
to know,  
Letter 744: 
Darwin to 
Hooker on 
31 Mar 1844 
 5 
 then in flower.— 
Please bear this in 
mind in comparing 
the  
representative 
species 
.— (You know that 
Henslow has 
described a new 
Opuntia from t 
6 
o many enemies. On 
the whole I believe 
that many 
individual  
representative 
species 
 of large genera 
have wide ranges, 
but I do not 
consider the 
Letter 745: 
Hooker to 
Darwin on 5 
April 1844 
 
7 
pecies having a 
wide range is not 
large compared with 
other  
representative 
species 
 of the same genus 
whose limits are 
confined—& further 
becau 
8 
cause small genera 
have likewise 
individual widely 
extended  
representative 
species 
. The converse holds 
true in a certain 
degree & in the 
Cacti 
9 
that it is not 
proved in Botany 
that “in mundane 
genera the  
representative 
species 
 have a wide range 
each in its own 
country”, to any 
remarkab 
10 
ecies have extended 
ranges but I do not 
know that it is the  
representative 
species 
 that have wide 
ranges each in its 
own territory, even 
if tr 
11 t out, bearing representative  of widely 
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directly on the 
grand question, 
“Have the 10  
individual 
species 
distributed genera 
over 10 countries 
wide ranges  
12 
Isld & Society Isld 
lists, they are 
woefully imperfect, 
the  
representative 
species 
 are very few, there 
is a certain 
similarity between 
them, f 
Letter 804: 
Hooker to 
Darwin on 
30 Dec 1844 
 13 
several Islds of 
the Sandwich 
present numerous 
instances of  
representative 
species 
, nothing in this 
respect is known of 
the Society. Shall I 
s 
14 
vely what a third 
collector might 
produce. The 
instances of  
representative 
species 
 on the several 
Islets may be 
divided into 
2 groups, 1st. of 
Letter 883: 
Hooker to 
Darwin on 
12 July 
1845 
15 
o not know how far 
some of the genera 
may not have 
solitary  
representative 
species 
 in seperate Islets. 
Of confined genera 
there are many examp 
Letter 884: 
Hooker to 
Darwin mid 
July 1845 
16 
larly interested 
with similar facts 
in the Birds &c: Do 
the  
representative 
species 
 actually join on a 
neutral territory? 
Are both species, or  
Letter 912: 
Darwin to 
Hooker 3 
Sep 1845 
17 
am much pleased to 
hear you have 
worked out the 
identical &  
representative 
species 
 of N. temperate & 
Antarctic regions & 
shall be exceedingly  
Letter 996: 
Darwin to 
Hooker 3 
Sep 1845 
18 
ish Flora. When 
such results of any 
comparisons between 
the  
representative 
species 
 of the N. & 
S. hemispheres that 
my Flora will shew, 
shall b 
Letter 998: 
Hooker to 
Darwin 28 
Sep 1845 
 
All the instances shown in Figure 4 come from letters written by Darwin and J.D. 
Hooker, which can be explained by his cautious approach to revealing his 
theory. We can also observe other intertextual relations in the same letters, 
which will be discussed later (see section 5.5.10 Range + species), indicating 
the importance of this correspondence for the development of Darwin’s theory.  
Finally, what is striking about these examples is how suddenly they disappear 
from discourse, similarly to the notion of disjoined species (Section 5.5.3). 
However, in this case the topic restarted later, incidentally with a reference to 
Hooker:  
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Letter 1863 Darwin to Gray on 2 May 1856: 
1) The relation of the genera (excluding identical species) seems to 
me a most important element in geographical distribution often 
ignored, & I presume of more difficult application in plants than in 
animals, owing to the wider ranges of plants; but I find in 
N. Zealand (from Hooker) that the consideration of genera with 
representative species tells the story of relationship even plainer 
than the identity of the species with different parts of the world.— 
From the example above, we can observe the notion of representative species 
disappeared for more than 10 years from the correspondence and, 
unsurprisingly, was reintroduced to the discourse roughly around the time 
Darwin decided to publish his theory – once again illustrating the importance of 
Darwin’s correspondence in the formulation of his ideas. 
 
5.5.5 Describe + species 
The analysis presented in this section looks at the collocation describe + 
species, which includes the adjectives undescribed and described; as well as 
the respective verb forms. From Figure 5 we can notice that the collocation is 
concentrated relatively early on in Darwin’s correspondence. This coincides with 
the time of his classification work and does not necessarily indicate the 
negotiation of the meaning of the phrase. 
Figure 5 Distribution of collocation (describe* + species) 
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The logical assumption is confirmed by looking at the concordances showing 
practically no instances of intertextual relations or meaning negotiations, but 
rather reports on species description.  
 
Figure 6 Concordance output of (representative + species)  
1 very branch. as for 
insects I trust I shall 
send an host of  
undescribed 
species 
 to England.— I believe 
they have no small ones in 
the colle 
2 opical countries, I shall 
bring home a very great 
number of  
undescribed 
species 
 both from Brazil & the Rio 
Plata.— It may be a foolish 
fear 
3  were on the table at the 
Zoological Society; Mr 
Gould also  
described the 
11 species 
 from the Gallapagos, & all 
new.— Sarah Williams cut 
out thi 
4 might afford, should 
exclusively be employed on 
the new and  
undescribed 
species 
. Other naturalists and 
myself are of opinion that 
150 plate 
5 pinion, that 150 plates, 
would be necessary for the 
new and  
undescribed 
species 
, and that the probable 
expense of drawing and 
engraving, wo 
6 ength his vivid regret 
that M. Henslow has not 
been able to  
describe the 
species 
, or even characterize the 
genera of the very curious 
collec 
7 e to examine their 
structure more closely 
than I did when I  
described the 
species 
. Believe me my dear Sir | 
Yours very truly | Francis 
Walker 
8 ding Arctic forms.— These 
lists are troublesome to 
make, as  
species are so 
loosely described 
. For instance of the 
arbor. comp. of St Helena 
in one genus 
9  genus which I know to be 
found in South America— 
Babington  
described a 
species 
 from your collection found 
at Rio, which is very 
nearly all 
10  [Identifies CD's fossil 
shells and marks new 
species. Many  
species have been 
described 
 previously by Orbigny. The 
list is annotated by CD and 
Geor 
 
These examples do not indicate an intertextual negotiation of the notion of 
describe + species. Thus we cannot observe paraphrases indicating the 
negotiation of meaning. However, we can observe that the collocation mainly 
occurs at the beginning of the corpus, which corresponds to Darwin’s early 
work, his Beagle journey and work on collecting and describing species. 
Naturally, it is expected for Darwin to discuss undescribed species at this stage. 
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Conversely, describing species becomes much less relevant later on in the 
correspondence when Darwin becomes more immersed in defining his own 
theory. Thus this particular example demonstrates mainly the diachronic shifts 
in the focus of discourse.  
 
5.5.6 Derive + species 
Figure 7 shows the collocation derive + species, including the nominalised form 
derivation. However, as the number of examples was low, we can only observe 
one minor topic hotspot.  
Figure 7 Distribution of collocation (derive + species) 
 
When looking into more detail, we can observe that the hotspot is caused by a 
discussion on Owen’s paper theorising the derivation of species.  
Letter 4024: Darwin to Hooker on 5 Mar 1863: 
1) I have half a mind to get Owen’s paper on Aye-Aye, in which Lyell 
tells me, that he claims whole credit of making out the derivation 
or origin of species; & if this is so, write a letter to Athenæum & 
show, what he has really done.— It is in my Hist. Introduct. to 3d 
Edit of Origin; but I did not then point out the laugable definition 
he gives of “Creation”; after doubting whether certain species 
were “created”.— .[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4024] 
Letter 4186: Gray to Darwin on 28 May 1863: 
2) Your letter on Heterogeny is keen & good. Owen’s rejoinder 
ingenious. But his dissent from your well-put claims of Nat. Sel. to 
attention & regard, is good for nothing except on the admission of 
the view that species are somehow derived genealogically—& 
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this I judge from various of Owen’s statements that he really in his 
heart believes to be the case,—and was (as I long ago intimated 
my suspicions) hunting about for some system of derivation, when 
your book came down upon him like a thunder-clap. 
.[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4186] 
Letter 4248: Gray to Darwin on 21 July 1863  
3) have been reading Owen’s Aye-Aye paper. Well, this is rich and 
cool! Did I not tell you in Atlantic long ago that Owen had a 
transmutation theory of his own. It is your Hamlet, with the part 
of Hamlet left out. But as you say now you don’t so much insist on 
Nat. Selection if you can only have derivation of species,— and 
Owen goes in for derivation on the largest scale, you may as well 
lovingly embrace! Oh, it is rare fun. How I could now tease 
Agassiz, if I could see him,— only he is of late so cross and sore. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4248] 
These examples thus show a strong intertextual link to a third text, i.e. Owen’s 
Aye-Aye paper. Thus, the phrasal structure of derivation + species cannot be 
attributed to Darwin’s interpretation of the meaning of species. Apart from the 
reference to Owen’s work, it is very rarely used in the discourse which is the 
reason why the collocation ranks highly on MI-score, i.e. by being a very unique 
combination. Nevertheless, by identifying the topic hotspot, the intertextual 
relationship was quickly uncovered by looking at the wider context than the 
standard 5x5 span usually used for collocation studies.  
 
5.5.7 Allied + species 
Allied is a frequent collocate of species, counting 107 instances and the high 
number of collocations implies that the use of the modifier is relatively evenly 
distributed. Thus, there are only a few potential topic hotspots where the 
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collocations are grouped, although it is much harder to delimit where each 
group starts and begins.  This can be observed in Figure 8 below. 
Figure 8 Distribution of collocation (allied + species) 
 
It was not only difficult to delimit the hotspots, but the example of allied species 
did not show any particular intertextual relations in the potential topic hotspots. 
A potential implication of this result is that with highly frequent phrases, which 
are more likely to be evenly distributed, it may be difficult to identify meaningful 
topic hotspots. 
 
5.5.8 Close + species 
In this analysis both the adjective and adverb form, i.e. close and closely, are 
included. The example of close + species exemplified in Figure 2 indicates 
significantly stronger topic hotspots than with allied + species, and also that it is 
a concept frequently and consistently expressed throughout the discourse of 
Darwin’s correspondence. 
 
Figure 9 Distribution of collocation (close + species) 
The hotspots certainly indicate intertextual relations showing 25 instances of the 
collocation in the letters spanning from June 23rd to August 24th 1855. For 
simplicity, the results are presented as concordances in Figure 10, as it makes 
the comparison easier than listing all 25 examples with full context. 
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Figure 10 Concordance output of (close+species) indicating intertextual relations 
1 I will just mention what I want, it 
is, to have marked the “ 
close species ” in a Flora, so as to compare in 
different Floras whether t Letter 1695: 
Darwin to Asa 
Gray on 8 
June 1855 
2 o compare in different Floras 
whether the same genera have “ 
close species ”, & for other purposes too vague to 
enumerate.— I have atte 
3 le or present varieties. The 
definition I should give of a “ 
close species ” was one that you thought 
specifically distinct, but which  
4 cies, which you believe to be 
really species, but which are  
close species ;—taking some such definition for a 
“close species”, as a fo 
Letter 1705:  
Darwin to 
Henslow on 
27 June 1855 
5 which are close species;—taking 
some such definition for a “ 
close species ”, as a form, which even to a good 
Botanist is a little trou 
6 e unbound sheets of a copy of 
the Manual, and mark off the “ 
close species ’, by connecting them with a bracket 
Those thus connected so 
Letter 1707: 
Asa Gray to 
Darwin on 30 
June 1855 
7 ra of North America —we should 
find that the proportion of “ 
close species ” to the whole flora increased 
considerably. But here I spea 
8 h’s Fl. Germanica —or Godron’s 
Flora of France —& mark the ‘ 
close species ” on the same principle, you will 
doubtless find a much grea 
9  getting you to mark in 
accompanying list with (X) all the 
“ 
close species ” ie such as you do not think to be 
varieties, but which nev 
Letter 1708: 
Darwin to 
Henslow on 2 
July 1855 10  on subject.— I know & can 
perceive that the definition of “ 
close species ” is very vague, & therefore I shd. not 
care for the list be 
11 ds) but what you think are really 
species, but yet are very  
closely allied to 
some other 
species 
: I well know how vague this is, & 
perhaps you will find it  
Letter 1712: 
Darwin to 
Henslow on 7 
July 1855 12 lways the possibility & even 
sometimes probability of these  
close species  turning out varieties.— Ever most 
truly yours | C. Darwin P 
13 . Darwin Perhaps you might (if 
you can do the job) mark the  
closely allied 
species 
 in connection, thus in an imaginary 
genus diag Quercus pedu 
14 that you thought Q. pedunculata 
sessiliflora & humilis very  
closely allied 
species 
, but yet real species. I repeat perhaps 
the job will be imp 
15 ou I long hesitated whether I 
would make) about marking the  
close species . I do not quite understand from 
Hooker’s note, whether the  
Letter 1725: 
Darwin to Asa 
Gray, 21 July 
1855 
16 o not apply. On the other hand, 
many which I do not mark as  
close species , simply because entered in the 
Catalogue as Species & Vary. 
Letter 1743: 
Watson to 
Darwin on 17 
Aug 1855 
17 s Species & Vary., other botanists 
would consider to be the  
close species , while those marked would by them 
be deemed not close enoug 
18 r object. I think my leading idea 
was to select examples of  
close species  or quasi-species, rather than to make 
the list numerically  
Letter  1747: 
Watson to 
Darwin on 23 
Aug 1855 
19 ss large genera in Europe, or 
elsewhere. In the question of  
close species , I should prefer the testimony of Fries 
before that of Hook 
20 h. It would seem to follow as a 
logical necessity, that the  
species are 
closer 
 in the large genera: diag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8 9 Many sps. 1 – 3 
21 nk you enough for the very great 
trouble which the list of “ 
close species ” must have caused you.— What 
knowledge & labour & judgment  
Letter 1749: 
Darwin to Asa 
Gray, 24 Aug 
1855 
22 ies-splitters, to mark (without the 
object being known) the  
close species  in a list; then if I counted the average 
number of the spec 
23  it would, to a certain extent, tell 
whether on average the  
close species  occurred in the larger genera. Now in 
your M.S list (Salix  
24 ing what is called a genus, some 
of them are apt to be more  
closely allied 
than are the 
species 
 in the smaller genera. Mr. H. C. 
Watson has marked for me t 
25 hich was a very long one, & the 
average of the genera with “ 
close species ” is 6.37 & the same standard of 
comparison as used with you 
Letter 1750: 
Darwin to 
Watson, 26 
Aug 1855 
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An interesting example of the development of meaning is found in the letters of 
Charles Darwin to John Stevens Henslow, where Darwin is unwillingly forced to 
keep expanding on the notion of close species. Sadly, Henslow’s input is only 
preserved as references in Darwin’s letters.  
Letter 1705 Darwin to Henslow on 8 June 1855 
1) & mark with cross, all those species, which you believe to be 
really species, but which are close species;—taking some such 
definition for a “close species”, as a form, which even to a good 
Botanist is a little troublesome to distinguish, or which you can 
just conceive possible, though not probable, that further research 
will prove to be only 
varieties.[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1705] 
Letter 1708 Darwin to Henslow on 2 July 1855 
2) I think you have quite misunderstood me in regard to my object in 
getting you to mark in accompanying list with (X) all the “close 
species” ie such as you do not think to be varieties, but which 
nevertheless are very closely allied;—it has nothing whatever to 
do with their cultivation, but I cannot tell you object, as it might 
unconsciously influence you in marking them. Will you draw your 
pencil right through all the names of those (few) species, of which 
you may know nothing. Afterwards when done I will tell you my 
object,—not that it is worth telling, though I myself am very 
curious on subject.— I know & can perceive that the definition of  
“close species” is very vague, & therefore I shd. not care for the 
list being marked by anyone, except by such as yourself.— 
.[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1708] 
Letter 1712 Darwin to Henslow 7 July 1855 
3) I do not think I have yet made it quite clear what I want marked in 
the Catalogue. (but I am really ashamed to be so troublesome) it 
is not so much what you “think may turn out varieties” (to quote 
your own words) but what you think are really species, but yet are 
very closely allied to some other species: I well know how vague 
this is, & perhaps you will find it impossible to do; but certainly, 
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judging from what I have seen in animals, one pretty often meets 
a pair or more real (as far as one can judge) species, which yet are 
far more closely allied together than the average. 
4) Of course there is always the possibility & even sometimes 
probability of these close species turning out varieties. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1712] 
From these examples we can observe how Darwin is forced to expand the 
definition of close species in order to get Henslow to interpret it as Darwin 
intended. Although Henslow’s letters are lost, from Darwin’s citations we can 
notice that his interpretation must be different enough to incite Darwin to 
gradually expand his definition of close species. 
 
5.5.9 Origin + species 
The example of origin + species is particularly interesting as it forms the title of 
Darwin’s most famous work, particularly considering the time the collocation first 
appeared in discourse. Figure 11 shows the distribution of the collocation in the 
correspondence. 
Figure 11 Distribution of collocation (origin + species) 
 
Almost all hotspots indicate a discussion on Darwin’s book and show plenty of 
intertextual relations. However, it is the early hotspots and specifically the lack 
of them that is interesting. Namely, the first nine instances of the collocation are 
not attributed to Darwin, and there are only a few instances that can be said to 
have occurred before Darwin started work on his manuscript of the book. Thus 
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the distribution of the collocation indicates that Darwin developed his theory 
after many years of his work with species.  
Interestingly, the earliest reference from Darwin to the concept of origin of 
species is dated December 1855, more than 10 years after starting the 
development of his theory of transmutation. Thus it is interesting to observe 
these early instances in order to observe whether they relate to Darwin’s 
formulation of the notion. 
The earliest instance of the collocation comes in a letter from J.D. Hooker, 
where he rejects the discussion on the notion, stating that ‘each species has 
one origin is immutable & migrates’, as seen in the example below: 
Letter 947 Hooker to Darwin Feb 1846: 
1) At present I endeavor to hold aloof from all speculations on the 
origin of species, & wish to till at any rate this part of my flora is 
finished. When that is the case I should like to have much talk 
about it with you, at present I go on the old assumption that each 
species has one origin is immutable & migrates. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-947] 
Ten years later, in a letter from Edward Blyth to Darwin, we can observe that 
Hooker himself started publicly ‘embracing some speculations on the origin of 
species.’ The implication that Hooker is embracing these ideas implies that they 
are not necessarily his own; although it is not stated what these ideas might be. 
Letter 1776 Nov 1855 Blyth to Darwin 
2) I have not yet seen, & look forward with much interest to read, 
what Hooker and Thomson have written on the general subject of 
species & varieties of plants, in their Flora Indica; embracing (if I 
understand aright) some speculations on the origin of species. 
Thomson has been my neighbour for some months; within a few 
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miles: but I have not yet been able to find time to spend a day 
with him, though pressingly asked to do so. Now that the cold 
weather has fairly set in, I mean to do so soon. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1776] 
Although Darwin did not use the term origin until December 1855, he was the 
first to use it with the implications on transmutability of species. In that letter to 
Edgar Leopold Layard, Darwin states that his theory is a product of many years 
of collecting data and reasoning about variation and origin of species.  
Letter 1794 December 1855 Darwin to Edgar Leopold Layard 
3) I have during many years been collecting all the facts & reasoning 
which I could, in regard to the variation & origin of species, 
intending to give, as far as lies in my power, the many difficulties 
surrounding the subject on all sides. One chief line of investigation 
naturally is concerned with the amount of variation of all our 
domestic animals. 
4)  [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1794] 
In the letter to J.D. Dana, Darwin explicitly states that he is already working on 
his theory, although he does not specify exactly what it is, but expressing it 
vaguely as drawing up on ‘variation & the origin of species, classification &c.’ 
Letter 1925 July 1856 Darwin to J.D. Dana 
5) I want to beg one more favour to the many which formerly you 
have conferred on me. I am extremely much interested in regard 
to the blind cave animals, described some time since in your 
Journal by Prof. Silliman Junr., as the subject is connected with a 
work of somewhat general nature, which I am endeavouring to 
draw up on variation & the origin of species, classification &c. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1925] 
Finally, Darwin gives credit to Hooker for his contributions to the formulation of 
his theory. Another interesting remark is that he understood how little his 
opinion on the issue is worth without like-minded supporters. 
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Letter 1938 August 1856, Darwin to Hooker: 
6) I thank you most sincerely for all your assistance; & whether or no 
my Book may be wretched you have done your best to make it less 
wretched. Sometimes I am in very good spirits & sometimes very 
low about it. My own mind is decided on the question of origin of 
species but good Heavens how little that is worth. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1938] 
To summarise, from these examples, we can observe that, prior to the 
publication, Darwin has extensively discussed his theory without explicitly using 
the term origin of species. This was not necessarily a strategy for keeping his 
theory secret, but more of a product of the kind of knowledge he was looking 
for. This interpretation would explain the hotspot distribution starting near the 
time of the publication, despite the extensive indirect discussion of the notion. 
From a theoretical perspective, attributing the theory to his correspondent J.D. 
Hooker reaffirms the proposition of Darwin’s theory being a product of a 
meaning negotiation process.  
 
5.5.10 Range + species 
Range + species is another collocation that has well-defined topic hotspots. As 
it can be observed from Figure 12 the discussion on the topic is generally well 
clustered in the first half of the correspondence but is almost completely omitted 
from later discussions.  
Figure 12 Distribution of collocation (range + species) 
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The analysis of correspondence also confirms intertextual relations in topic 
hotspots. Specifically, the discussion on ranges of species is heavily 
concentrated in a few letters, sent between J.D. Hooker and Darwin. 
Particularly interesting are the examples where the expansion of meaning 
through paraphrase can be observed. Looking in detail, we can observe this 
process in the following examples.  
Firstly, Darwin queries Hooker on the hypothesis that large genera might have 
wide ranges, about which he has certain doubts, which are expressed later in 
the letter. 
Letter 744: Darwin to Hooker, March 1844 
1) suppose a genus with ten or more species, inhabiting the ten main 
botanical regions, should you expect that all or most of these ten 
species would have wide ranges (ie were found in most parts of) 
in their respective countries. 
[http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-744] 
Hooker responds somewhat in agreement to this proposal, but also tones down 
its importance, expressing possible exceptions to such a proposal: 
Letter 745: Hooker to Darwin, March 1844 
2) On the whole I believe that many individual representative 
species of large genera have wide ranges, but I do not consider 
the fact as one of great value, because the proportion of such 
species having a wide range is not large compared with other 
representative species of the same genus whose limits are 
confined—& further because small genera have likewise individual 
widely extended representative species. 
[http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-745] 
In the same letter, Darwin provides an example of the genus of monkey, which, 
to his belief, demonstrates that the hypothesis is probably false: 
188 
 
3) on the other hand no genus of monkey ranges over so large a part 
of the world & the individual species in their respective countries 
seldom range over wide spaces. I suspect, (but am not sure) that 
in the genus mus (the most mundane genus of all mammifers) the 
individual species have not wide ranges, which is opposed to my 
query.— 
[ http://www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-744] 
In the response, Hooker addresses several issues raised by Darwin. Firstly he 
agrees that Darwin’s proposal is likely, but devalues the importance, or the 
generality, of the ranges of individual species stating:  
Letter 745 Hooker to Darwin, March 1844: 
4) The converse holds true in a certain degree & in the Cacti we have 
a parallel case to Monkeys, their geographical range is small 
being confined to warm & chiefly to tropical S. America & Mexico I 
have somewhere read that the species are remarkably peculiar 
to certain narrow limits. 
Thus Hooker expands on the proposals of Darwin, firstly by stating that the 
hypothesis cannot be generalised, and secondly by providing further evidence 
to support his claim. In the example above, we can also observe how Hooker 
paraphrases Darwin’s ‘the individual species have not wide ranges’ into ‘the 
species are remarkably peculiar to certain narrow limits. ’ 
Finally, Darwin offers two possible scenarios in which genera might be divided: 
5) It is evident a genus might be widely diffused in two ways. 1st by 
many different species, each with restricted ranges, & 2d by 
many or few species with wide ranges.— Any light, which you cd 
throw on this I shd be very much obliged for. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-744] 
In response, Hooker expands the meaning of Darwin’s hypothesis by proposing 
a third scenario: 
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6) …, I believe that most large mundane Genera contain both 1st 
many different species each with restricted limits, & 2nd also a 
large proportion of species with very wide ranges besides 3rd 
many local species with very narrow ranges: but it is not apparent 
that the proportional number of species distributed under any one 
of these conditions is larger in general than those distributed 
under either of the others.— I shall however bear the matter in 
mind & hope for new lights in time.. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-745] 
In the above examples Hooker demonstrates three strategies of meaning 
negotiation; firstly, he repeats Darwin’s first statement word for word, implying 
complete agreement in interpretation; secondly, he paraphrases Darwin’s 
second statement by removing the proposition of a few species with wide 
ranges determining a genus, thus expressing partial agreement; and finally, 
Hooker proposes a third alternative introducing new interpretation into the 
discussion.  
5.5.11 Variable + species 
Finally, the last collocation presented in this analysis also shows one or two 
topic hotspots in the first half of the plot. Although mostly concentrated around 
the hotspots, the idea expressed by this collocation is used sporadically in the 
correspondence, before it eventually disappears from the discourse. 
Figure 13 Distribution of collocation (variable + species) 
 
The following examples from the marked hotspots illustrate the process of 
meaning negotiation. Firstly, we can see Darwin clarifying his question, since he 
did not get the answer he expected, indicating that Gray did not understand the 
190 
 
difference between ‘genera with close species’ and ‘genera with variable 
species.’ 
Letter 2060 Darwin to Gray, March 1857: 
1) There is only one point, to which for myself, I wish to call your 
attention, viz whether you rightly understood that my question 
did not refer to genera having very close species, but to genera 
having very variable species. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2060] 
Similarly, it appears Darwin has posed the same question to Herbert Watson, 
who expresses uncertainty to what Darwin considers as ‘variable genera.’ 
Watson proceeds to express three alternative interpretations, each of which he 
supports with examples. 
Letter 2063 Watson to Darwin, March 1857: 
2) I am not quite sure of understanding your question about 
“variable genera”. To explain my uncertainty, I will endeavour to 
define or state the differences for choice. 
1. Genera, of which the species are close, & difficult to distinguish 
by reason of their similarity;—but the species themselves not 
remarkably variable. Ex: Carex & Ranunculus (excluding 
Batrachium) 
2. Genera, of which the quasi species are so close that it becomes 
highly difficult to say whether the genus is composed of a 
comparatively few extremely variable species, or of many very 
close species. Ex: Rubus & Hieracium. 
3. Genera, the species of which are themselves so variable, & 
approximating, that it becomes difficult to say where one species 
ends & the next begins. Ex: Viola & Saxifraga, at least in certain 
sections or subgenera—[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-
2063] 
These examples show how the meaning of variable genera, can be 
misinterpreted, reinterpreted and redefined – essentially negotiated and 
constructed in discourse. Darwin, Gray and Watson, as participants of 
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discourse, determine the questions and the answers collaboratively. Thus the 
process of meaning construction is a process of interpretation and 
reinterpretation of words.  
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6 Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the results of the analysis, presented in the previous chapter, will 
be compared to the theoretical notions discussed in the literature review and 
theoretical framework. The aim of this discussion is not solely to support the 
theoretical approach taken in this research, but also to contrast the results with 
alternative explanations. 
This chapter is divided into sections which correspond to the analyses 
undertaken in the empirical chapter (Chapter 5 Analysis). Thus, the first section 
deals with the analysis of discursive, or contextual, meaning of the term species 
which is contrasted to the meaning of the term varieties. The aim of this section 
is to demonstrate that, despite the uncertainty expressed by Darwin and his 
peers, a clear difference in the meaning of these terms can be observed in their 
correspondence.  
The following section discusses the analysis of the paraphrases of the term 
species. The analysis is discussed in relation to the question of the formulation 
of linguistic meaning in the act of paraphrase. Namely, based on the notion of 
paraphrase as evidence of interpretation (Teubert, 2010), this analysis observes 
how, in the acts of paraphrase, meanings are not just created, but perpetually 
reformulated in further paraphrases.  
The third section discusses the realisation of intertextuality in discourse and the 
role of intertextual markers in the process of meaning negotiation.  The analysis 
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of intertextual markers is used to support the argument that new definitions of 
meaning are essentially paraphrases since they are usually reactions to other 
interpretations. 
The fourth section focuses on the diachronic dimension of meaning 
construction. The aim of this section is to focus on the evidence of diachronic 
change of meaning to argue against the propositions of structuralist and 
cognitive theorists that linguistic meaning is a product of universal, unconscious 
and innate structures of language.  
Finally, the last section summarises all the findings in the analysis and relates 
them to different theories of meaning construction as well as different 
approaches in linguistics.  
 
6.2 Discourse realisation of meaning 
The first analysis presented in this thesis involved the analysis of collocations of 
the terms species and varieties. The collocation analyses have demonstrated 
that the meaning of the terms species and varieties can be distinguished by 
analysing the ways they are used in discourse. Furthermore, contrastive 
analysis of collocations showed clear differences in the meaning between these 
closely related terms.  
Although throughout the thesis the focus was on the analysis of the term 
species, this analysis included a comparison with the term varieties, in order to 
demonstrate that the meanings of such closely related terms can be 
distinguished relatively easily using these methods. This was motivated by 
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many examples found in the correspondence where Darwin expresses the 
difficulty of distinguishing these terms.  
1) even supposing Botanists better agreed than they are likely to 
be in our day, as to what (or which) are species & what are 
varieties. Really, they can neither define what species are, 
nor can they empirically agree in selecting species from 
varieties, or varieties from species.— 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1775] 
In this task, the three-fold analysis of collocations of these terms proved 
particularly successful in distinguishing their meanings.  Thus, the first analysis 
(5.2.1 Frequency collocations) provided us with some insight on the similarities 
of the meanings of these terms since 9 out of the 20 highest ranking collocates 
were shared by the two terms.  
The second analysis (5.2.2 Mutual Information) demonstrated a more striking 
difference in the meanings of these terms by identifying a variety of term-
specific collocations. This analysis identified collocations that were more 
exclusive to the search terms (nodes), which formed more specialised 
expressions thus providing a starker contrast between the meanings of the two 
terms.  
Finally, the contrastive analysis (5.2.3 Contrasting Collocations) demonstrated 
several sets of semantically related collocations that distinctly differentiate the 
two terms. This analysis showed the advantages of combining interpretative 
and statistical approaches. Namely, based on the lists of collocations for each 
of the nodes, semantic groups of collocates were identified and compared for 
each of the search terms; for example terms denoting geographical ranges (see 
Section 5.2.3.1 Contrasting collocations: wide and ). A similar approach has 
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been conducted by Baker et al. (2008) where they compared the collocations of 
refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers by grouping them into semantic 
categories. Thus the aim of both approaches was to identify semantic 
preferences (Stubbs, 2001) of these terms. For example, the collocates of 
species, denoting wide geographical ranges, such as British, European, 
Northern, etc., were tested how frequently they collocated with varieties. On the 
other hand, all the terms denoting narrow geographical ranges, which 
collocated with the node varieties were tested how frequently they collocated 
with the term species. Thus the results were contrasted by cross-referencing 
the raw frequencies of co-occurrence, which also allowed for the calculation of 
the ‘zero’ collocation, i.e. the absence of collocation.  
A potential alternative approach to this analysis is to use the SketchDiff function 
in the Sketch Engine corpus access tool (Kilgarriff, Rychly, Smrz, & Tugwell, 
2004) which compares the strongest collocations of the two compared nodes. 
The difference with the approach presented in the thesis is that the SketchDiff 
option does not contrast the terms in semantic groups, but rather focuses on 
specific grammatical relations (gramrels), which was not the aim of this 
analysis. Furthermore, by contrasting collocations in semantic groups, we 
observed tendencies which otherwise would not be noticed because of the 
individual low frequencies of semantically related terms. Thus, we can make 
comparisons of collocates which are not frequent or statistically strong enough 
to be observed in collocation analysis on their own, but as a group show quite 
distinct patterns.   
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Although the results of collocation analyses are foreseeable from the 
perspective of corpus linguistics, in the context of the study of meaning 
construction, they have provided important evidence to support the argument 
for discourse construction of meaning. Specifically, collocation analyses 
successfully distinguished specific meanings of the terms species and varieties 
in a discourse abundant with statements indicating the difficulties in 
differentiating the meanings of these terms. This indicates that the meaning of 
these terms can be attributed less to the physical properties of objects referred 
to as species and varieties, but more to how the terms are used in the 
discourse.  
 
6.3 Paraphrase 
The analysis of explicit definitions of the meaning of species aimed to 
demonstrate that the meaning of the term species is not based on innate 
concepts or physical properties of objects denoted as species, but rather that it 
is constructed in the discourse.  
The argument against innate universal concepts is most evident from the 
multiple definitions of species expressed in the correspondence by different 
naturalists. In the example below, Darwin reports on the general disagreement 
among naturalists on how to define species and varieties. 
1) even supposing Botanists better agreed than they are likely to 
be in our day, as to what (or which) are species & what are 
varieties. Really, they can neither define what species are, 
nor can they empirically agree in selecting species from 
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varieties, or varieties from species.— Jordan would make a 
million species. J. D. Hooker would perhaps allow 50,000.  
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1775] 
The lack of agreement among experts on natural classification on how to define 
species and varieties certainly questions the argument that their concept of 
species is universal. Furthermore, from the example we can observe that 
naturalists referred to in the correspondence do not innately distinguish 
between species and varieties even when empirically analysing the physical 
properties of specimens.  On the other hand, the examples from 
correspondence indicate that the definitions of species influence the 
interpretations of the empirical data; with different definitions emphasising 
different physical features and attributes:  
2) It is really laughable to see what different ideas are prominent 
in various naturalists minds, when they speak of “species” in 
some resemblance is everything & descent of little weight—
in some resemblance seems to go for nothing & Creation the 
reigning idea—in some descent the key—in some sterility an 
unfailing test, with others not worth a farthing. It all comes, I 
believe, from trying to define the undefinable. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2022] 
From these examples we can observe that the definitions of the terms species 
and varieties affect empirical decisions more than the physical properties of 
specimens affect the definitions of the terms. This supports the theoretical 
approach of linguistic meaning being the product of discourse as outlined in 
Section 2.2 Constructing meaning and reality.   
The notion of discourse construction of meaning is based on Teubert’s (2010) 
definition of the paraphrase as an act of interpretation. In the correspondence 
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corpus we can observe many examples of such definitions representing 
speakers’ interpretations of the meaning of the term species. For example: 
3) After personally comparing the two, I cannot see how any 
sane man can infer that each was separately created. Yet they 
must be distinct species now, (according to my interpretation 
or definition of that term) for otherwise they would intercross 
& produce races having intermediate genital hooklets and(…) 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6332a.txt] 
The significance of the notion of paraphrase is not in that it represents different 
interpretations of meaning, but rather that it illustrates that interpretations are 
reactions to others’ discourse. In other words, the notion of paraphrase is 
introduced to demonstrate the construction of meaning through negotiation in 
discourse. Examples 4 to 6 demonstrate how certain interpretations are 
diachronically developed and expanded. This development is realised almost as 
direct paraphrases of previous definitions, gradually expanding and refining the 
meaning of the term. For example, Darwin’s initial formulation: 
4) I am almost convinced (quite contrary to opinion I started 
with) that species are not (it is like confessing a murder) 
immutable. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-729] 
is refined into: 
5) The general conclusion at which I have slowly been driven 
from a directly opposite conviction is that species are mutable 
& that allied species are co-descendants of common stocks. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-782]  
and finally Darwin expands the meaning even further: 
6) From the nature of the grounds, which make me believe that 
species are mutable in form, these grounds cannot be 
restricted to the closest-allied species;  
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-793] 
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From these examples we can observe that each interpretation is realised as a 
paraphrase of the previous definition to which new interpretations have been 
added. Thus, the analysis has shown that the definitions of the meaning of the 
terms species and natural selection are not fixed objects of discourse, but rather 
constructs which are subject to reinterpretation and renegotiation. Therefore, 
definitions are not property of their authors, but rather propositions which are 
open for interpretation and reformulation by the discourse community. In other 
words, definitions of meaning are not systemic laws or natural facts, but rather 
statements that one may accept, ignore or argue against. In the example below, 
we can observe how Darwinist theory was rejected by the French scientific 
community. 
7) How strange it is that the country which gave birth to Buffon, 
the elder Geoffroy & especially to Lamarck shd now cling so 
pertinaceously to the belief that species are immutable 
creations.   
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5794] 
 
In this example, we can observe that without the acceptance of discourse 
community, particular meanings will not become part of that discourse. Thus, 
consensus is a prerequisite for meaning to become accepted as part of the 
discourse. This supports the notion that language is a social phenomenon in 
which linguistic meanings are constructed in relation to other discourses. 
Conversely, the lack of agreement on the meaning of the terms species and 
varieties, as well as the impact the definitions have on empirical approaches to 
their study, contradicts the assertion that meanings are synchronic, universal or 
innate.  
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6.4 Intertextual markers 
Charles Darwin’s correspondence as a corpus of epistolary texts is abundant 
with intertextual markers. These markers of intertextuality function as organisers 
of discourse but also as links to other texts in relation to which paraphrases are 
made.  
In the process of meaning construction, in this case of the notion of species, 
intertextual markers serve as explicit links to other interpretations that the 
paraphrase may relate to. In the corpus of Charles Darwin’s correspondence 
the following markers have been identified: (un)aware + preposition, (dis)agree 
+ preposition, what + say, say + preposition, object or objection to, in regard or 
regarding, hear + preposition or determiner, according to, ask + preposition, 
state or mention that, and discussion, proposal, assertion.    
Intertextuality markers show the stance and strategies people use when 
negotiating meaning. However, although they have operational functions such 
as expressing agreement or disagreement, invoking other texts as reference, 
positioning ones argument etc., the main purpose of these intertextual markers 
is to invoke other discourses in relation to which a particular a paraphrase is 
made. For example: 
1) You say that all Botanists would agree that many tropical plants 
could not withstand a somewhat cooler climate. But I have come 
not to care at all for general beliefs without the special facts. 
[www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5020] 
 
2) All analogy makes me quite disagree with the Duke that the 
differences in the beak, wing & tail are not of importance to the 
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several species. In the only two species which I have watched, the 
difference in flight & in the use of the tail was conspicuously 
great. [www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4752] 
 
Intertextuality markers illustrate the negotiation of meaning in the sense they 
make a reference to previous interpretations and introduce a reinterpretation. In 
other words, they explicitly demonstrate that interpretations are reactions to 
previous discourse.  
Although, intertextual markers illustrate dialogic formulation, their analysis does 
not directly demonstrate the diachronic aspect of meaning development. As the 
term implies they connect different texts, with the latter forming a paraphrase of 
the former, but they do not capture the diachronic dimension beyond that.  
Intertextuality markers are closely related to the notion of paraphrase in the 
sense defined by Teubert (2010); i.e. their function is to relate to other 
discourses when new interpretations are made.  
To summarise, the aim of the analysis of the markers of intertextuality was to 
illustrate that meanings are not fixed but perpetually negotiated in discourse. 
Definitions of meaning are motivated as reactions to previous interpretations, 
which is realised through the use of explicit or implicit intertextual relations. If 
meaning was a product of a generative system as described by Chomsky 
(2006) then there would be no reason to form intertextual relations when 
making definitions of meaning. Thus the extensive use of explicit and implicit 
intertextuality supports the argument that meanings are products of negotiations 
in discourse. 
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6.5 Diachronic analysis  
Diachronic analyses of meaning have been conducted before by other 
researchers (e.g. Kehoe, 2009; Cheung, 2009). However, like in Cheung’s 
(2009) analysis, such analyses usually observed the processes of meaning 
negotiation as a successive set of reinterpretations. Although, this corresponds 
to diachronic development of meaning, such research is only possible in 
controlled environments. Whereas, in general discourse a plethora of topics and 
meanings are constantly being reinterpreted in an environment where meanings 
emerge and gradually disappear from discourse. 
Charles Darwin’s correspondence does not constitute a well-balanced corpus of 
social interactions, as it is not a complete account of Darwin’s correspondence. 
As such, a detailed diachronic analysis of meaning negotiation is not possible 
due to the lack of the necessary data. Nevertheless, the diachronic analysis of 
meaning construction was still possible, albeit in a more general analysis.  
The diachronic analysis presented in this thesis analyses how particular 
collocations are used diachronically in discourse. The focus of the analys is is 
not so much on how interpretations are being modified, since the corpus does 
not represent a complete account of meaning negotiation. Rather the analysis 
focuses on how and when particular meanings enter discourse, when they are 
discussed the most, and whether they stop being discussed in discourse. 
The moments in discourse when particular notions are discussed most 
frequently are defined as ‘topic hotspots’. As these hotspots indicate an 
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intensified use of a particular expression in discourse, they imply a temporal 
point where particular interpretations were intensely discussed.  
The case of disjoined + species, discussed in Section 5.5.3 Disjoined + species, 
exemplifies the main goals of such diachronic analysis as it demonstrates 
clearly how one particular interpretation enters discourse, establishes clear 
intertextual relations and then abruptly disappears from the discussion. The 
examples like this one correspond to Dawkins’ (2006) meme theory 
demonstrating that particular interpretations have a life of their own, which 
depend on their repetition in discourse.  
Furthermore, the case of mutable + species, discussed in Section 5.5.2 Mutable 
+ species illustrates the purpose of identifying topic hotspots. Specifically, the 
two hotspots identified in the early stages of correspondence represent key 
moments of reformulation of the term species. It is in these hotspots where the 
interpretation of ‘immutability of species’ is replaced with the notion that species 
are indeed mutable. 
These examples illustrate the diachronic nature of meaning. Thus meaning is 
not a fixed property of language; rather it is perpetually renegotiated in 
discourse. Different interpretations are constantly being proposed causing a 
gradual change in meaning. Thus this analysis provides a strong argument 
against the proposition of synchronic interpretation of meaning and language.  
 
 
204 
 
6.6 Summary 
The analyses presented in this thesis have been based on the theoretical 
formulation of discourse as an autopoietic system, where meanings are 
formulated in relation to one another. The analyses of collocation, paraphrase 
and intertextuality have all presented strong evidence that meaning is 
formulated through negotiation in discourse, thus supporting the theories of 
dialogism (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981), intertextuality (Kristeva & Moi, 1986), 
formulation of meaning in discourse (Foucault, et al., 1972; Sinclair & Carter, 
2004), and definition of paraphrase as an act of interpretation (Teubert, 2005, 
2007, 2010).  
Considering the examples of co-existence of multiple interpretations of the 
notion of species, with evidence of intertextual relationships between different 
definitions and diachronic change of meaning, there is little evidence to support 
any conceptual or structural theories outlined in the literature review. Chomsky’s 
(2006) argument of generative grammar is contradicted by the high frequency of 
intertextual relations when making new definitions of the term species. The vast 
number of different interpretations of species contradicts the innate and 
universal structures proposed by structural (Johnson, 2003; Saussure, et al., 
1983) and cognitive theorists (Fodor, 1998; Pinker, 1994). Finally, the evidence 
of the diachronic change of meaning contradicts the proposals of synchronic 
language systems (Chomsky, 2006; Saussure, et al., 1983).   
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7 Conclusion  
7.1 Summary 
This thesis has demonstrated that linguistic meaning has both dialogic and 
diachronic dimensions. Specifically, the research analysis confirmed the 
theoretical position that meanings are constructs of discourse and are as such 
contingent and negotiable. This stance is in contrast to the definition of 
language as a psychological phenomenon (see Section 2.1.1 Language as a 
psychological phenomenon), which argues that meanings are generally either 
innate or unconscious elements of language. Corpus linguists have countered 
these claims for decades by demonstrating all the meaningful patterns that can 
be deduced from the observation of linguistic data. However, the aim of this 
thesis was also to demonstrate that meanings are products of discourse and as 
such have a diachronic dimension. This was achieved by a corpus analysis 
investigating the intertextual links and evidence of meaning negotiation. In 
particular, the methods applied a diachronic approach to the analyses of 
collocation, paraphrase, and intertextuality, which demonstrated that meanings 
in language are contingent constructs subject to ongoing negotiation. 
Furthermore, the thesis has succeeded in answering all the research questions 
presented in the introductory chapter; namely: 
 
1.  Is there any evidence to suggest that the meaning of the term 
species is a product of a generative language system and thus 
independent from discourse? 
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The analyses of paraphrase and intertextual markers have demonstrated 
that the definitions of the term species are formed in relation to previous 
discourse. As the definitions of species illustrate strong intertextual 
relationships, it is unlikely that they are a product of a discourse-
independent generative language system. 
 
2. Is there any evidence to suggest that the meaning of the term 
species is a product of negotiation in discourse? 
Intertextual relations between different definitions of the term species, as 
well as the evidence of paraphrasing previous interpretations, indicate 
that the meaning of species is formulated in relation to previous 
definitions of the term. Furthermore, there is evidence that some 
interpretations are not further paraphrased and expanded, but on 
occasion ignored by discourse communities. This indicates that 
meanings are products of social negotiation and depend on acceptance 
by the discourse community.  
 
3. Is there any evidence to suggest that the meaning of the term 
species is either synchronic or diachronic? In other words, does 
the meaning of the term species change over time? 
As meanings are subject to negotiation in discourse, they constantly 
change and are never fixed. This is evident in analyses of paraphrases 
and intertextual relations which indicate that meanings are constantly 
reinterpreted. Furthermore, diachronic analysis illustrates how particular 
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interpretations appear and disappear from discourse. Similarly, topic 
hotspots help to identify where the meanings are most intensively 
discussed, thus indicating at what point in discourse the reformulation of 
meaning takes place. 
 
7.2 Empirical findings 
7.2.1 Collocation analysis 
The first analysis focused on identifying the most common interpretations of the 
word species through the analysis of collocations. The main purpose of this 
study was to identify interpretations for the use in diachronic analysis. The 
secondary goal of the analysis was to contribute to the debate on the meaning 
of the word species, particularly in relation to the closely related notion of 
varieties.  
The analysis of collocation using t-score and MI-score statistical measures 
identified the most frequent and the strongest collocates of the terms species 
and varieties. These results identified certain distinctive patterns which 
differentiate the meanings of these terms, but more importantly uncovered the 
key information for the subsequent contrastive and diachronic analyses.  
The application of these methods is a standard procedure in corpus linguistics 
and as such does not offer a methodological contribution to the scientific 
debate. Similarly, from a theoretical perspective, the analysis merely confirmed 
that the meaning of a word can be observed in the discourse, but without 
offering any new insights on the process of meaning construction. Nevertheless, 
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as mentioned above, the main goal of this analysis was to uncover the key 
interpretations of the terms species and varieties, which were subsequently 
used in contrastive and diachronic analyses. 
 
7.2.2 Contrastive collocation analysis 
The idea for the contrastive collocation analysis came from the method in which 
t-score and MI-score collocation analyses were conducted. Namely, for both 
analyses the minimum number of collocates was set to at least five instances. 
In this manner, the collocation analysis identified only those linguistic items that 
co-occurred with the search term at least five times in the corpus.  
To contrast the meaning of the terms species and varieties, their collocates 
were grouped based on their meanings, forming semantic collocation groups.  
Thus collocates of each term belonging to the same semantic group were 
compared. This approach has some similarities with the SketchDiff function in 
Sketch Engine corpus access tool (Kilgarriff, et al., 2004), but the difference 
between the two is that SketchDiff is calculated taking into account the 
grammatical relations between the two terms, whereas this analysis focused on 
the terms’ semantic preferences. This showed a clearer contrast in the way the 
terms species and varieties were used. For example, the word species was 
more frequently often used to describe organisms with wide natural habitats, 
collocating with words such as British, European, American etc. On the other 
hand, the word varieties collocated more frequently with terms denoting narrow 
habitats, e.g. local and garden.  
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By grouping the collocates this analysis has also demonstrated that words of 
similar meaning tend to collocate with the same nodes, although this finding is 
expected, especially when proposing that meaning is a product of paraphrasing. 
 
7.2.3 Paraphrase analysis 
The aim of this analysis was to demonstrate that the act of the explanation of 
meaning is essentially an act of negotiation of meaning in which new 
interpretations are constructed in relation to the previous ones. Furthermore, the 
aim was also to demonstrate that the meaning of the word species depends 
more on the social consensus than the natural and physical properties of the 
referent.  
The results of this analysis show that in the discourse of Charles Darwin’s 
correspondence many different interpretations of the meaning of the term 
species exist. The multitude of different interpretations of the meaning of 
species indicates that the meaning of the term is not based either on the 
physical properties of species, or some innate mental conception. Namely, if 
either of these proposals were accurate we would expect more unified 
interpretations of the meaning of species.   
The key observation of this analysis is that the interpretations of the meaning 
gradually expand by adding on new information to previous interpretations. This 
is clearly shown in Darwin’s initially hesitant formulations of the mutability of 
species. This indicates that the meaning is product of a gradual addition of 
interpretations realised in the acts of paraphrase.  
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7.2.4 Intertextuality markers 
The analysis of intertextuality markers has been implemented to observe the 
process of meaning negotiation. However, the issue with analysing 
intertextuality markers for the purpose of analysing meaning construction was 
that they could not be analysed on their own in the whole correspondence 
corpus since they could refer to virtually any point in discourse. Thus the 
analysis had to be performed on a sub-corpus made of only the paragraphs 
containing the word species. In that way, only the markers of intertextuality in 
the immediate context of the word species have been observed. The analysis 
observed ten intertextual markers which demonstrated that meanings are 
discussed, negotiated and constructed in discourse. 
Having observed the use of intertextual markers in the context the term species 
was discussed, the analysis has identified a set of functions that these markers 
performed in the discourse. The most common function intertextual markers are 
used for is simply, as their name suggests, to create an intertextual link 
between two texts, or in other words to incorporate a statement made by others 
into the text. However, intertextual markers also perform more complex 
functions:  
 draw attention to a statement from another text or to make the author’s 
statement appear as a reference to another text, with the aim of creating 
an illusion of objectivity. (See Section 5.4.3 Markers: aware, unaware) 
 evaluate a statement from another text, without necessarily expanding or 
reducing its meaning. (See section 5.4.4 Markers: agree, disagree) 
 to elicit information from the addressee  (See Section 5.4.8 Markers: 
hear) 
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 invoke a text which can be used to act as a reference to support the 
speakers statement. (See Section 5.4.9 Markers: according to)  
 restate the questions to which the author is providing the answer to in 
order to provide the context for the response (See section 5.4.10 Markers: 
ask)  
 to refer to previous discourse (See Sections 5.4.5 Markers: say that, say 
about) 
 to relate disagreement to previous discourse (See Section 5.4.6 Markers: 
object to, objection)  
 
7.2.5 Diachronic analysis 
Diachronic analysis presented in this thesis focused on identifying the 
prominence certain interpretations gain at particular moments in time. In other 
words, the analysis focused on uncovering how and when particular meanings 
entered discourse, when they were discussed the most, whether and when they 
stopped being discussed in discourse. The aim of this approach was to 
demonstrate the diachronic, or rather, contingent nature of linguistic meaning. 
This was achieved through the identification of time spans in which particular 
interpretations occurred, which allowed for the application of diachronic analysis 
to a more general diachronic corpus.  
Apart from observing the “life-spans” of selected interpretations, diachronic 
analysis was also applied to detect the moments when particular interpretations 
were discussed most frequently. These periods of intensified use of a particular 
collocation were labelled as ‘topic hotspots’ and were identified using dispersion 
plots. The main application of these topic hotspots was to identify moments in 
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discourse when a particular notion is discussed most frequently. The major 
benefit of this approach is that it allows the identification of potential intertextual 
paraphrases. This is best demonstrated by the examples of close species (see 
Section 5.5.8) and variable species (see Section 5.5.11 Variable + species), 
where a degree of intertextual negotiation of meaning was necessary firstly to 
convey the desired meanings and secondly to develop them further. 
To conclude the diachronic analysis presented in this thesis successfully 
observed how certain interpretations enter and leave discourse. However, the 
process of meaning construction by negotiation has not been thoroughly 
observed. One of the main reasons for the smaller number of examples of 
meaning construction by paraphrase is attributed to the corpus. Namely, it is 
rather the structure than the size of the corpus that caused the problem with the 
analysis of meaning negotiation, since the corpus does not include the complete 
correspondence of Charles Darwin. Furthermore, unlike the corpora based on 
forums or other interactive discussion boards, the written correspondence of 
Charles Darwin will not represent the whole account of the debate on the 
meaning of species, much of which must have been conducted verbally. Thus, 
the corpus does not represent a full account of the debate.  
 
7.3 Theoretical Contributions  
The research presented in this analysis supports the formulation of language as 
a social phenomenon (See section 2.1.2 Language as a social phenomenon) 
characterised by the theories of dialogism (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981; Bakhtin, et 
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al., 1994) and intertextuality (Barthes, 1968; Barthes & Heath, 1977; Kristeva & 
Moi, 1986). 
The negotiation of meaning in discourse has been demonstrated by several 
analyses, in particular by the analysis of intertextual markers (Section 5.4 
Intertextuality) and the diachronic analysis of collocation (Section 5.5 Diachronic 
analysis of intertextuality). The evidence presented strongly argues for the 
notions of social construction and negotiation of meaning and supports the 
notion of paraphrase as an act of interpretation through which meanings are 
constructed, as proposed by Teubert (2005, 2007, 2010).   
Furthermore, by successfully demonstrating the formulation of meaning by 
solely referring to discourse element, this thesis also supports the argument that 
all meanings in discourse are products of the discourse itself (Foucault, et al., 
1972; Maturana & Varela, 1980). As mentioned previously, diachronic analysis 
has also provided empirical evidence to reinforce Dawkins’ (2006) meme 
theory, by demonstrating that fecundity, that is replication, is a key aspect of 
meaning construction. This is especially evident in the example of disjoined 
species (Section 5.5.3 Disjoined + species).  
To conclude, although the thesis has not provided a new theoretical framework 
to explain the processes of meaning construction, it has provided empirical 
evidence to support the diachronic study of discourse as a valid approach to the 
study of linguistic meaning.  
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7.4 Methodological contributions 
The key contributions presented in this thesis relate to the methodological 
approaches to the study of meaning. These include a method for analysing 
intertextual markers that is suitable for application in more general corpora; and 
a method for diachronic analysis of collocation. In addition to these, a variant of 
collocation analysis, labelled ‘contrastive analysis’ has also been proposed.  
The contrastive analysis of collocations is not a method designed to study the 
dialogic or diachronic aspects of meaning. Rather its purpose is, as the name 
suggests, to conduct contrastive analyses of the meanings of closely related 
terms. The rationale for such analysis is that by semantically grouping 
collocates of each search term, semantic preference of each term will be easier 
to distinguish. Then by contrasting the collocates of one node with the other, 
and vice-versa, the differences can be determined. In that sense, the first 
search node is tested against the collocates of the second, testing both their 
similarities and differences. Although I was not aware of their research at the 
time of conducting this analysis, Baker et al. (2008) used a very similar 
approach to contrast the meanings of refugee, asylum seeker, migrant and 
immigrants. The advantage of such approach is in that it can be carried out on 
any type of corpus without using any advanced computational methods and 
tools to contrast the meaning of terms. On the other hand, a more advanced 
corpus tools like the Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff, et al., 2004) can perform a similar 
analysis automatically, with the added advantage of observing grammatical 
relations between the node and the collocate in addition to the difference in 
semantic preference. 
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The study of intertextual markers offers a versatile approach to the study of 
meaning construction. The method stems from the problem of analysing 
intertextual markers in written correspondence, where the analysis would result 
with too many instances referring to a whole plethora of topics. Thus it was 
necessary to limit the scope which these markers could refer to by relating them 
to a particular search term, namely the word species. Since making the relation 
on the sentence level risked losing a significant number of intertextual 
references made in the wider context, the markers were analysed on the 
paragraph level, which linked the intertextual references with the wider context.  
By observing the wider context it was possible to observe more intertextual 
relations and hence demonstrate the construction of meaning through the 
process of paraphrase.  
Finally, the contributions to the diachronic analysis are based on the 
applicability in larger and more general corpora, rather than just in structured 
discourse. This approach illustrates when particular interpretations enter and 
are abandoned in discourse. Namely, by observing dispersion plots it can be 
determined exactly when a particular term or a phrase first appears in the 
discourse, when it is most frequently used, and finally when it is abandoned in 
the debate. The first and last occurrence in the discourse marks the so-called 
‘life-span’ of the search term in the corpus. This may be used to indicate 
whether particular meanings are accepted or rejected from the debate. On the 
other hand, the high concentration of the use of the search term at a particular 
point in discourse may indicate the so-called ‘topic hotspot’ which may imply a 
point of intensive negotiation of meaning. The concept of ‘topic hotspots’ is 
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similar to the notion of ‘heat maps’ proposed by Kehoe and Gee (2009). 
Although both concepts relate to the occurrence of collocations in a diachronic 
discourse with the purpose of analysing the meaning, they are applied 
somewhat differently. Namely, Kehoe and Gee (ibid) applied the method to a 
large, general diachronic corpus to observe when particular collocations first 
appeared in the discourse, whereas the aim of this thesis was to observe the 
process of paraphrasing specific collocations. The results of both studies have 
shown that this method is suitable when dealing with large amounts of data 
which cannot be analysed as a whole in detail. Thus by identifying topic 
hotspots, the analysis can focus on particular parts of discourse. This was 
particularly suitable for this research where the corpus consisted of more than 
one million tokens, divided into more than two thousand letters all of which 
mentioning the term species. However, one possible drawback is that by 
focussing on topic hotspots certain important interpretations will be left out of 
the analysis. For this reason, this approach is best suited for large corpora 
where the amount of relevant information will be significant enough to drop out 
such interpretations from the analysis.  
 
7.5 Limitations of the study 
The main limitations of this study relate to the data used in the analysis. 
Although a corpus of correspondence would generally be an ideal corpus for a 
diachronic analysis with chronologically ordered data, the specific problem with 
the Charles Darwin Correspondence Corpus is that it does not represent the 
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complete account of the correspondence. In other words, the corpus does not 
include the full correspondence necessary for the analysis of meaning 
negotiation. Furthermore, the size of the corpus also presents a challenge with 
this type of analysis, with the abundance of data making it difficult to find the 
best examples and to present an exhaustive list to the reader. Due the 
limitations of the corpus, the main aspect of the analysis, i.e. the diachronic 
analysis of meaning construction, did not provide as extensive evidence as the 
methodology would otherwise allow. This has been demonstrated by the fact 
that neither the analysis of intertextual markers, nor the analysis of ‘topic 
hotspots’ always identified clear examples of meaning negotiation.  
Another limitation in the study is that intertextual markers, collocations and 
paraphrases cannot exhaustively detect all the intertextual relations and 
interpretations which form meaning. The same applies for the corpus, since no 
corpus can include all the intertextual references in relation to which 
interpretations of meaning are made. 
From a methodological perspective, the problem with the analysis of intertextual 
markers, at the level of paragraphs, made the process of identifying relevant 
example quite laborious due the frequency of both the markers and search 
terms.  
One of the problems in this analysis was how to make the identification of topic 
hotspots more objective. Namely, higher the number of occurrences, harder it is 
to delimit what is relevant without reading all the instances. And as it was 
mentioned above, the size of the corpus makes that very labour intensive. 
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Finally, to conclude, due to the abstract nature of the notion of intertextuality, 
the incompleteness of the correspondence and the size of the corpus, this 
analysis provided more an answer on how to analyse intertextuality in text, than 
an in-depth account of the notion of intertextual construction of meaning. 
 
7.6 Potential for further research 
The diachronic analysis of meaning has a potential for widespread application, 
most notably in critical and sociolinguistic analyses. Observing the process of 
meaning construction in a field such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) will 
allow for a diachronic analysis of the formulation of ideologies, or their 
influences on the construction of social reality. This can be realised by an in-
depth analysis of particular collocations focusing on when particular 
interpretations enter discourse, how they are introduced into the discourse, and 
how they are further negotiated and established by discourse communities. 
Due to the limitations of this study, further research can be conducted using 
data that represent a more detailed account of meaning negotiations, such as, 
for example, transcriptions of public debates, discussion panels, online forums 
or chat rooms etc. Such data would allow a more thorough observation of 
meaning negotiation and hence a more comprehensive understanding into the 
processes of meaning construction.  
The method used for diachronic analysis can also be used to track the 
development of particular topics within texts. Theoretically, the diachronic 
analysis of collocation could also be used to create a topic profile of a text. 
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Using this approach one can observe selected patterns for within-text 
distribution. Alternatively, this could be applied to study the use of meta-
discourse markers in specific genre texts, in order to observe in which parts of 
text they are more likely to occur in. 
Additionally, to address the problems of analysing very frequent collocations in 
a large corpus, which would make distinguishing between topics virtually 
impossible, further research could focus on developing a software tool or a 
method that would automatically determine the strength of a hotspot. This could 
be achieved with a method that focuses on observing which instances cluster 
closer together and would have to take into account both the collocational 
patterns, or contexts, as well as the ‘distances’ between each instance of 
collocation. 
Finally, the arguments for further research into the construction of meaning lie in 
the potential for wide application of such developments, particularly in the fields 
of lexicography, semantics, natural language processing and other areas 
focusing on the construction, realisation or interpretation of meaning. 
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8 Appendices 
Appendix 1 – List of collocates of the term species 
n>10 MI score Collocate   n>10 T-score  Collocate 
15 7.42197 mutability 
 
3701 57.67664 of 
10 7.3845 disjoined 
 
3628 55.69504 the 
22 7.26825 immutability 
 
1414 34.73792 in 
46 7.19911 representative 
 
1123 30.71215 a 
10 6.91501 compos 
 
1196 30.34304 to 
10 6.83701 undescribed 
 
1112 28.18013 i 
10 6.83701 derivation 
 
711 25.4436 are 
10 6.76301 immutable 
 
717 24.24696 that 
13 6.65609 quasi 
 
597 22.37535 as 
107 6.62183 allied 
 
585 21.70249 is 
18 6.54062 inhabiting 
 
515 21.45292 or 
60 6.49998 identical 
 
580 21.41236 have 
12 6.48999 trimorphic 
 
516 20.9557 on 
254 6.37883 origin 
 
451 19.62806 which 
14 6.32244 endemic 
 
384 18.5728 one 
188 6.28693 distinct 
 
409 18.35509 with 
12 6.17805 presenting 
 
387 17.67639 be 
28 6.1441 ranges 
 
313 17.22498 same 
11 6.09316 describing 
 
376 17.09967 not 
284 6.02554 genera 
 
284 16.5936 genera 
221 6.01758 genus 
 
350 16.5726 and 
30 5.99748 created 
 
325 16.47004 from 
49 5.9854 variable 
 
266 15.77772 two 
40 5.97641 dimorphic 
 
317 15.75148 but 
36 5.95566 modification 
 
254 15.74586 origin 
10 5.91501 defined 
 
281 15.74253 some 
21 5.9074 limits 
 
302 15.69041 this 
59 5.90419 closely 
 
278 15.40379 all 
221 
 
28 5.88386 average 
 
358 15.29703 you 
16 5.88037 mundane 
 
281 15.18585 by 
66 5.82441 close 
 
320 14.74577 it 
20 5.76301 indigenous 
 
221 14.6366 genus 
18 5.72348 belonging 
 
230 14.43327 other 
199 5.71664 varieties 
 
254 14.3036 very 
18 5.70412 extinct 
 
5625 14.24641 species 
25 5.69262 belong 
 
219 14.17306 many 
16 5.63373 oxalis 
 
224 14.03739 there 
10 5.62551 fewer 
 
199 13.83848 varieties 
18 5.61101 varying 
 
188 13.53571 distinct 
45 5.60381 individuals 
 
249 13.13391 for 
31 5.59827 existing 
 
174 12.74488 new 
41 5.597 recent 
 
190 12.66988 more 
23 5.58613 sub 
 
189 12.66276 any 
48 5.56661 described 
 
166 12.55966 different 
12 5.56661 descendants 
 
198 12.39288 so 
30 5.56138 widely 
 
163 12.00992 only 
10 5.56138 definition 
 
214 11.85877 my 
56 5.49355 european 
 
173 11.84497 has 
15 5.48008 typical 
 
161 11.23477 if 
29 5.47124 wide 
 
152 11.18136 they 
10 5.47023 ramme 
 
169 11.04027 at 
32 5.45923 vary 
 
154 11.03522 been 
57 5.44615 peculiar 
 
142 11.00657 than 
13 5.44108 foreign 
 
168 10.93945 will 
22 5.41509 vars 
 
135 10.86693 these 
28 5.41049 local 
 
141 10.78336 about 
17 5.40753 named 
 
123 10.73065 common 
14 5.40044 describe 
 
121 10.67189 each 
39 5.37599 individual 
 
135 10.60899 most 
166 5.3115 different 
 
168 10.5413 your 
35 5.30733 fossil 
 
117 10.52554 number 
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14 5.28496 authors 
 
107 10.23905 allied 
10 5.27758 pairs 
 
110 10.16722 several 
14 5.26658 localities 
 
132 10.14599 would 
37 5.25822 range 
 
113 10.12128 found 
313 5.24406 same 
 
113 10.11695 into 
27 5.24177 orders 
 
99 9.62137 another 
10 5.22696 included 
 
114 9.56466 what 
25 5.21704 temperate 
 
120 9.31631 he 
117 5.21552 number 
 
101 9.22029 were 
45 5.1834 group 
 
109 9.21226 no 
10 5.17805 upwards 
 
94 9.09328 few 
28 5.17805 differ 
 
97 9.00188 out 
14 5.17805 descended 
 
110 8.93293 do 
24 5.17805 botanists 
 
112 8.91085 s 
10 5.1542 represented 
 
86 8.90031 large 
25 5.14948 proportion 
 
93 8.87842 being 
16 5.1483 distinguished 
 
103 8.87334 c 
29 5.1132 rare 
 
95 8.86544 believe 
37 5.10828 numerous 
 
88 8.72028 whether 
19 5.10405 families 
 
101 8.68846 an 
11 5.07269 held 
 
86 8.64813 our 
121 5.06716 each 
 
135 8.64256 me 
22 5.06257 countries 
 
91 8.60606 their 
31 5.03773 groups 
 
88 8.4911 plants 
11 5.03262 tend 
 
105 8.47369 am 
110 5.03064 several 
 
93 8.46263 may 
12 5.02604 increase 
 
83 8.39794 work 
44 4.98882 british 
 
77 8.25977 having 
16 4.98165 third 
 
82 8.1652 such 
10 4.95566 admitted 
 
81 8.14219 good 
123 4.94564 common 
 
73 8.10325 forms 
266 4.93871 two 
 
71 8.02677 between 
10 4.93519 domesticated 
 
66 7.98067 close 
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14 4.92651 contains 
 
85 7.8244 think 
99 4.92069 another 
 
80 7.81604 when 
37 4.89031 marked 
 
66 7.72397 both 
174 4.88628 new 
 
73 7.68783 its 
47 4.88297 change 
 
60 7.66038 identical 
15 4.86255 isld 
 
79 7.61611 can 
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Appendix 2 – List of collocates of the term varieties 
n>5 MI score Collocate   n>5 T-score  Collocate 
7 8.47206 quasi 
 
553 22.26607 of 
5 8.47206 maize 
 
495 20.36983 the 
7 8.27942 verbascum 
 
199 13.83848 species 
8 8.15014 abnormal 
 
206 12.79023 to 
16 7.78556 cultivated 
 
174 11.94177 in 
5 7.62407 presenting 
 
125 10.79521 or 
11 7.48855 fertility 
 
163 10.70342 i 
18 7.48212 local 
 
114 10.21076 are 
5 7.43644 station 
 
103 9.17964 have 
6 7.41317 wheat 
 
82 8.47842 which 
7 7.39678 modifications 
 
81 8.32108 and 
5 7.36773 babington 
 
82 8.20607 as 
34 7.33071 domestic 
 
86 8.15648 that 
28 7.19727 marked 
 
85 7.66364 a 
20 7.17194 intermediate 
 
67 7.43843 on 
7 7.17089 peas 
 
66 7.41264 with 
6 7.01263 differently 
 
65 7.31746 be 
16 6.98021 crossed 
 
65 7.21957 not 
18 6.91407 crossing 
 
56 7.05073 all 
5 6.7496 normal 
 
50 6.83082 other 
10 6.73871 sterile 
 
53 6.6902 from 
6 6.7351 etc 
 
44 6.23884 some 
7 6.66471 distinguished 
 
41 6.19597 two 
7 6.59292 fowls 
 
45 6.10547 by 
7 6.57898 sub 
 
47 6.04026 but 
9 6.47206 botanists 
 
37 5.87512 same 
5 6.47206 attempt 
 
51 5.8547 is 
14 6.41523 numerous 
 
34 5.79473 domestic 
5 6.40168 descended 
 
35 5.67676 many 
5 6.19408 naturally 
 
34 5.60179 these 
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14 6.17089 call 
 
50 5.58814 you 
5 6.15014 grown 
 
33 5.34748 any 
5 6.07975 six 
 
29 5.2896 between 
10 6.06607 garden 
 
29 5.26646 different 
24 6.02636 distinct 
 
28 5.25545 marked 
5 6.01263 fowl 
 
32 5.24167 more 
7 5.9848 tendency 
 
30 5.14958 most 
8 5.97222 strongly 
 
27 5.06784 genera 
11 5.89258 races 
 
29 5.01753 c 
6 5.85735 area 
 
27 4.97896 being 
13 5.85509 together 
 
27 4.95051 plants 
29 5.81632 between 
 
26 4.9354 into 
6 5.8091 series 
 
31 4.91908 so 
199 5.71664 species 
 
30 4.91744 one 
7 5.70199 pigeons 
 
28 4.9171 about 
5 5.67505 kinds 
 
27 4.91162 only 
5 5.64425 growing 
 
29 4.86131 if 
5 5.60417 yellow 
 
31 4.85257 very 
5 5.59432 run 
 
27 4.84658 what 
29 5.5035 different 
 
26 4.83199 their 
8 5.48907 close 
 
24 4.82382 distinct 
8 5.47206 cross 
 
38 4.76969 it 
5 5.40168 variable 
 
27 4.69416 been 
5 5.39311 v 
 
25 4.5673 they 
5 5.34278 probable 
 
844 4.56703 varieties 
27 5.33973 genera 
 
32 4.52815 for 
9 5.28884 why 
 
21 4.4569 forms 
5 5.2862 rare 
 
23 4.44336 them 
7 5.27942 mere 
 
20 4.44112 intermediate 
5 5.26261 themselves 
 
22 4.33693 than 
844 5.2485 varieties 
 
27 4.33294 this 
6 5.22414 consider 
 
18 4.21891 local 
6 5.21154 produce 
 
18 4.20746 crossing 
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21 5.18842 forms 
 
20 4.20073 how 
5 5.16464 names 
 
22 4.15861 do 
14 5.14499 animals 
 
22 4.12949 has 
5 5.13578 supposed 
 
18 4.12134 several 
18 5.12826 several 
 
19 4.07608 such 
11 5.12414 white 
 
18 4.03057 new 
6 5.07403 mention 
 
18 4.01912 also 
12 5.06834 three 
 
17 3.98923 each 
8 5.01263 produced 
 
19 3.98289 we 
6 5.00174 making 
 
16 3.98187 cultivated 
10 4.99309 known 
 
16 3.96832 crossed 
26 4.96183 into 
 
23 3.96009 will 
41 4.95003 two 
 
20 3.94444 would 
17 4.94482 each 
 
17 3.90796 our 
16 4.91748 large 
 
16 3.86764 large 
15 4.91543 both 
 
17 3.85178 its 
5 4.89313 set 
 
18 3.78049 no 
50 4.87931 other 
 
16 3.74672 well 
13 4.87559 thus 
 
15 3.74465 both 
37 4.87255 same 
 
14 3.69782 numerous 
6 4.86227 greater 
 
14 3.68972 call 
125 4.85948 or 
 
16 3.68125 were 
10 4.84271 true 
 
14 3.63591 animals 
8 4.75097 called 
 
16 3.61419 when 
6 4.72164 near 
 
16 3.61384 now 
5 4.71718 european 
 
17 3.60726 there 
8 4.70058 generally 
 
14 3.57852 common 
5 4.6907 red 
 
13 3.54326 together 
34 4.66926 these 
 
14 3.53242 those 
12 4.63917 number 
 
13 3.48273 thus 
35 4.62765 many 
 
14 3.46976 should 
6 4.58942 among 
 
19 3.46507 at 
27 4.58039 being 
 
15 3.42326 may 
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7 4.54133 want 
 
12 3.36086 three 
8 4.52955 nearly 
 
13 3.34273 whether 
14 4.51953 common 
 
12 3.32509 number 
114 4.51705 are 
 
11 3.29816 fertility 
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Appendix 3  
Appendix 3.1 Intertextuality marker: according to 
1. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-171. I have just returned from a walk, & as a specimen how 
little the insects are know.—Noterus, according to Dic Class. contains solely 3 European species, I, in 
one hawl of my net took five distinct species.— is this not quite extraordinary?.— 
2. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-376.  Also, that I am convinced that independently of the 
relative percentage of recent shells, about which naturalists may differ according to their notions of 
what constitutes a specific difference, there are other characters in the entire assemblage of forms 
of shells belonging to each great tertiary epoch, which will enable us to classify the deposits 
according to the approach which they make to the type of organisation now existing in the 
neighbouring seas; and that this approach will serve as a chronological test of the eras to which 
tertiary deposits may respectively belong. 
3. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-538. You say there are about 37 new species of Acanth. & 
according to this proportion there would be about 21 in the other orders. Now do you think it very 
desirable that all these should be engravedwww.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-723. I have been 
progressing with the Antarctic plants, using your’s King’s & my own at once, & each according to the 
Nat. Ords. beginning with Ranunculaceæ, where the value of every scrap tells better than it is 
possible to suppose.  
4. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-748. By way of illustration I will suppose I am called upon to 
point out a type of the order Carnivora. According to the first definition I should select a Cat 
because in the Cat tribe some of the more striking characters of the Carnivora are most strongly 
developed;  
5. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-897. The word Oniscia is correct—and Stylifer, is also 
correct— I did not find either of these Genera in the Pacific Ocean they are both to be found in the 
West Indies— Oniscia is found also in China (two or three Species)— Stylifer is found in the 
Philippines and the Mauritius and according to Turton it is also British. 
6. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-986. I was having some talk with Lyell about coal, when in 
London: his fossils from Alabama being most of them identical in species according to Bunbury with 
the coal-plants 20o degrees N. in Europe, is an interesting fact 
7. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1496. (5) When an organ is developed in an extraordinaryly 
great degree it is (according to Waterhouse) apt to be variable in same species; so it is, when 
developed in an extraordinarily little degree (ie when rudimentary). Is this likewise case when organ 
developed in some very unusual manner?— 
8. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1607. On the back of this you have a list of 80 very 
anomalous genera selected by Bentham— I appended 1) the number of species enumerated in 
Steudel Nomenclator  the only catalogue of plants & not a bad one for such purposes & 2) the 
number of species according to Benthams & my knowledge of the genera, which increases some, 
diminishes others, & also diminishes the total of species. I append Steudels ratio of species to 
genera of all plants.— I should suppose however that it would stand considerable reduction & that 
1:8 would possibly be a fair estimate or even 1:6.— 
9. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1743. I send the Catalogue of plants by this post, marked in 
some degree according to your want. Perhaps I have marked too many as resembling pairs, by 
including some species that are always known when once understood.  
10. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1752. Dieffenbach remarks that, in N. Zealand, “the Cat 
often runs wild”, and that “these wild Cats soon resume the streaky grey colour of the common wild 
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Cat” II, 185. In Sardinia, on the contrary, according to Azuni, the feral Cats are, nearly all of them, 
black! Like the Falkland Island Rabbits! 
11. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1761. Are the humped Camels & tropical cattle species or 
normal or abnormal varieties ? Are they merely analogous to the fat-rumped Sheep or otherwise? 
According to Buffon, the humps & the callosities, &c of the Camel are the results & badges that it 
bears of its long servitude; an opinion which would scarcely be backed by anyone now!  
12. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1792. Wallace has, I think, put the matter well; and 
according to his theory, the various domestic races of animals have been fairly developed into 
species.  
13. True, the contrast is enormous between Guzerat, Rajputana, & Cutch,—the lowland sandy desert,—
& the intensely cold elevated regions of Tibet; but though he does not pass through the Punjab & 
up the wooded regions of the Himalaya, he is nevertheless find in Sindh, Afghanistan, 
Mesopotamia, & through northern Persia right up to the Aral, in gradually increasing numbers, & 
then all through Gt. Tartary to the frontiers of Tibet, according to Pallas, & in Tibet as the Khyang. 
Gmelins supposed wild Ass is merely a Dziggetai with a short shoulder stripe, such as has likewise 
been seen in Indian specimens, but very rarely.  
14. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1825. As you receive specimens from Madeira, kindly 
procure me some skins of the wild Canary; also ascertain which is the ‘Red-legged Partridge’ of 
Madeira & also of the Canary isles,—P. petrosa I suppose. According to Widdrington, this is not 
found in Spain, but is the only species in Sardinia, as in Barbary. I have no specimen of it. I should 
like also to see the peculiar Chaffinch of Madeira. 
15. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1830. We have a vast deal yet to learn with respect to the 
limits of species; the excessive differences in the views of different turalists on this point intro 
cusion & uncertainty into  reasonings on the geogra plants & animals. When  that what according to 
Duval’s views are nearly 50 different species of Solanum, are considered by Bentham as all referable 
to the one Solanum nigrum; & that another botanist has made 12 species out of our common White 
Water-lily; it is rather bewildering.  
16. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1905. The littoral shells according to Macandrew imply that 
Madeira and the Canaries were once joined to the main land of Europe or Africa but that those isles 
were disjoined so long ago that most of the species came in since. In short the marine shells tell the 
same story as the land shells.  
17. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1982. Above is the upshot as to our species common to 
Europe ranging N. I have gone into this matter with no small pains.— Of course further observation 
all tends one way—i.e to carry the range further north—; but so it is according to our present 
knowledge— I think you will be a little astonished, at the result. 
18. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2034. Seeing that this seemed so in Persoon, I took our little 
British Flora, & discriminating trees from Bushes according to Loudon, I have found that the result 
was in species, genera & Families, as I anticipated.  
19. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2065.  Artemisia:— species numerous & close, rather than 
variable if taken singly; but A. camphorata is a group of species according to some botanists, a 
varying species according to others. Senecio:—same remark, three or four confused or variable 
species. Cirsium:—many intermediates, supposed hybrids.  
20. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2104. For, see you, Mr. Watson cites Carex & Ranunculus 
under this head. Now Carex, viewed according to Dr. Boott, is a good case in point. The species very 
difficult to distinguish by reason of their similarity, but not remarkably variable; because he regards 
almost every definable form as a separate species. But if Dr. Hooker were to elaborate the genus, 
how would it be? Would it not fall at once into no. 3? Potamogeton, would be placed by Mr. 
Tuckerman under no 1. —by me under no. 3. etc— 
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21. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2250.  For example, the Greater Redpole, or Linet which is 
very abundantly met with in the island, retains its bright carmine plumage through the year; the 
Herring Gull, also very common, is, according to Dr. Renton, quicker by some months in obtaining its 
mature garb than with us; & the Black cap Warbler assumes in some instances, an intensity of 
colour, which has led to its being described by Sir. W. Jardine as a new species.”— 
22. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2409. Thus Forficula auricularia has an ovary consisting of 
numerous short tubes, while in Labidoura gigantea the ovary is composed (according to Leon 
Dufour) of a few long eggtubes. What external circumstances can possibly have produced such 
great differences in animals so 
23. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2520. There seemed to me some little confusion about your 
fossil Elephants: the species in N. & S. States, I believe, are distinct according to Falconer. The 
northern one, anyhow, can hardly be adduced as evidence of warmer climate. But it is foolish in me 
to write on; for I am writing only after one hasty read, several months ago.— 
24. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2794. I believe I succeeded in diminishing, if not entirely 
removing, the chances of Darwin’s being prejudged by many who take their cue in such cases 
according to views of those they suppose may know something of the matter— 
25. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2927a. Falconer has been holding forth today on the difft, 
Mastodons & Elephants not coming in chronologically as they shd do, according to yr views, but 
when one sees the new Maltese dwarf intermediate between E. antiquus & E. meridionalis & Anca’s 
new Sicilian cave elephant, a modification of the living Indian one leaning towards antiquus, & when 
one thinks that Falconer can distinguish all American varieties of Mammals from all European fossil 
species, I confess I attach little value to the objection. 
26. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2943. Hence, I do not see that it is “more complex” to 
suppose in this case an evolution, than a suppression;— when, according to your theory, the 
evolution must have once occurred, whereas the suppression, at best, only may have occurred.  
27. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2998. How capitally in the Atlantic, you show that Geology & 
Astronomy are according to Bowen Metaphysics; but he leaves out this rubbish in the 4to. 
Memoir.— 
28. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3332. The Oxalis pairs distinguished on account of the 
proportion of the stamens and styles, and which have nevertheless been supposed to belong to one 
species are according to Zuccarini 
29. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4229. Prof. Treviranus says (Botanische Zeitung 1863 p. 4.) 
that according to Koch & Tausch all species of Primula, present two forms, except P. longiflora 
which is always short-styled. 
30. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4306. This may be due to there being plenty of space for 
preservation of intermediates: Can this be accounted for by the land rising, & increased space thus 
being afforded— We (you & I) clash a little here Extreme diversity of form should according to you, 
follow on much destruction of individuals.—  
31. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4449. Now there is a species I am informed the Turdus 
dactylopterus, Bonaparte from Syria which has a prominent claw on its carpus. This then according 
to the theory expounded by you enables us to understand the existence of the wart in so many 
species of the same group.  
32. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4715. There are no Crypheæ, no Leptodonteæ no 
Leskeaceæ, no Cylindrothecieæ while there is two Nekeræ much alike, also two Antitrocheæ two or 
three (according to authors) species of Pterogonium three Alsiæ and in the great division of the 
Hypna all the species are united in the subgenera: Isothecium Camptothecium Scleropodium, 
Eurynchium with the exception only of one Shuidium, one Thamnium one Brachythecium and the 
two universal Amblystegium repens & A. riparium.  
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33. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5852. And hence according to Mr Wallace’s doctrine it might 
be inferred that they did so in consequence of their gaudy appearance;—or that only such of them 
as concealed themselves had been able to continue their races.—  
34. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6095. But I suspect that the sterility is not caused so much 
by any particular conditions, as by long habituation to conditions of any kind. To speak according to 
Pangenesis the gemmules of Hybrids are not injured, for Hybrids propagate freely by buds; but their 
reproductive organs are somehow affected so that they cannot accumulate the proper gemmules, 
in nearly same manner as the reproductive organs of a pure species become affected when exposed 
to unnatural conditions. 
35. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6140. On littoral rocks near Desterro, under the oysters and 
Balanidæ by which they are covered, there lives a Sphæroma interesting by the uncommonly great 
difference of the two sexes; the female is a true Sphæroma, the male would be, according to Milne 
Edwards’ classification, a Cymodocea. In most or all other species of the genus there is no external 
sexual difference.  
36. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-12532. As to the names of the species by the seeds, it is not 
clear— But, according to $Watson$, who has done his best with them, the one with large ovate 
turgid seeds rather pointed at one end, the germination of which is figured in Amer. Jour. Sci. & in 
Text-Book is Megarrhiza Californica, I suppose 
37. www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-13872.  There is much difficulty in deciding on age of the 
isolated Tertiary deposits on coast of Chile; the most probable conclusion seems to be that they are 
old Miocene or Eocene.— The generic character, I believe, is Miocene, but nearly all the species are 
distinct, & all according to M. d’Orbigny.— 
 
Appendix 3.2 Intertextuality marker: agree 
 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-367  Has your late work at shells startled you about the 
existence of species? I have been attending a very little to species of birds, & the passages of forms, do 
appear frightful—every thing is arbitrary; no two naturalists agree on any fundamental idea that I can 
see.  
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734  The Eastern limit to agree with this definition in the Straits 
of Magals. should coincide with the change in Geolog. formation, & with the Beeches, cease at Cape 
Negro; as however the Patagonian flora is the Negative one, & characterized by the absence of Beech 
district forms; some of its peculiar plants are probably also found in the latter & I should include 
therefore those found on the immediate boundary, as those of Elizabeth Isld & Cape Gregory Bay.  
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-884  Kerguelens Land has only 3.. New Zealand & V. D. L. are 
certainly poor—in Trinidad (of Brazils) I saw only 3, I think, a Hemerobius & the House-flie & cockroach, 
introduced from a wreck: Canaries & Madeira are poor, I think: Cape de Verds are too dependent on 
the W. coast of Africa to judge from— nothing struck me as so marvellous as the appearance of 
4 Insecta & many Arachnida you mention as on St. Pauls rocks.— Still I agree with you on the main 
point that such few as there are, wd. be enough for impregnation, if they only went to work about it.. 
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-961  It is quite curious how our opinions agree about Forbes 
views; I was very glad to have your last letter, which was even more valuable to me than most of yours 
are & that is saying, I assure you, a great deal.—  
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-964  These being done I am again ready to do a little to my 
notion of the distrib. of Gal. plants, though alas with hands fuller than ever. I think we are agreed on 
Polymorphism in the sense we did argue it, & also in that we are now about to treat it under.  
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1239  I have written so lately that I have nothing to say about 
myself; my health prevented me going on with a crusade against “mihi” & “nobis” of which you warn 
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me of the dangers: I showed my paper to 3 or 4 naturalists & they all agreed with me to a certain 
extent: with health & vigor, I wd not have shown a white feather, but with aid of 1⁄2 a dozen really 
good naturalists, I believe something might have been done against the miserable & degrading passion 
of mere naming species.  
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1520   I happen to be too much occupied to give as much time 
as I should like to studying your specimens; but after a pretty careful inspection, I am quite inclined to 
agree with almost all your determinations, and I can feel no doubt that the species considered by you 
as new, are new. Indeed I consider it as in some degree presumptuous in saying this; for you are 
evidently an adept amongst the Cirripedia.  
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1601  All this has amused me, but I daresay you will have a good 
sneer at me, & tell me to stick to my Barnacles. By the way you agree with me that sometimes one gets 
despondent, for instance when theory & facts will not harmonise; but what appears to me even worse, 
& makes me despair, is, when I see from the same great class of facts, men, like Barrande deduce 
conclusions, such as his Colonies  & his agreement with E. de Beaumonts lines of Elevation, or such men 
as Forbes with his Polarity;  
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1610  With respect to your speculation on effect of splitting 
Australia; I agree very far with you; but I think that you somewhat underrate the effect on all the 
species of such a movement or irruption as you suggest. 
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1612  I do not quite agree with your “grave objection to the 
whole process” which is “that if you multiply the anomalous species by 100, & divide the normal by the 
same, you will then reverse the names” – For, to take an example, ornithoryhnchus & Echidna would 
not be less aberrant if each had a dozen (I do not say 100, because we have no such cases in animal 
kingdom) species instead of one.  
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1762  When I disparaged the instinct of the Orangs in 
comparison with dogs, Dr. Mc Dougall did not agree with me in opinion: but it seems they can scarcely 
be reared in captivity even in their native country, being so impatient of restraint, & most 
troublesomely affectionate when at liberty to those they know. Dr. Mc Dougall gives them credit for no 
small amount of intellect; & he speaks from having had the best opportunity of observation.  
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1889  After the rect. of your last letter I consulted with Mr 
Waterhouse again about the Island Faunas—& we agreed that the doctrine might be maintained 
against all comers. Sir Chas. Lyell is coming to the same opinion—tho’ he would account for it 
metaphysically. We can start with a good case in Tasmania—an island which must have been separated 
from Australia since the creation of Thylacinus & Dasyurus (which occur fossil in the mainland) & before 
the arrival of those species peculiar to the continent.  
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1991  In short I think the warm temperate would be exposed 
very much longer to those causes which I believe are alone efficient in producing change than the sub-
arctic; but I must think more over this, & have a good wriggle I cannot quite agree with your 
proposition that because the sub-arctic have to travel twice as far, they wd be more liable to change. 
Look at the two Journeys which the Arctics have had from N. to S. & S. to North, with no change, as 
may be inferred, if my doctrine is correct, from similarity of Arctic species in America & Europe & in the 
Alps.—  
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1997  Therefore, according to my principles, whether right or 
wrong, I cannot agree with your proposition that Time + altered conditions + altered associates are 
“convertible terms”. I look at first & last as far more important;—time being important only so far as 
giving scope to selection.— God knows, whether you will perceive at what I am driving.— I shall have to 
discuss & think more about your difficulty of the temperate & sub-arctic forms in S. hemisphere, than I 
have yet done.—  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2020f   But first let me thank you for your paper on Geological 
Development: everything which you have ever written interests me; but I own this last paper is rather 
too grand for my digestion; not but that I am very much inclined, from different reasons, to agree with 
you on antiquity of continents & oceans; & I have lately had some written discussion on subject with 
Lyell, who differs toto coelo from me.  
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2034  P.S. | You might give me a valuable piece of information, 
with very little trouble to yourself.— I have been comparing, as far as I can, Protean genera, & have left 
off in a maze of perplexity. By Protean genera, I mean such as hardly two Botanists agree in about the 
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species,—what to call species & what varieties. Now what I want to know is, whether such genera as 
Salix, Rubus, Rosa, Mentha, Saxifraga, Hieracium, Myosotis, &c have equally Protean species in 
U. States; even if they have only one, but more especially if they have many. I think you have no Rosa, 
& I forget how it is with some of the other genera.— The converse case wd. be equally valuable to me if 
you would think over your half-dozen or dozen worst genera which have any European species, & then 
I could find out whether such are very troublesome in Europe.— I think Hooker told me that in 
Himalaya, Rubus & Salix, though large genera, were not troublesome to make out.— I think Protean 
genera of shells are troublesome at all geological times & in all places. 
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2182  But I cannot agree with you for my object, that general 
monographs are best: (1st) I presume the varieties wd. be best known in small country like ours; 2d. a 
very large genus might have very few species in many separate countries & then according to my 
doctrine, on average it wd not be a numerically increasing or varying genus. Again a genus, though 
small for its order in a monograph, might be large in any one country, & then it ought to be there on 
average an increasing or varying genus.  
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2239  Of course I do not suppose with groups of plants so 
widely extended as they are, that there ever shd. be such difference, as there might be in case of 
Mammals. Therefore I agree that orders in a Prodromus not obeying my rule as with Labiatæ & 
Verbenaceæ is a serious objection; though not nearly so fatal, in my opinion, if in a local Flora.— I was 
led to all this work by a remark of Fries, that the species in large genera, were more closely related to 
each other than in small genera; & I thought if this were so, seeing that varieties & species are so hardly 
distinguishable, I concluded that I shd. find more varieties in the large genera than in the small: but at 
first, seeing the many causes of doubt, I certainly did not expect to find more than three-fourths of the 
Floras, yielding the result, which they have.— 
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2503   Birds which have struggled in their own homes when 
settled in a body nearly simultaneously in new country, would not be subject to much modification, for 
their mutual relations would not be much disturbed. But I quite agree with you that in time they ought 
to undergo some. In Bermuda & Madeira they have, as I believe, been kept constant by the frequent 
arrival of, & the crossing with, unaltered immigrants of same species from the mainland. In Bermuda 
this canbe proved; in Madeira highly probable as shown me by letters from E. V. Harcourt.—  
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2516  I hope that you will read my Book, straight through; 
otherwise from the great condensation it will be unintelligible. Do not, I pray, think me so 
presumptuous as to hope to convert you; but if you can spare time to read it with care, & will then do 
what is far more important, keep the subject under my point of view for some little time occasionally 
before your mind, I have hopes that you will agree that more can be said in favour of the mutability of 
species, than is at first apparent. It took me many long years before I wholly gave up the common view 
of the separate creation of each species. 
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2575  I have very long interview with Owen, which perhaps you 
would like to hear about, but please repeat nothing. Under garb of great civility, he was inclined to be 
most bitter & sneering against me. Yet I infer from several expressions, that at bottom he goes 
immense way with us.— He was quite savage & crimson at my having put his name with defenders of 
immutability. When I said that was my impression & that of others, for several had remarked to me, 
that he would be dead against me: he then spoke of his own position in science & that of all the 
naturalists in London, “with your Huxleys”, with a degree of arrogance I never saw approached. He said 
to effect that my explanation was best ever published of manner of formation of species. I said I was 
very glad to hear it. He took me up short, “you must not at all suppose that I agree with in all 
respects”.— I said I thought it no more likely that I shd. be right on nearly all points, than that I shd toss 
up a penny & get heads twenty times running. 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2595  He assumes (like old geologists assumed the forces of 
nature were formerly greater) that species were at first more plastic. His simile of tree & classification 
is like mine (& others), but he cannot, I think, have reflected much on subject, otherwise he would see 
that genealogy by itself does not give classification.— I declare I cannot see much closer approach to 
Wallace & me in Naudin than in Lamarck—we all agree in modification & descent.— 
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2614  I remember your remarks on non migration but I cannot 
say that I quite appreciate them. I entirely agree with you that difficulty of not finding intermediate 
fossils in number is very great, even when looking at the Geological Record, as being as imperfect as I 
234 
 
believe— No one will think anything of my book, unless his mind leads him to put weight on the 
apparent explanation offered by the theory from several large classes of facts as affinities,—
homologies, embryology &c.  
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2649  I fully agree that the difficulty is great, & might be made 
much of by a mere advocate. Will you oblige me by reading again slowly from p. 267–272.— I may add 
to what is there said, that it seems to me quite hopeless to attempt to explain why varieties are not 
sterile; until we know precise cause of sterility in species.—  
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2690  I quite agree with what you say on effect of admission of 
theory on Systematic work; (see p. 485), not but what I was haunted with endeavouring to guess what 
cirripedes would be ranked as species by other naturalists. I think the importance of theory bears on 
opening up new fields of enquiry & in giving a rational, instead of theological explanation of many 
known facts I am much pleased to hear that you intend reading the Book again.  
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2728  The Lyells went this morning. I had much talk most 
interesting to me. & it did not kill me to the extent which I expected. We talked over your Essays & 
agreed about the Book which you ought to make. What fine materials in all combined, including as Lyell 
remarked, the Galapagos papers! But I see in the Gardeners’ Chron: that you have started on a gigantic 
task with Bentham. By the way I now quite understand Bentham’s silence on the modification of 
species.— 
27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2759   Although I fully agree that no definition can be drawn 
between monstrosities and slight variations (such as my theory requires) yet I suspect there is some 
distinction. Some facts lead me to think that monstrosities supervene generally at an early age; and 
after attending to the subject I have great doubts whether species in a state of nature ever become 
modified by such sudden jumps, as would result from the natural selection of monstrosities.  
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2825a  I am inclined to agree with his meaning at lines 2–6 of 
p. 3, but there again he is not clear N.S. is not dependent on variability in any logical sense— As to the 
question of personality it is simply ridiculous— I agree with him & you too that the real primary agency 
is as great a mystery as ever, call it mystery or theistic element or God or nature or what he will, 
unseen Power if he likes.  
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2915  I entirely agree with what you say about only one species 
of many becoming modified: I remember this struck me much when tabulating the varieties of plants. 
& I have a discussion somewhere on point. It is absolutely implied on my ideas of classification & 
divergence that only one two species of even large genera give birth to new species; & many whole 
genera become wholly extinct, ie none of the species.  
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2922   When I have spoken of dominant forms, it has been in 
relation to the multiplication of new specific forms, & the dominance of any one species has been 
relative generally to other members of the same group, or at least to beings exposed to similar 
conditions & coming into competition. But I daresay that I have not in the Origin made myself clear, & 
space has rendered it impossible. But I thank you most sincerely for your valuable remarks, though I do 
not agree with them.) 
31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2940  I ought to apologise for troubling you; but I have at last 
carefully read your excellent criticisms on my Book.— I agree with much of them, & wholly with your 
final sentence. The objections & difficulties, which may be urged against my view, are indeed heavy 
enough almost to break my back; but it is not yet broken!  
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3047  I quite agree that Phillips is unreadably dull.— You need 
not attempt Bree,— the man must be a conceited fool.— If you come across Dr Freke on “Origin of 
species by means of Organic Affinity”, read a page here & there just to see the maximum of ill-written 
unintelligible rubbish, which he tells the reader to observe has been arrived at by “induction”, whereas 
all my results are arrived at only by “analogy”.  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3098  I quite agree with what you say on Lieut. Hutton’s Review 
(who he is, I know not): it struck me as very original: he is one of the very few who see that the change 
of species cannot be directly proved & that the doctrine must sink or swim according as it groups & 
explains phenomena. It is really curious how few judge it in this way, which is clearly the right way.  
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3235  I have just said that I cannot agree with “which variations 
are the effects of an unknown law, ordained & guided without doubt by an intelligent cause on a 
preconceived & definite plan”. Will you honestly tell me (& I should really be much obliged) whether 
235 
 
you believe that the shape of my nose (eheu) was “ordained & guided by an intelligent cause” By the 
selection of analogous & less differences, fanciers make almost generic differences in their pigeons, & 
can you see any good reason why the natural selection of analogous individual differences should not 
make new species?  
35 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3532  To us who theorise I am sure the case is very important. 
Do the S. American Carabi differ more from the other species, than do, for instance, the Siberian & 
European & N. American & Himalayan (if the genus exists there); if they do, I entirely agree with you 
that the difference would be too great to account for by the recent Glacial period. I agree, also, with 
you in utterly rejecting an independent origin for these Carabi.— 
36 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3542  You ask for criticisms, I have none to give only 
impressions.— I fully agree with “your skimming-of pot-theory” & very well you have put it.— With 
respect contemporaneity, I nearly agree with you, & if you will look to the d—d— Book 3d Edit p. 349, 
you will find nearly similar remarks.  
37 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3746  You make important remarks versus natural selection, 
and you will perhaps be surprised that I do to a large extent agree with you. I could show you many 
passages, written as strongly as I could in the Origin, declaring that Natural Selection can do nothing 
without previous variability; and I have tried to put equally strongly that variability is governed by many 
laws, mostly quite unknown.  
38 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3856  I am actually reading de Tocquevilles Democracy in 
America, it appears to me a most able book, though I do not at all agree with it. (bigger fool you, you 
may so, & double big fool I am to say so) but I cannot help it. He assumes that D. in America was a 
success— Now I never regarded America as having cohesion enough to be pronounced either a success 
or a failure: there has been hitherto far too much freedom of motion there, too little “struggle for 
existence”—to develop any settled Govt. at all, & it is impossible to predicate what shape the existing 
introduced form of Govt. would take in 100 years, even if this war had not stepped in to confound all 
calculations.  
39 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4148  You give good advice about not writing in newspapers; I 
have been gnashing my teeth at my own folly; & this not caused by Owen’s sneers, which were so good 
that I almost enjoyed them. I have written once again to own to certain extent of truth in what he says; 
& then if I am ever such a fool again have no mercy on me.— I enclose A. Gray’s letter, as you might 
like to read all. I quite disagree with what he says about Lyell acting as a Judge on Species; I complain 
that he has not acted as a judge; I sometimes wish he had pronounced dead against us rather than 
possessed such inability to decide.—  
40 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4217   I can hardly tell why it is, but your address has pleased 
me as much as Lyell’s book disappointed me,—that is the part on species, though so cleverly written. I 
agree with all your remarks on the Reviewers. By the way, Lecoq is a believer in the change of 
species.— I, for one, can conscientiously declare that I never feel surprised at anyone sticking to the 
belief of immutability; though I am often not a little surprised at the arguments advanced on this 
side.—  
41 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4234  I like and agree to your remark that in Bates’s 
Geographical varieties, etc. etc. we get about as near to seeing a species made as we are ever likely to 
get:—and so believing I think your gradual way more likely than Heer’s jumps. 
42 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4265   With regard to sports in cultivated plants here I cannot 
agree with Schomburgk. By neglect dahlias & such degenerate, ie double & fine flowers are no more 
produced, but otherwise I can see nothing particular. That plants vary here perhaps more than in 
temperate zones appears to be correct & in this respect I wish to draw your attention to the genus 
Capsicum.  
43 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4642   I will fight you to the death, that as Primrose & Cowslip 
are different in appearance (not to mention odour, habitat & range) & as I can now show that when 
they cross, the intermediate offspring are sterile like ordinary Hybrids, they must be called as good 
species as a man & a Gorilla.— I agree that if Scotts Red Cowslip grew wild or spread itself & did not 
vary into common cowslip (& we have absolutely no proof of primrose or cowslip varying into each 
other) & as it will not cross with cowslip, it would be a perfectly good species.— 
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44 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4752   All analogy makes me quite disagree with the Duke that 
the differences in the beak, wing & tail are not of importance to the several species. In the only two 
species which I have watched, the difference in flight & in the use of the tail was conspicuously great. 
45 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4778   I think there is some great mystery concealed in this 
matter, which time & patient observation & experiment will be certain to elucidate. I wish, if you have 
one, you would send me a copy of your Paper on Primula. I saw long ago an abstract with very full 
extracts of your Linum paper in Silliman’s Journal. I quite agree with you in your note (p.  101) on the 
irrelevancy of von Mohl’s arguments. How can men be so muddle-headed? Has Leersia oryzoides ever 
been observed in a state of nature? If not, I do not think that we can argue conclusively from the habits 
of a tame organism to the habits of a wild organism.  
46 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4969  Of course everybody agrees about species thats settled—
but why do Entomostraca univalve Mollusca, & amphibia begin with such high forms? I would add Fish, 
but I might run the risk of saying something outrè & you have always Huxley at command. 
47 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5007   I quite agree that Agassiz could never mistake 
weathered-blocks & glacial action; though the mistake has, I know, been made in 2 or 3 quarters of the 
world. I have often fought with Hooker about the Physicists putting their veto on the world having been 
cooler; it seems to me as irrational, as if, when Geologists first brought forward some evidence of 
elevation & subsidence, a former Hooker had declared that this cd not possibly be admitted until 
Geologists cd explain what made the earth rise & fall.  
48 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5020   You say that all Botanists would agree that many tropical 
plants could not withstand a somewhat cooler climate. But I have come not to care at all for general 
beliefs without the special facts. I have suffered too often from this; thus I found in every book the 
general statement that a host of flowers were fertilised in the bud,—that seeds could not withstand 
salt-water &c &c.—  
49 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5062  Another Paper which concerns you is one of Lecoq’s on 
the migration of plants wh special reference to the mountain flora of Auvergne nearly identical with 
those of the Alps & Pyrenees— He disagrees with you as to the glacial epoch and its effect in producing 
the present distribution of plants   He says the former greater extension of glaciers was rather due to a 
higher than to a lower temperature and says he has anticipated Frankland & Tyndall in this point   see 
his book Des glaciers et des Climats”— He considers that birds and the winds have effected the 
colonization of Alpine & Articc plants in the Auvergne mountains—but while disagreeing with you on 
most points he shares your views as to Origin of Species and has anticipated you— see his Etudes sur la 
geographie botanique de l’Europe tom i. p. 140. tom iv. p 245–277. 
50 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5546  I quite agree about filiation of species, in a century to 
come there will be splendid work— I also agree how much unknown in Embryology & causes of each 
variation—utterly unknown [after del illeg]— | My book in French | I am aware that few follow your 
views & Most of your leading men are bitterly opposed | Paris—your papers 
51 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5554  I have been very glad to read this latter paper, as all 
inosculating forms are very interesting to me. I quite agree with what you say on the extreme interest 
of attempting to affiliate extinct & existing Species. 
52 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5565  The Duke of Argyll’s book is very fair & manly. He cannot 
agree with you, but he writhes about under you as one who feels himself likely to be beat. What he 
says about the humming birds is his weakest part. He utterly overlooks sexual selection by the females, 
as one great branch of Natural selection.  
53 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5591   With respect to mimetic plants I remember Hooker many 
years ago saying he believed that there were many, but I agree with you that it wd be most difficult to 
distinguish between mimetic resemblance & the effects of peculiar conditions. Who can say to which of 
these causes to attribute the several plants with heath-Erica-like foliage at the C. of Good Hope? Is it 
not also a difficulty that quadrupeds appear to recognize plants more by their odour than their 
appearance?  
54 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5642   I quite agree with your Chairman that you have put the 
whole argument better than I have done. But I disagree with you, & it is the only point on which I do 
disagree, when you say that there is nothing in your article original. As I am writing I will ask you two 
questions, but if you cannot answer them easily, pray do not take any trouble on the subject; Firstly. 
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Where have you seen an account of inherited baldness & deficient nails; & 2ndly of the case of the 
plane which sent up an evergreen sucker or shoot. 
55 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5762  I have sometimes thought that a strong argument might 
be drawn against your Theory—when extreme about the Origin of Species (I quite agree with you 
except when, as I think you get into extremes) when you look at the extraordinary differences in the 
mode & organs of procreation. 
56 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5861   I wholly disagree with you that the Numida ptilorhyncha 
of Eastern Africa is the true original type of the domestic guinea-fowl. As regards Gallus ferrugineus (v. 
bankiva), you have not seen my remarks on this bird in the Ibis (commentary on Jerdon’s book). Are 
you aware that the game fowls of India & the Malay countries are totally different from our game-
fowls, heavy and thick in the leg, & inelegant to my eye, though with inveterate pluck, & too heavy for 
our form of gamecock, which they would be an overmatch for, as remarked by Crawford.  
57 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5997  I agree with what Dr Wallace says about collecting larvæ 
and as those of many species of Macro-Lepidoptera differ very much in size—the females being much 
larger than the males—they are more conspicuous and consequently are more often collected than the 
smaller ones which produce males— I do not suppose Mr Stainton has ever reared whole broods of any 
of the Micro-Lepidoptera from the eggs—it is the only way to ascertain the numbers of each sex— 
58 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6095  I agree with my son’s argument & not with rejoinder. The 
cause of our difference, I think, is, that I look at the number of offspring as an important element (all 
circumstances remaining the same) in keeping up the average number of individuals within any area.— 
I do not believe that the amount of food by any means is the sole determining cause of number. 
Lessened fertility is equivalent to a new source of destruction.  
59 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6192   I quite agree with what you say, that entomologists have 
the best means of proving the derivation of species, & I have often much wished that I was one of the 
class, but it evidently requires the labour of a life to study carefully even one division of so gigantic a 
class. 
60 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6427  I am delighted that you, with whose name I am familiar, 
should approve of my work. I entirely agree with what you say about each species varying according to 
its own peculiar laws; but at the same time it must, I think, be admitted, that the variations of most 
species have in the lapse of ages been extremely diversified; for I do not see how it can be otherwise 
explained that so many forms have acquired analogous structures for the same general object, 
independently, of descent.  
61 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6728  I quite agree with you that Wallace’s sketch of Natural 
Selection is admirable. I wrote to tell him so after I had read the article & in regard to the concluding 
theory I reminded him that as to the origin of man’s intellectual & moral nature I had allowed in my 
first edition that its introduction was a real innovation interrupting the uniform course of the causation 
previously at work on the earth.  
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Appendix 3.3 Intertextuality marker: ask 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-359  The marine Saurian, which you were asking me about 
last night, inhabits the Galapagos Archipel:, which is situated under the equator, and about 
600 miles from the West coast of America.—  
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-392  — You ask me how many species of fish would be 
published in each number; there would probably be from 12 to 16.— The numbers come out on 
alternate months, but as I have said, invertebrate animals might alternate with the fish if more than 
one number is produced.— 
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-722  I am very much obliged to you for your interesting 
letter; I have long been very curious even for as short a sketch, as you have kindly sent me, of the 
bontanical geography of the southern hemisphere.— I shall be most curious to see your results in 
detail. From my entire ignorance of botany, I am sorry to say, that I cannot answer any of the 
questions, which you ask me.—  
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734  You ask me whether I suppose the small proportion of 
sp to genera in Coral Islets, arises from chance of seeds &c? I cannot answer this, I should say 
perhaps not:— if genera or small groups are truly natural they are supposed to contain many 
characters in common, it is but right to assume that the character of transportable seeds should 
hence be common to some groups above others, the inference I need not state.  
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-739  You ask whether the uniformity consists in species or 
forms. I am inclined to consider that uniformity of species is to a certain extent a sequitur to a 
uniformity of forms, & that it is a corollary to our Theorem.— Thus, uniformity of Flora must 
depend upon the genera being widely diffused, genera being forms, I think that is evident, again we 
have (or suppose we have) proved that it is the largest genera which are most widely diffused, & 
that a larger proportion of their species have wide ranges than those of small genera, whence I 
think it follows that in all countries of uniform floras, certain single, species should to a certain 
extent, be widely distributed.—  
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-880  — You ask about Amber, I believe all the species are 
extinct, ie without the amber has been doctored) & certainly the greater number are.— 
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-914  So as S. pinnat. does not at Valp. vary into big pods, I 
am more persuaded that yours is a rep. species of W. coast of Am.— That Neutral territory of rep. 
species you ask about is just what I want to work out but it needs great materials  
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1093  I, also, return Silliman & am glad to have seen Dr. 
Morton’s arcticle: my opinion, of it, as you ask for it, is that it is in main part, a merely tabulated 
compilation from Griffith’s Cuvier, with a few other facts interpolated.  
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1339  You ask what effect studying species has had on my 
variation theories; I do not think much; I have felt some difficulties more; on the other hand I have 
been struck (& probably unfairly from the class) with the variability of every part in some slight 
degree of every species: when the same organ is rigorously compared in many individuals I always 
find some slight variability, & consequently that the diagnosis of species from minute differences is 
always dangerous.  
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1351  You ask me whether I am now at work on the 
Pedunculated or Sessile cirripedes; I have finished in M.S. the former & have just described my 41th 
species of the genus Balanus: the sessile cirripedes will take me at least six months more.  
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1463  You formerly asked me for specimens for Ipswich, I 
have consequently packed up 20 to 25 specimens of Cirripedia of the several leading genera, & have 
named them: I have chiefly selected British species. 
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1719  You ask how far I go in attributing organisms to a 
common descent; I answer I know not; the way in which I intend treating the subject, is to show (as 
far as I can) the facts & arguments for & against the common descent of species of same genus; & 
then show how far the same arguments tell for or against forms, more & more widely different: & 
when we come to forms of different orders & classes, there remain only some such arguments as 
those which can perhaps be deduced from similar rudimentary structure, & very soon not an 
argument, is left.— 
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13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1735  You ask me about the trained Otters of “S India”, 
where the only species is Lutra nair; as docile no doubt as any of its congeners, but I never heard of 
its being made use of in that part of the country.  
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1752  You ask if I consider the Columba intermedia to be a 
species, or a mere race of C. livia. I did not reply to this at the time; but referred you to a notice by 
the Prince of Canino of many such races, admitted by him as species.  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1792  You ask me to publish my ideas about the domestic 
Cat. I may do so in a series of papers which I have promised to write for the ‘Calcutta Sporting 
Review’, where I have undertaken “the Feline animals of India”,—have already got a long article on 
Asiatic Lions printed off, and have partly written one on the Tiger—  
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2060  You ask about my doctrine which led me to expect 
that Trees would tend to have separate sexes. I am inclined to believe that no organic being exists 
which perpetually self-fertilises itself.  
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2167  Some time ago you asked me to furnish you with 
remarkable instances of desparity in form etc—in workers of Insects living in community— As one is 
apt to forget these things at the moment they are asked for I send you one that is a truly 
remarkable instance—  
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2251  You ask what my Book is about, I fear it is almost de 
rebus omnibus: my attempt is to look at all facts in Nat. Hist & Geology under the two points of 
view,—has each species been created independently or have species, like varieties, descended from 
other species?  
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2470  You ask about specific centres, if you change terms 
into specific areas, my theory quite requires them; i.e. it is, I think, next door to an impossibility that 
the same species should have been formed identically the same in any two areas. This point is 
discussed in my volume.— 
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2621  As I believe fully in your theory of the origin of species 
I shall be glad to do anything for you in advancing same and shall attend to the questions you send 
me and send you answers as soon as possible If you have more points I shall attend to them if you 
drop me a line— The question you ask me about the Chilean breed of sheep—I can in part answer 
now— 
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2780  You ask me how the blind Paussi in foreign Countries 
get from one ants nest to another— Your question is pertinent enough as regards some insects such 
as Claviger, Batrisus, &c., which are blind & live in ants nests— But the Paussi are not blind (at least 
I know of no blind ones). 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3084  I am not in the least surprised at your demurring to 
accept my notions on species. It took me long years before I converted myself; though daily thinking 
and observing on the subject. You ask why I should not draw a line and allow natural selection to do 
a little work and no more. I can give no direct answer to this.  
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3104  With regard to the question you ask me—whether an 
intermediate local form B is numerous & widely dispersed between the ranges of its extreme forms 
A & C: the facts that I have on the subject are numerous & rather ill digested at present. They are 
complicated in themselves & difficult.  
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3480  Again you ask “if variety A succeed in locality I. why 
should it not succeed at locality II. if it had ever been existent there”—my answer is that no locality 
II. is identical with a loc. I. & that Nat. Selection will act on an imperceptible difference—it searches 
where no faculty of man can follow.  
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3542  You ask for criticisms, I have none to give only 
impressions.— I fully agree with “your skimming-of pot-theory” & very well you have put it.— With 
respect contemporaneity, I nearly agree with you, & if you will look to the d—d— Book 3d Edit 
p. 349, you will find nearly similar remarks.  
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3851  Dr. Hooker tells me that you ask him if I had your 
`Origin of Species’, if ever in my life I could be induced to tell an untruth, it would be here the case, 
because I should consider it the highest compliment to receive a work like yours from the hand of 
the Author, and on returning to Ch. Church, I shall present my copy to our embryo of a library, so 
that I can then fairly say, I do not possess it. 
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27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3913  You ask what I think about Falconer; of course I am 
much pleased at the very kind way he refers to me; but, as I look at it, the great gain is for any good 
man to give up immutability of species: the road is then open for progress; it is comparatively 
immaterial whether he believes in N. Selection; but how any man can persuade himself that species 
change unless he sees how they become adapted to their conditions is to me incomprehensible.— 
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4053  You ask about Sprengels “Dichogamy”: he means by 
this a plant in which each flower first matures & sheds its pollen & then has its stigma mature; & 
much more rarely matures its stigma first & subsequently its pollen: so that these plants are in 
function monoœcious. I am sure his observations are to large extent correct, & the case is very 
common.  
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4642  In your last note you ask what the Bardsfield oxlip is— 
it is P. elatior of Jacq. which certainly looks when growing to common eyes different from common 
oxlip. I will fight you to the death, that as Primrose & Cowslip are different in appearance (not to 
mention odour, habitat & range) & as I can now show that when they cross, the intermediate 
offspring are sterile like ordinary Hybrids, they must be called as good species as a man & a 
Gorilla.— 
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5140  Now it seems to me that you have yourself led to this 
objection being made, by so often stating the case too strongly against yourself. For Example, at the 
Commencement of Chap. IV. you ask, if it is “improbable that useful variations should sometimes 
occur in the course of thousands of generations”;—and a little further on you say, “unless profitable 
variati do occur natural selection can do nothing.” Now such expressions h given your opponents 
the advantage of assuming that favourable variations are rare accidents, or may even for long 
periods never occur at all, & thus Janet’s argument would appear to many to have great force.  
31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5174  P.S. 2d. As you were asking about Books on “Origin”; a 
very good Zoologist Claus has just published one, with my name on title-page—the subject being an 
investigation of the amount of individual variability in the Copepodous Crustaceans & he shows it is 
wonderfully great in many organs & that some co existing vars, are apparently passing into distinct 
species.— 
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5389a  I am much obliged to you for your kind letter 
(without date) in which you ask about the number of capsules produced by the Maxillaria with the 
larger pods. I am told by a french collector M. Gautier that it is the Maxillaria tetragona; however 
his names are not always to be relied upon.—  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5429  I have also to thank you for your kind letter of Jan. 1st, 
and will now first answer the questions, you ask in this letter. As to Adenanthera pavonina, the only 
tree, I know, stands in a garden; but I had not even suspected, that it had been planted there, and 
still less, (as we are here very rich in Mimoseæ) that the species had been introduced from India. 
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5633a  Since you wrote me, I have examined the genus in 
the Herbarium, and did not find a single species without perfect flowers. As you ask me if ever I 
have seen Vandellia with perfect flowers, I append enumeration of the species I have examined 
they may interest you and may possibly thus also hit upon the species which you have in view.  
35 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6016  When you asked whether other birds beside the 
Gallinaceæ were polygamous, I presume you had not forgotten the Ruff (Machetes pugnax); it is 
most remarkable that in such a very dull colored group as the Tringidæ and the allied family 
Scolopacidæ, that the only polygamous species (I believe) should have such marvellous nuptial 
appendages as the ♂ pugnax, small wart like wattles, and large hackles capable of being erected like 
a Gallus.— 
36 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6269  Your references & remarks will be of great use should 
a new edition of my book be demanded; but this is hardly probable, for the whole edition was sold 
within the first week, & another large edtion immediately reprinted which I shd think wd supply the 
demand forever. You ask me when I shall publish on the variation of species in a state of nature. 
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Appendix 3.4 Intertextuality marker: aware  
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-503 I am not aware that the genera which it is difficult to 
hybridize are slow to sport. Up to this day, tho’ I am still trying, I have failed in all attempts to cross 
Crocuses, yet there is a different either species or vary of Crocus in almost every part of S. Europe, 
& the garden varieties of Crocus vernus & versicolor are very numerous.  
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734 You are I daresay aware of the fact that there is no 
reason to believe that plants can be artificially acclimated to any extent— Gardeners have hardly 
made any plant hardy, either by growing it from seeds of an introduced live specimen which did but 
just ripen, or by grafting on allied hardier species.— 
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-737 I was not aware of the analogous fact with regard to the 
Sandwich group; nor have I yet examined the Canary Isld. Campbell Isld, 2 degrees further S. than 
Auckland, contains several species not found in the former, though the latter is the smallest & 
furthest South— I should not think however that it would hold with Islds in the more temperate 
zones generally, as the Azores which have not very many peculiar plants I shall however sift this 
subject with my friend Mr H. Watson..  
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-788  I am perfectly aware of the xtreme caution that should 
be used in this instance, & the propriety of keeping the two species distinct in V. D L., or finding 
some character between the V. D L. form of varium which appears there as Selago,—if in either 
case, any, however slight, a character can be found between them; but I can find none, the V. D L. 
Selago is, to my eyes, identical with the English & V. D L. appears to me to possess all intermediate 
states between selago & varium: this is not the passage merely of one species into another, but of 
two groups of the genus differing originally toto caelo. 
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-996 Have you ever thought of G. St. Hilaire “loi du 
balancement”, as applied to plants: I am well aware that some zoologists quite reject it, but it 
certainly appears to me, that it often holds good with animals.— You are no doubt aware of the 
kind facts I refer to, such as great development of canines in the carnivora apparently causing a 
diminution—a compensation or balancement—in the small size of premolars &c &c. 
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1544 – I have not a well defined dissection to appeal to. I 
have so often, as I remark above, seen the mouth far posterior to the organs referred to, that I had 
hardly doubted the relation I have suggested until you expressed your opinion about it.— I was not 
aware of the objectionable character of the terms Kingdom & Subkingdom as I have used them in 
my Chapter on Dist. of Crustacea, until I read your inferences from them. 
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1735 You are doubtless aware that, for the most part, the 
Estreldinæ represent in India & the Malay countries, exclusively in Australia, & to a great extent in 
Africa, the Fringillinæ of northern climes (inclusive of the Himalaya); & we have also 3 species of 
Ploceinæ, one of which (with a fourth) is likewise found in Java, the rest of this group being 
African—  
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1761 The Achatina perdix will doubtless spread, & rapidly, 
over the whole country; and I am not aware of any species enemy that it has encountered as yet. 
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1776 Are you aware that the old Peruvians had domestic 
Dogs, regular parti-coloured curs! Vide Tschudi’s plates on Peruvian Antiquities. (Pl. 23, I think); & I 
especially call your attention to this.  
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1790 Among species separated by a wide extent of Seas you 
are probably aware that Pupa Anconostoma Lowe is common to Madeira & the Canary Isles The lost 
shell which I reported as found by me on the summit of St Helena, and lately refound by E Layard, 
proves to be the same species 
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1825 I was not aware of what you mention concerning the 
muscular foundation of the tuft in the Polish (Polled?) fowls. I have been trying to hunt up a notice I 
remember reading some time ago, in some French work, respecting the wild range of the Golden 
Pheasant extending I think to Orenbourg; a very remarkable fact, which may account for the 
ancients having some knowledge of it, however vague, which Cuvier connects with the old 
descriptions of the Phœnix!! 
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12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2005 I was not in the least aware that those Leguminosæ, 
which have apetalous flowers, “were almost without anthers”: you once told me before, about the 
apetalous Leguminosæ, & I think I wrote down other names besides Ononis, Lespediza & Clitoria: I 
will, if I do not hear to the contrary quote this fact on your authority, viz the apetalous condition of 
“many” Leguminosæ, which in this condition are almost without anthers & yet produce more seed 
than the ordinary flowers.  
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2076 I am not aware that insects will ever “fight for their 
females”. I know however, from painful experience, that they will fight for themselves (having been 
bitten by a Scarites very severely some months ago); & I believe that “No. 1” is their motto,—caring 
little for No. 2 (or their mates), except now & then to eat them.— 
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2133 I was not aware that varieties occurred more in large 
genera than in small ones,—except from the &lsquo; a priori certainty, that where there are more 
species to vary, there must naturally be more varieties. 
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2629 Let us, I say return to your Tucotuco— We learn (& I 
remember examining the specimen dissected by Mr Reid) that its thigh bone is destitute of the 
Ligamentum teres,— accounting for its queer movements.— Now this ligament is wanting in very 
few mammals,—(but I am not aware of its absence in any birds) among which are four of very 
different character—viz the Orang, & the Elephant—The Seal tribe & the 3=toed Sloth.  
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2920c I am not aware of any fossil bats or rodents in 
Australian caves, so the small antiquity of rodentia may be a reason for their not having given origin 
as yet to Gyrencephala & does there not seem some connection between the low grade of 
Lyssencephala as the only occupants of that vast Australian continent? 
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3061 I am much obliged to Mr. Marshall, of Ely, for his 
statement that the 15 plants of Fly Orchis (Ophrys muscifera) which does not grow in his 
neighbourhood, but which flourished in his garden, had not one of their pollen masses removed. 
The Orchis maculata, on the other hand, which likewise does not grow in the neighbourhood, had 
all its pollen masses removed. Mr. Marshall is not perhaps aware that different insects haunt 
different Orchids, and are necessary for their fertilisation.  
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3121 In p. 422 of your new edition you say “Madeira does 
not possess one peculiar bird”— This is not quite the fact. Out of the 99 birds given by Mr Vernon 
Harcourt in Ann. N.H. June 1855 as belonging to its Fauna one—Regulus maderensis is peculiar— it 
is of course an altered form of R. auricapillus. Three others Fringilla canariensis, Cypselus unicolor 
and Columba trocaz if not peculiar are distinct from European species and only found elsewhere in 
the Canaries— I am not aware that Cyps. unicolor has been met with even there. 
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3407 I have never succeeded in growing Cycnoches.— & I do 
not recollect ever to have had Mormodes, but as this last is one of the aberrant forms of 
Catasetum, I suspect it follows its habits— You are doubtless aware that Myanthus & Catasetum are 
identical though totally unlike.— Twenty years & more ago, I flowered a most beautiful specimen of 
Myanthus barbatus.—two full spikes of flower, exactly like the plant represented in an early volume 
of Paxtons Mage. 
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3937 I am not aware that any sexual difference has been 
noticed in its flowers. Acct. wd. have to be taken of the Algae in such great preponderance 
submerged altogether,—fertilising of course by antherozoids. Some (as some Fuci) are monoecious 
& I fancy have both sexes in same conceptacle. 
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4071 P.S. By way of experiment, I gave a large plant of 
Phaius Grandiflorus a good `shaking’ to try if irritation would do anything in the way of inducing 
seed and I find some half dozen pods upon the plant. I was induced so to do as probably you may be 
aware that Erica elegans will not cross with any other species of heath neither will it set a single pod 
unless some artificial mode be adopted; but by shaking the plant the pollen will disperse and the 
plant thereupon will produce seed in abundance. 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4257 You are doubtless aware of the cosimilarity of 
tendency to change of the Japanese as compared with the Chinese birds with the British birds as 
compared with those of the European continent. The causes are probably due to the influence on 
the respective atmospheres produced by the Gulf streams of the Pacific and the Atlantic.  
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23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5218 So much is this the case that some Norfolk farmers say 
that Carduus arvensis will not propagate from seed and I heard when there that one farmer had 
said that he would give 5s/ to any one who would prove that it could be raised from seed— I may 
possibly have repeated this story and that may have led some one to suppose that I believe that 
C. arvensis did not produce fertile seed—whereas I am perfectly aware that it is often introduced 
into fields by seed— when there it generally spreads by its rhizomes    
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5826 In retiring into a hole the large hand must block up the 
hole from its size: therefore I do not see the weight of M. Edwards quotation of M. Marion de 
Procé. You are probably aware that in some Gelasimi the hand can be of no use in feeding itself in 
as much, that the claw is so large that it cannot be brought to reach the mouth— In this Singapore 
species before me, the hand passes far beyond the mouth, 
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6130 I was much struck with your remarks about the Ducks 
with the white crescentic mark on the breast, you are probably unaware that in Sussex Ducks so 
marked are very common, I have stood by a ponds side & been amazed to observe every duck in 
some instances so marked, you will observe in several wild species there is a tendency to two colors 
on the breast, perhaps the uniformity of coloring adverted to may arise from atavism, my Brother 
who had some so marked thought it was an extension of the white ring of the Mallard.  
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6169 I am not aware that in any other species of Dog this 
difference is so great. It does not seem to be so in the common Greyhound, or in the Setter or 
Bulldog. It is strange that it should be so, yet we see it in some wild animals, tho’ not in others; for 
instance in the Capercailzie and Black-cock, but not in the wild-duck or goose.   
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Appendix 3.5 Intertextuality marker:  discussion, hypothesis, 
assertion 
 
 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-736  I will trouble you with only one other question. In 
discussion with Mr Gould, I found that in most of the genera of birds, which range over the whole or 
greater part of the world, the individual species have wider ranges: thus the Owl is mundane, & 
many of the species have very wide ranges. So I believe it is with land & fresh-water shells—& I 
might adduce other cases.  
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-739  Thus, uniformity of Flora must depend upon the genera 
being widely diffused, genera being forms, I think that is evident, again we have (or suppose we 
have) proved that it is the largest genera which are most widely diffused, & that a larger proportion 
of their species have wide ranges than those of small genera, whence I think it follows that in all 
countries of uniform floras, certain single, species should to a certain extent, be widely 
distributed.— There is no occasion to suppose they are distributed to such an extent as to invalidate 
a hypothesis that “in each group of tropical S. S. Islds the several Islets have distinct floras;—”.. I 
consider the S. S. Islds as a whole, or Oceania to have a most distinct & peculiar flora, not from 
possessing any one very large group peculiar to itself, (as America has her Cacti &c) but because she 
has a mixture of the peculiarities of N & S. America, Australia, India & perhaps N. Asia.  
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-964  Certainly there is no objection to the hypothesis of a 
Sargassum being an absolute creation, though I see no reason to call for such an aid in this case, the 
species being in my opinion decidedly the littoral Atlantic one 
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1856  You will probably object, why have so many more 
Northern species & forms gone to the south, than southern forms come to the north; I can explain 
this only on a pure hypothesis of cold having come on first from the north; but there has been some 
migration from south to north, as of Australian forms on Mountains of Borneo. And I am sure I have 
notes of a few S. African forms, as wanderers across the Tropics, into N. Africa & Europe: is not this 
so with Gladiolus, Stapelia(?).  
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1863  The discussion on Social plants (vague as the term & 
facts are) in De candolle strikes me as the best, which I have ever seen: two points strike me as 
eminently remarkable in them; that they should ever be social close to their extreme limits; & 
secondly that species having an extremely confined range, yet shd. be social where they do occur: I 
shd. be infinitely obliged for any cases either by letter or publickly on these heads, more especially 
in regard to a species remaining or ceasing to be social, on the confines of its range. 
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2020f  But first let me thank you for your paper on 
Geological Development: everything which you have ever written interests me; but I own this last 
paper is rather too grand for my digestion; not but that I am very much inclined, from different 
reasons, to agree with you on antiquity of continents & oceans; & I have lately had some written 
discussion on subject with Lyell, who differs toto coelo from me. In my coral volume, I remember 
coming to same conclusion of continents now & lately having risen, ocean-beds having sunk, & 
great archipelagoes having oscillated.  
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2599   With respect to food of large animals, if you care 
about the subject, will you turn to my discussion on this subject partly in respect to the Elephas 
primigenius in my Journal of Researches (Murray’s Home & Colonial Library) Ch V. p. 85.— In this 
country we infer from remains of Elephas primegenius, that the climate at the period of its 
embedment was very severe, as seems countenanced by its woolly covering,—by the nature of the 
deposit with angular fragments,—the nature of the coembedded shells, & coexistence of the Musk 
Ox.  
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2639  I remember putting the case to myself almost in your 
words,—Why does not every individual become converted into distinct species? The answer, which 
I framed, and the discussion on this curious point, which I have somewhere in M.S. is nearly to the 
245 
 
following effect: Although the number of species supported over equal areas under apparently 
nearly similar conditions is now very different in different quarters of the world; and although we 
are far from knowing that the most prolific area is fully stocked with species, as perhaps may be 
inferred if not so from some European plants having become naturalized even at Cape of Good 
Hope, yet Geology shows us, at least within the whole immense Tertiary period, that the number of 
species of shells & probably of mammals has not increased.  
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2649  The only point which I might add to my short 
discussion on this subject, is that I think it probable that the want of adaptation to uniform 
conditions of life in our domestic varieties has played an important part in preventing their 
acquiring sterility when crossed. For this want of uniformity & changes in the conditions of life 
seems only cause of the elimination of sterility (When crossed) under domestication.  
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2898  The facts of Embryology & of morphology are 
favourable to belief in an intimate relationship of organism to organism throughout nature; & this 
relationship is explicable on the hypothesis of a community of descent: & though these facts are not 
contrary to a notion of separate creation they are unexplained by it.— 
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2908a  But the antiquity of islands void of mammals checks 
the hypothesis of the easy adaptability of one species of a genus to new conditions. On a new 
volcanic island before all the best places are seized upon, seals or walrus’s, manatees, dolphins & 
other cetacea, when pressed hard for food wd go up the rivers or if amphibious devour the eggs or 
young of land-birds.  
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2927a  I return the M.S. on dogs which I think excellent. The 
case you make out seems very strong not only of crosses from distinct living species having blended 
into the dog, but in favour of difft savage races having domesticated different canine types, wolves, 
jackalls &c by domestication in accordance with the hypothesis of Pallas having eliminated the 
dislike to cross with other species as well as the tendency of such crosses to sterility. 
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3345  I have hardly anything to remark. That is a capital 
discussion on the effects of climate on the dress of species; very original & throws new light on 
subject.—  
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3603  The general hypothesis of indefinite transmission 
across centuries of forms with more or less marked modifications seems preferable to any other, 
but I am uncertain that natural selection is the means for it. There are so many factors that for a 
long time keep forms the same from generation to generation or that cause them to revert! It is so 
rare for a new form to be preserved without the protection of man! I know of no proven instance of 
the latter case.  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3913  I have just received long pamphet by Alph. De 
Candolle on Oaks & allies, in which he has worked out in very complete & curious manner individual 
variability of species, & has wildish speculations on their migrations & duration &c. It is really 
curious to see how blind he is to the conditions or struggle for life; he attributes the presence of all 
species of all genera of trees to dryness or dampness! At end he has discussion on “Origin”; I have 
not yet come to this, but suppose it will be dead against it.  
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3969  I have thought that I ought to state to you the ground 
for my assertion on page 602, that Geology has not afforded facts that sustain the view that the 
system of life has been evolved through a method of development from species to Species.—  
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4108   So little do we know of the conditions of life all 
around us, that we cannot say why one native weed or insect swarms in numbers, and another 
closely allied weed or insect is rare. Is it then possible that we should understand why one group of 
beings has risen in the scale of life during the long lapse of time, and another group has remained 
stationary? Sir C. Lyell, who has given so excellent a discussion on species in his great work on the 
`Antiquity of Man,’ has advanced a somewhat analogous objection, namely, that the mammals, 
such as seals or bats, which alone have been enabled to reach oceanic islands, have not been 
developed into various terrestrial forms, fitted to fill the unoccupied places in their new island-
homes; but Sir Charles has partly answered his own objection.  
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4167  May 22d. I have been very bad & chiefly confined to 
bed; but will amuse myself by writing a little more to you. With respect to Bates & Wallace having 
distinct views on species during their Journey; what does astonish me is the extreme poverty of 
246 
 
observation on this head in Wallace’s book; with one discussion on very dissimilar Birds feeding 
alike showing, as it seemed to me, complete misunderstanding of the economy of nature. 
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4715   More than twenty years ago, I read in the account of 
your travels in the Southern hemisphere an assertion which I quoted in a book on the peat bogs 
(Neuchatel 1844). It is: that in the peat bogs of South America contrary to what happens in Europe, 
no species of mosses enters into the composition and formation of the peat: that Astelia pumile Br. 
& Donatia Magellanica cover nearly entirely the peat bogs of Terra del Fuego and that both these 
plants are the essential constituents and agents in the formation of the peat &c. I quote from 
memory.  
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5242  When looking over some grass a species of Bromus 
from the North Western coast of America—with a friend & botanist we noticed some oats that 
were producing ears of barley   this led to the assertion made by Elihu Burritt in his “Walk through 
the Eastern Counties” that a farmer at St. Ives Hunts had for years “transmuted” oats into barley. 
doubting this I wrote to the writer of the enclosed a farmer of 1600 acres a Member of the Council 
of the Royal Agricultural Society & above all a good & truthful gentleman.  
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5280  We are going to have a discussion on “Mimicry, as 
producing abnormal sexual characters” at the Entomological tonight. I have a butterfly (a Diadema) 
of which the female is metallic blue, the male dusky brown contrary to the rule in all other species 
of the genus, & in almost all insects;—but the explanation is easy;—it mimics a metallic blue 
Euplœa, and so gets a protection perhaps more efficient than its allies derive from their sombre 
colours, & which females require much more than males.  
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5416  When our discussion on Mimicry took place a most 
interesting little fact was mentioned by Mr. Stainton. After mothing he is accustomed to throw all 
the common species to his poultry & once having a lot of young turkeys he threw them a quantity 
of moths which they eat greedily, but among them was one common white moth (Spilosoma 
menthastri) One of the young turkeys took this in his beak, shook his head & threw it down again, 
another ran to seize it and did the same, and so on, the whole brood in succession rejected it!  
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6140  As to “Pangenesis”, on which you wish to hear my 
opinion, my first impression, when for the first time I rapidly read your exposition, was the very 
same, which I formerly had at the first lecture of your “Origin of species”, viz. that it was a fanciful 
speculation; but you know, that notwithstanding this first impression I am now fully convinced of 
the truth of the views maintained in the “Origin”. The hypothesis of “Pangenesis” would certainly 
account for, and connect several great classes of facts hitherto isolated and unexplained; it can also 
hardly be doubted, that eggs, spermatozoa, ovules of plants and pollengrains, notwithstanding their 
minute size and apparent simplicity, must be highly complicated structures, containing, as it were, a 
photograph of the whole organisation, from which they are derived.—  
 
 
Appendix 3.6 Intertextuality marker: hear 
 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-81 Of Course you have heard of the new species of wild 
Swan, discovered in England, by Mr. Yarrell. I have bad stuffed specimen of it, for 10s.— bad as it is, 
you may think yourself, lucky in getting. Yarrell himself, has pronounced it to be the new sort, so 
there can be no doubt.— 
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-178  Every one has heard of the dislocoured streaks of water 
in the Equatorial regions.— One I examined was owing to the presence of such minute Oscillaria 
that in each square inch of surface there must have been at least one hundred thousand present.—  
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-785 The specimens on a cursory inspection appeared to 
possess the exact similitude to the Genus Trinoton. The occurrence of which on any other that 
water Fowl I believe has never been noticed, at all events, I never heard of an instance in which 
species of the same Genus were found, some on Birds others on Mammals. 
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4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-789 What a curious, wonderful case is that of the 
Lycopodiums; I suppose you would hardly have expected them to be more varying than a 
phanerogamic plant. I trust you will work the case out & even if unsupported publish it, for you can 
surely do this with due caution. I have heard of some analogous facts, though on the smallest scale, 
in certain insects being more variable in one district than in another; & I think the same holds with 
some land-shells.  
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-864a I am delighted to hear that you are grappling with the 
Galapagos insects: the more I go into the Fauna, the more peculiar it is: out of 17 land shells 16 are 
new species confined to the group! 
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-924 I am glad to hear that you are hard at work again & 
continue to find interesting geographical results: assuredly, as you say in your Preface, geographical 
distrib: will be the key which will unlock the mystery of species.  
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-951 I am very glad to hear that you mean to attack this 
subject some day: I wonder whether we shall ever be public combatants: anyhow, I congratulate 
myself in a most unfair advantage of you, viz in having extracted more facts & views from you than 
from any one other person. 
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1082  I shd. like to see sometime the war-correspondence: 
have you the Phytologist & cd. you sometime spare it; I wd go through it quickly.— I have not heard 
from Murray; I am rather sorry to hear about Dr. Holland being probably the reviewer: he does not 
know enough of Nat. Hist. & between ourselves he is so dreadfully conceited & vain that he never 
wd. condescend to learn, or to think enough of the labours of others.—  
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1202 I am glad to hear that you are struck with my case of 
the Supplemental males: I have lately reworked them most carefully. They have no mouth or 
stomach, but the natatory larva or rather pupa (for the larva in 2d stage in no cirripede, I find, has a 
mouth) fixes itself on the hermaphrodite, develops itself into a great testis! & then dies & is 
succeeded by a fresh crop of these temporary Supplemental males. 
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1480 I am very much pleased to hear that you have not 
given up the idea of noticing my Cirripedia volume. All that I have seen since confirms everything of 
any importance stated in that volume. More especially I have been able rigorously to confirm, in an 
anomalous species, by the clearest evidence, that the actual cellular contents of the ovarian tubes, 
by the gland-like action of a modified portion of the continuous tube, passes into the cementing 
stuff: in fact cirripedes make glue out of their own unformed eggs!. 
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1750 I am quite delighted to hear that you can perhaps 
illustrate apparent rule, about difference between species & variation of the individual.— 
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2060  These notions are too long to give & indeed not worth 
giving, as far as America is concerned, & I can see from your letter that we shd. take very much the 
same view. I am very glad to hear that you think of discussing the relative ranges of the identical & 
allied U. States & European species, when you have time.  
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2134 I am very glad to hear that you have been tabulating 
some Floras about varieties. Will you just tell me roughly the result?— Do you not find it takes 
much time? I am employing a laboriously careful Schoolmaster, who does the tabulating & dividing 
part into two great cohorts more carefully than I can.  
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2192 I am extremely glad to hear that you are attending to 
distribution in accordance with theoretical ideas. I am a firm believer, that without speculation 
there is no good & original observation. Few travellers have  I cannot say that I am; for so very few 
naturalists care for anything beyond the mere description of species.  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2475 I am sorry to hear that you are so much worked with 
many subjects & building.— Never mind about Goodneia: perhaps I cd. get some species to flower 
in my greenhouse.— I thought the Acacias had been crossed.— 
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2690  I think the importance of theory bears on opening up 
new fields of enquiry & in giving a rational, instead of theological explanation of many known facts I 
am much pleased to hear that you intend reading the Book again. If not too troublesome I shall be 
most grateful for any other remarks.  
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2711  I am extremely much pleased to hear that you like my 
Book. I look at every geological believer of the mutation of species as a most important gain.— 
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There will be a long & stiff battle before such doctrines are generally admitted. The progress of 
subject will now depend far more on such men as yourself than on anything I can do.— 
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2928  I hope I have not blundered likewise in its coexistence 
with extinct species. What horrid blundering. I am grieved to hear that you think I must work in the 
notes in text; but you are so much better judge, that I will obey. I am sorry that you had trouble of 
returning Dog. M.S,—which I suppose I shall receive tomorrow.— 
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2931 I am very glad to hear about the Germans reading my 
Book. No one will be converted, who has not independently begun to doubt about Species.— Is not 
Krohn a good fellow? I have long meant to write to him. He has been working at Cirripedes & has 
detected 2 or 3 gigantic blunders, but in very difficult points. & about which, I thank Heaven, I spoke 
rather doubtfully, such difficult dissection that even Huxley failed.  
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2993 I am delighted to hear that you, with all your large 
practical knowledge of Nat. History, anticipated me in many respects & concur with me.— As you 
say I have been thoroughily well attacked & reviled, (especially by entomologists, Westwood, 
Wollaston & A. Murray have all reviewed & sneered at me to their hearts’ content) but I care 
nothing about their attacks; several really good judges go a long way with me, & I observe that all 
those who go some little way tend to go somewhat further.  
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3086 I am most uncommonly pleased, I can assure you, to 
hear that you are become “heretical” on species.— I perceived with no surprise that you were at 
first dead against me: in fact I cannot say that I respect anyone who has knowledge & can change 
his opinion suddenly on such a point.— If any fair & good opportunity occurs in any publication, I 
hope that you will say a word on our side: for I observe that those opposed write vehemently, & 
those on our side are silent; consequently the public have no means of knowing how many are on 
our side. 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3854 It pleases me much to hear that you are not a believer 
in the immutability of species,—a doctrine perfectly adapted to stop philosophical research.— I 
trust that you some day will write on variation in Butterflies, & express your beliefs on the subject 
of species.—  
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3945 I am heartily glad to hear that your great labours over 
your Book are drawing to a close: I know that I for one shall read it with real interest.— Pray thank 
Wallace when you see him about Melastomas; I have in truth given more trouble on this, than case 
deserves, & am truly obliged to you. The fact is I cannot endure being beaten by a beggarly flower 
to the degree, which these confounded Melastomas have beaten me.—  
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4024 Cordial thanks for your deeply interesting letters about 
Lyell, Owen & co. I cannot say how glad I am to hear that I have not been unjust about species-
question towards Lyell. I feared I had been unreasonable.  
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4046 I have received your kind letter of the 31st. January, 
and am very glad to hear that my Orchid sketches & obsns. interested you. You are quite right in 
supposing that there is no movement of the pollinia in the species I have described; I imagine that 
such motion is chiefly found in those species which have a cap of membrane over the viscid matter 
of the pollinia discs in situ,—certainly none of the Cape species that I have seen (all of which have 
the discs naked) present any phenomenon of the kind. 
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4167  I am heartily rejoiced to hear that you intend to try to 
bring L. & F. together again: but had you not better wait till they are a little cooled? you will do 
science a real good service. Falconer never forgave Lyell for taking the Purbeck bones from him & 
handing them over to Owen.— 
27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4185 I have been glad to hear about Mercurialis; but I will 
not accept your offer of seed on account of time, time, time, & weak health. For same reason I must 
give up Primula matter. What a wonderful indefatigable worker you are! You seem to have made a 
famous lot of interesting experiments. D. Beaton once wrote that no man could cross any species of 
Primula, you have apparently proved the contrary with a vengeance.—  
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4569 I naturally feel much curiosity on the progress of 
opinion on the descent of species, & I am delighted to hear that the subject is progressing in 
Germany which so abounds with great naturalists.— But what you tell me about yourself interests 
me the most, & I thank you sincerely for your confidence. I feel what you say in praise of my book & 
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your intention of carrying onwards & perfecting the subject, as by far the greatest honour which 
could be paid me.  
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4763 I am much obliged for yr letter & am particularly glad 
to hear that you are going to experimentise on Passifloras. & perhaps publish the results. If 
published I shd very much wish for a copy.—  
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4786f I am pleased to hear that you have been interested in 
my work on the Origin of Species. Your law of inheritance I dare say is true & may have some 
bearing on the modification of Species; but I fear it would be difficult to prove it with sufficient 
clearness to allow of its use  
31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5007 It seems that I erred greatly about some of the plants 
on the Organ Mts., but I am very glad to hear about Fuchsia &c. I cannot make out what Hooker 
does believe, he seems to admit the former cooler climate, & almost in the same breath, to spurn 
the idea. To retort Hooker’s words “It is inexplicable to me” how he can compare the transport of 
seeds from the Andes to the Organs Mts. with that from a continent to an island: not to mention 
the much greater distance, there are no currents of water from one to the other, & what on earth 
shd make a bird fly that distance without resting many times.  
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5097  I have almost finished correcting the new Ed. of the 
Origin & I am pleased to hear that my labour will be so much the more advantageous as a 3rd 
German Ed. is immediately to be printed revised by Prof. Leonhard. As you feel interested on the 
subject, I may mention that I have lately read two pamphlets in our favour, by good men, one by 
Oscar Schmidt & the other by Carl Nägeli.  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5202 I am delighted to hear that you keep on your zealous 
love & work for Nat History & British Assoc— New discussion—on modification of species 
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5499 In that case nothing wd give me higher satisfaction 
than that Schweizerbart shd arrange with you, if that be possible, for a translation; for I have often 
heard of the fame of your excellent translations. My present work I greatly fear is of much greater 
length than value.  
35 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5618 I am very glad indeed to hear that you take an interest 
in my few essays written rather by a learner than a teacher. In all of them I have tried as far as 
possible to break down the barrier between Pleistocene and living species, by attaching weight to 
individual variation, and to results of living under different conditions. Thus the Pleistocene animals 
utterly extinct amount only to about 10 or 11 out of 56. 
36 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5794 I am delighted to hear that you intend to consider the 
relations of fossil animals in connection with their genealogy,; it will afford you a fine field for the 
exercise of your extensive knowledge & powers of reasoning.  
37 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5920  Lately again I have had the pleasure to hear that two 
of my correspondents have become ardent followers of your theories: Dr Speyer, known as a 
perfect connoisseur of Germain Lepidoptera is about to show the descent of the Lepidoptera from 
the Phryganidae (I have sent him my collection of Westfalian Phryganidae for his exploration); 
another friend of mine, Röse, is about to explain the genealogical connection of some mosses. Every 
one who has been instructed by the reading of your works is full of admiration and of thanks for 
you. 
38 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6075 I am delighted to hear that you uphold the doctrine of 
the Modification of Species, and defend my views. The support which I receive from Germany is my 
chief ground for hoping that our views will ultimately prevail. To the present day I am continually 
abused or treated with contempt by writers of my own country; but the younger naturalists are 
almost all on my side, and sooner or later the public must follow those who make the subject their 
special study.  
39 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6091 Many thanks for your last M.S. I am very glad to hear 
about the colours of Hylobates. Unfortunately, I cannot find in Isidor Geoffroy Hist. des Anom. any 
statement in regard to which digits in man are most liable to syndactylism; if I cd ascertain this point 
your remark wd be most interesting. I knew about the variability of the junction of the digits in 
some of the species. 
40 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6292  I am glad to hear that you are going to touch on the 
statement that the belief in Nat. selection is passing away; I do not suppose that even the 
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Athenæum wd. pretend that the belief in the common descent of species is passing away, & this is 
the more important point. This now almost universal belief in the evolution (somehow) of species I 
think may be fairly attributed in large part to the “Origin.”  
41 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6390 Almost the one exception, as far as I know is Mr. 
Gaudry—& I think he will be soon one of the Chief Leaders in Zoological Paleontology in Europe & 
now I am delighted to hear that in the sister department of Botany you take nearly the same view. 
42 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6427  I am very glad to hear that you have been arguing 
against Nägeli’s law of perfectibility which seems to me superfluous. Others hold similar views, but 
none of them define what this “perfection” is, which cannot be gradually attained through Natural 
Selection.  
43 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-8719  I am glad to hear that D. filiformis catches only small 
insects, as I suspected this. I have observed with care several other species of Drosera.  
 
Appendix 3.7 Intertextuality marker: mention, state 
 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-421  Meanwhile I will just state that with a few exceptions 
the Chalcidites of S. America, & also those of Australia are remarkably like the European species, 
many of them are very nearly allied to the British species, & 2 or 3 are absolutely identical with the 
latter. 
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-591  I write now to inform you that I have probably led you 
into one small error— I stated that the Fungus grows on the Fagus antarctica, but I am almost 
certain that the F. betuloides  is the common tree of Tierra del Fuego, & as this Fungus abounds 
every where it must  grow on this latter species— it may (& I believe does) grow on the F. 
antarctica.  
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-718  I have one criticism to make about your circles —that is 
that I think you are bound to state that they do not necessarily represent (without you think they 
do) groups of equal value & though all touching, the affinities are not necessarily equally strong.— I 
believe infinite harm has been done by these circles, which catch the eye as of equal size, & 
inevitably lead the mind to suppose they are of equal value— it is by this artifice, as I believe, the 
possibility of making the Quinarian system appear probible has chiefly rested: Moreover it shd be 
stated by everyone, I think, who indulges in these vicious  circles, that confessedly there is no 
standard to judge of the value of groups.— Who can prove that the woodpecker are not a group of 
equal value with the Hawks.— I suspect that number of species, ie amount of variation of one 
common type does silently come into play in estimating the value of groups.— 
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-722  P.S. I have been looking at my poor miserable attempt 
at Botanical-landscape-remarks, & I see that I state that the species of Beech which is least common 
in T. del Fuego, is common in the forest of central Chiloe. But I will enclose for you this one page of 
my rough journal.— 
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-736  Is it so with those plants, which are peculiar to this 
archipelago; you state that their numerical proportions are continental (is not this a very curious 
fact?) but are they related in forms to S. America.— Do you know any other cases of an Archipelago, 
with the separate islands possessing distinct representative species?  
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-788  I have not forgot a question you once propounded to 
me as to whether the species of large-groups-which-were-local were local also, & am inclined to 
think that species of local large nat. ords. are local also, Cacti I think I mentioned before as an 
example & Proteaceæ & Epacridæ I take to be two others. 
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-789   In my Journal, (p. 342) I see I state that in South Chiloe 
at height of about 1000 ft the forest had a Fuegian aspect: I distinctly recollect, that at sea-level in 
middle of Chiloe, the forest had almost a tropical aspect. I shd. like much to hear, if you make out, 
whether the N. or S. boundaries of a plant are the most restricted; I shd have expected that the 
S. would be, in the temperate regions, from the number of antagonist species being greater.  
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8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-974   I do not quite understand why you state that the 
species return in each country to a few typical forms, instead of supposing that the same typical 
forms have been originally widely spread, & have in each country varied a little.— 
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1093  I, also, return Silliman & am glad to have seen Dr. 
Morton’s arcticle: my opinion, of it, as you ask for it, is that it is in main part, a merely tabulated 
compilation from Griffith’s Cuvier, with a few other facts interpolated. He is, I think, too credulous; 
but it is a pretty good compilation: his worse fault is that he has not gone to his original source,—
thus he makes a great flourish about perfect fertility of the genus Crax: whereas the original 
authority, namely Temminck says speaking of these hybrids, “a great number are quite sterile, 
others have bred once, & a smaller number have produced a good many young,” & it is not stated 
that the crosses have been inter-se; on the other hand between two other species of Crax it is 
stated that the crosses were with either parent: no doubt by these crosses a multitude of hybrids 
have been produced, but there is a want of exactness in the manner Morton gives the facts. 
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1226  Now I, in my last letter, not knowing the history of the 
word Lepas, followed the last principle, but as you state that old authors used it only in a 
pedunculate sense, of course L. anatifera is the type of Lepas, Linn. & accordingly Lepas restricted, 
should, as you propose, supersede Anatifera, Anatifa, &c. 
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1317  I shd feel particularly grateful, if you would take the 
trouble to answer me the following questions pretty soon.— (1) Skania age of beds? Von Buch 
states that only Upper Chalk occurs in north. (2) Is White Chalk of Denmark same age or stage with 
Faxoe. (3) Do you know what the age of the Kreidemergel Grunsand (?) of Saliberg Quedlingburg is? 
I suppose it is in Westphalia.— (4) Is Legina Thy in Denmark? Do you feel pretty sure that the large 
valv. lat. sup. (named P. lævis & figured 9. Pl. V.) belongs to a loose valve marked P. lævis in softer 
white chalk in same little box with Anatifera cretæ.— 5th & lastly, Do you feel pretty sure, & may I 
state so, that your Anatifera cretæ had only five valves?—  
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1480  I am very much pleased to hear that you have not 
given up the idea of noticing my Cirripedia volume. All that I have seen since confirms everything of 
any importance stated in that volume. More especially I have been able rigorously to confirm, in an 
anomalous species, by the clearest evidence, that the actual cellular contents of the ovarian tubes, 
by the gland-like action of a modified portion of the continuous tube, passes into the cementing 
stuff: in fact cirripedes make glue out of their own unformed eggs!. 
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1529  Now for a few mere details,— diag p. 30. Bory St 
Vincent Voyage dans les quatre principales iles des mers d’Afrique (1801. 1802).— p. 31. Lindley 
quite lately stated that the sexual structure of Ferns as just discovered, showed that hybridising was 
very possible.— p. 33. “such a view”, I think this expression wants expanding p. 37. “from whence” I 
hate this expletive; is not whence enough?  
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1664  I wish I had noted these & various other points more 
thoroughly when I was there; indeed I never can investigate any thing connected with the Floras of 
the Cape or of South America, without deeply regretting that I did not make better use of my 
opportunities. You may like, however, to have one or two instances of what I last mentioned.  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1670  www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1685  I should 
mention that Pursh, from the inspection of Peck’s herbarium, gave us two alpine species in his Flora 
that no one has verified; indeed, we may now say that they do not grow on the White Mts. viz. 
Alchemilla alpina & Dryas integrifolia:—though it was not unlikely that they should occur. They 
ought therefore to be excluded. 
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1735  You are doubtless aware that, for the most part, the 
Estreldinæ represent in India & the Malay countries, exclusively in Australia, & to a great extent in 
Africa, the Fringillinæ of northern climes (inclusive of the Himalaya); & we have also 3 species of 
Ploceinæ, one of which (with a fourth) is likewise found in Java, the rest of this group being 
African— Mentioning the Estreldinæ reminds me of the common L&rsquo; al Munia (as it is here 
termed), respecting which poor Strickland asked me if I could inform him of the origin of its English 
name Amadavat (whence the specific name amandava, auct., & the generic name Amadina, Sw.). I 
traced its etymology distinctly in old Fryer’s work (1698), where these little birds are stated to be 
brought to Sarat from “Amidavad”; meaning Ahmedab&rsquo; ad in Guzurat, where they still 
abound! And so the name of that town has become transferred to themselves, as in the more 
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familiar instances of Canary & Bantam! N.B. You will find “avadavats” mentioned in Sheridans 
‘School for Scandal’, 1777—act. V, sc. I; so that at that time the name must have been familiar.  
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1764  Posted with this sheet, but apart; is a copy of the 
London Catalogue of British plants. In the 3rd. paragh. within the Wrapper (ii) it is stated that the 
vars. there retained are (with few exceptions) the species of some botanists. By striking out those 
exceptions in the copy sent, we get the foundation for a list of debateable species (dubieties: i.e. 
varieties or species).  
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1803  Hence, also, as he asserts, the seedlings of one variety 
can never be confounded by an experienced eye with those of another variety, being as distinct as 
were their parents. Moreover, he states that the fruit of seedling Pears and Apples, though differing 
greatly in size, succulency, and flavour from those of their parents, yet resemble them in the more 
important characters of form and in the nature of their seeds.  
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1835  There is a notice (I think in the journal (geological)) of 
some deposits in which I believe it is mentioned that a stratum of extinct freshwater shells, cover a 
deposit of marine mollusca of still existing species. I believe it is alluded to to by Sir R. Murchison in 
his Alps paper, but I have not the reference.  
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2030  The connateness of elytra (as having merely a 
character, & not an organ) will not perhaps suit you.— otherwise I might mention that the only 
Harpalus (I believe) on record in which the wing-cases are ever joined is the H. vividus of the 
Madeiran Islands (opus diab. p.p. 56, 57); but that character (anomalous as it is) does not always 
occur in that species,—the elytra being sometimes connected, sometimes sub-connected, & 
occasionally almost (if not entirely) free.— 
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2235a  (1) In your work on Bees, you state that you have 
seen stray workers inhabiting the nest of a distinct species. Have you ever seen a stray fertile 
female Bombus inhabiting the nest of other species? 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2359  And as he states that there is no indigenous bee 
(perhaps this statement applies to bees resembling hive or humble bees, for some other genera are 
known to inhabit New Zealand), the fact that these plants seeded freely at first appears quite fatal 
to my doctrine. But Mr. Swale adds that he believes that three species of a wasp-like insect 
performed the part of bees, before the introduction of the latter; unfortunately he does not 
expressly state that he has seen them sucking the flower.  
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2749  But I have been assured by Mr Cattell of Westerham, 
that the several vars. of Sweet Pea can be raised close together for a number of years without 
intercrossing. But on other hand he stated that they go over the beds, & pull up any false plant 
which they very naturally attribute to wrong seeds getting mixed in the lot.—  
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3658a  Having seen it stated that the cells were larger, I 
procured (through the kindness of Mr. R. Hill, of Spanish Town), some bees and comb. The bees 
have been carefully examined by Mr. F. Smith, of the British Museum, and pronounced to be the 
common species.  
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3805  Yet when I call to mind the state of the placentæ in 
A. luteola, I am astonished that they should produce ovules. You will see in my book that I state that 
I did not look at the ovarium of A. Loddegesii. Would you have the kindness to send me word, which 
end of the ovarium is meant by apex (that nearest the flower?) for I must try & get this species from 
Kew & look at its ovarium. 
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3929  You most kindly permit me to mention any point on 
which I want information. If you are so inclined, I am curious to know from systematic experiments, 
whether Mr. D. Beaton’s statement that the pollen of two shortest anthers of scarlet Pelargonium 
produce dwarf plants, in comparison with plants produced from same mother-plants by the pollen 
of longer stamens from same flower.  
27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4142  I hope that you will grant me space to own that your 
Reviewer is quite correct when he states that any theory of descent will connect, “by an intelligible 
thread of reasoning,” the several generalizations before specified.  
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4881f  In Cardiospermum you state that the common 
peduncle which bears the subpeduncles with the flower-buds and the pair of short tendrils, 
although it spontaneously revolves, does not bend on contact or contract spirally; hence it may be 
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worth mentioning, as showing a difference in the action of the tendrils in related genera, that in 
Serjania the common peduncle contracts spirally when the single tendril which it bears has clasped, 
as frequently happens, the plant’s own stem. 
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5181  Beatson’s bird appears to be one of the Grallatores & 
such ought not to be called land birds & in my journal I especially exclude them, but state that they 
are the first immigrants on almost every island. At p. 422 of Origin you will find something about 
land birds on islands, which with respect to Madeira stands in New. Ed. thus corrected.  
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5567   But what extremely concerns me, is R. statement that 
I require million of years to make new species; but I have not said so, on contrary, I have lately 
stated that the change is probably rapid both in formation of single species & of whole groups of 
species, in comparison with the duration of each species when once formed or in comparison with 
the time required for the development of a group of species— with respect to Classification, it is the 
idea of a natural classification, which the genealogical explains.  
31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5649  I have done nothing worth mentioning this summer, 
as all my time has been consumed in correcting horrid proof sheets. I may mention one little fact 
which may possibly interest you. A man in Natal sent me a little packet by post of the dung of 
locusts with the statement that it was believed that locusts brought new plants to the districts 
which they visited. Six Grasses, belonging to at least two species have germinated out of the dung, 
& the seeds were fairly enclosed in the little pellets, as I ascertained by dissection. This verifies what 
I said in the Origin, that many new methods of transport wd be discovered; for locusts are often 
blown many 100 miles out to sea. 
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5840  First of all, allow me to express my most cordial thanks 
to you for kindly sending me your book “on the variation of animals and plants”. Your rich and 
multifaceted knowledge in all branches of biology and especially in the natural history of domestic 
animals and cultivated plants has amazed me anew, and I was most keenly interested in many of 
the facts you mentioned that are new and unknown to me. Still, all the special proofs that you 
produce for the theory of selectio naturalis do not hold the same kind of interest for me as they will 
for most readers.  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5893  Mr Stainton said that observations of numerical 
proportion of the sexes, in collecting were quite unreliable, for it was a well-known fact that in 
collecting Tineina moths the females were nearly in all species very scarce, whereas in breeding the 
females proved to be more numerous—as 2 to 1 to the males. Mr F. Smith also stated that 
observations in the field were of little value. He quoted some most interesting experiments he was 
making in breeding some British Sawflies—all the individuals turning out to be females. These I 
think will prove to be cases of parthenogenesis: Mr Smith will write to you himself. 
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6281  The following quotation from the Ibis for this month 
will interest you, & probably you have not yet heard of the discovery of Pavo nigripennis, Sclater, in 
Cochin China— Swinhoe writes—“In the aviary of the Prefect of Hainan I saw Sclater’s peafowl 
(Pavo nigripennis), which the Prefect assured me came from Annam or Cochin China (proper). There 
is a pair of the same species at this moment in a bird shop here” (Hong Kong); “and I now believe 
P. nigripennis to be the species known as the `bird of Confucius’, the train feathers of which are 
worn in mandarin’s hats as tokens of merit. Chinese works state that the peacock occurs in the west 
of China, bordering Cochin China”. 
 
 
Appendix 3.8 Intertextuality marker: to object 
 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-425  In one point of view, your grand discovery proves, I 
think, in the most striking manner, the weight of my principal objection to the argument of De 
Beaumont. You remember that I denied that he had proved that the Pyrenees were elevated after 
the cretaceous period, although it is true that the chalk has been carried up to their summits, and 
lies in inclined beds upon their flanks; for who shall say that the movement was not going on during 
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the cretaceous period? Now in your lines of elevation, there will doubtless be coralline limestone 
carried upwards, belonging to the same period as the present, so far as the species of corals are 
concerned. Similar reefs are now growing to those which are upraised, or are rising. 
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-685  I see our argument about the Marsupiata has become 
almost a verbal one— I have not the slightest objection to the Monotremata & other common 
Marsupials being united, as I said, under one main group, & that group being called Marsupiata, if I 
was wrong in supposing that term already used for the common marsupials & in that case I shd 
have thought some other term ought to have been invented for the group containing the common 
marsupiata & monotremata. What I should, according to my small proportion of knowledge, object 
to, would be the putting the monotremata into the same group with the Marsupiata, not from their 
resemblance but from the Monotremata consisting of only two species.— Even this may be right, 
but I revert to my old opinion, that all rules for a natural  classification are futile until you can clearly 
explain, what you  are aiming at.  
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-688  But as the term ‘natural’ certainly has a very vague 
meaning when thus used, I have no objection to apply the word ‘useful’ instead— In using the word 
natural for a kind of classification I merely follow others— it is no doubt presumptuous— But after 
all I do not see why we should not set up a kind of artificial standard of perfection in classification— 
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-718  These Mammalian groups, partake of some of the 
important characters (which no one would consider as merely adaptive) of Birds & Reptiles & I 
cannot see any objection to considering them as links— I do not know, however, whether you 
would object to calling them so, as long as they are clearly admitted amongst the Mammalia.— You 
speak rather undecidedly whether all such affinities are “adaptive”.— I quite admit the validity of 
this distinction, but it appears to me so vague, when applied to organs of such importance as the 
intestines & teeth of the wombat, that I think you are bound either clearly to define  (a tough job I 
expect) the distinction or to confess that it is vague.—  
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-939  I see no objection to this addition being inserted, 
provided that the fact of Mr. Cuming having found a living species of Struthiolaria at Arica be given 
on the authority of Mr. Cuming himself and not on mine. 
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-961  It is quite curious how our opinions agree about Forbes 
views; I was very glad to have your last letter, which was even more valuable to me than most of 
yours are & that is saying, I assure you, a great deal.— I had written to Forbes to object about the 
Azores on the same grounds, as you had, & he made me some answer, which partially satisfied me, 
but really I am so stupid I cannot remember it. ... He had one other reason, to my mind still less 
trust worthy.— I had also written to Forbes, before your letter, objecting to the Sargassum, but 
apparently on wrong grounds; for I could see no reason, on the common view of absolute creations, 
why one Fucus shd not have been created for the ocean, as well as several confervæ for the same 
end.  
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-964  Certainly there is no objection to the hypothesis of a 
Sargassum being an absolute creation, though I see no reason to call for such an aid in this case, the 
species being in my opinion decidedly the littoral Atlantic one 
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-989  The Conception Nautilus I cannot satisfactorily identify 
with any other. I propose to call it N. D’Orbignyanus if you have no objection. It comes very near 
some lower & middle cretaceous species. 
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1216  II. I have next to notice your second objection—that 
retaining the name of the first describer in perpetuum along with that of the species, is a premium 
on hasty & careless work. This is quite a different question from that of the law of priority itself, and 
it never occurred to me before, though it seems highly probable, that the general recognition of 
that law may produce such a result.  
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1223  If however there is the least chance of developing this 
silly vanity into an honourable ambition for the advancement of knowledge, by means of your 
proposed plan of quoting good Books in preference to first descriptions, I am sure I have no 
objection to it, and if you like to try the plan in your Cirriped work, I shall look with much interest to 
see how the plan answers.— 
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1251  I believe I told you that I require to disarticulate a 
specimen of each species; without this being done it is impossible to describe or recognise the 
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species: I trust you will not object to this; should you do so, there will be time to inform me. The Ibla 
is a species (not published) which I have named I. Cumingii & was found in numbers by Mr Cuming 
at the Philippines: I have never seen it from elsewhere, except the specimen from Tavoy sent by 
you: it is in some Anatomical respects, perhaps the most interesting cirripede in the world. 
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1359  I should esteem it a great favour & most valuable aid if 
you would entrust me with your collection of recent species; but you will almost certainly object to 
send me unique specimens, when I tell you that I cannot recognise the species, & will never name 
any species, without disarticulating one specimen; I can, however, almost always gum together the 
valves so that they look nearly as well as ever.—  
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1473  Have you published any name: in my M.S. I have called 
it, Acasta sporillus: do you object to this, supposing no name yet published? I presume I may state 
that I owe the specimens to you.? 
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1611  My grave objection to the whole process is, that if you 
multiply the anomalous species by 100 & divide the normal by the same you will then reverse the 
names, for anomaly is to a great extent synonymous with rarity or representation by few species. 
EG. as plants go now adays, Lepidodendron is an anomaly; but as years ago i.e. in the coal epoch no 
doubt a Rose would have been an anomaly— also substituting space for time & we have Proteaceæ 
anomalies in the S. American Flora & Fuchsias in the Australian—  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1612  I do not quite agree with your “grave objection to the 
whole process” which is “that if you multiply the anomalous species by 100, & divide the normal by 
the same, you will then reverse the names” For, to take an example, ornithoryhnchus & Echidna 
would not be less aberrant if each had a dozen (I do not say 100, because we have no such cases in 
animal kingdom) species instead of one.  
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1694  It is not necessary to suppose that (granting this true) 
there has been a progressive developement (by species or by varieties); ie that Grasses were 
created before Lilies &c; for we may assume that the lilies &c which coexisted with the earliest 
created existing grasses have been killed, & replaced by others. The objection to this is that it would 
argue a gradual spread & monopolization of the soil by the lowest orders, for which there is much 
to be said in favor. 
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1774  I am not at all sure that I understand myself!! my 
objection to Decaisne & I believe it is only to his not boldly calling his sous-especes either vars. or 
species. 
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1989  I shall not consider all your notes on my M.S. for some 
weeks, till I have done with crossing; but I have not been able to stop myself meditating on your 
powerful objection to mundane cold period, viz that many fold more of the warm-temperate 
species ought to have crossed the Tropics that of the sub-arctic forms.— I really think that to those 
who deny modification of species, this would absolutely disprove my theory.  
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1991  Look at the two Journeys which the Arctics have had 
from N. to S. & S. to North, with no change, as may be inferred, if my doctrine is correct, from 
similarity of Arctic species in America & Europe & in the Alps.— But I will not weary you; but I really 
& truly think your last objection is not so strong as it looks at first. You never make an objection 
without doing me much good.— 
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2060  Now I have thought that you would not object to my 
sending the latter half of your note with list of such American genera to Mr. H. C. Watson, of whose 
great clearness of mind & acuteness I have from long correspondence the highest opinion.—  
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2239  Of course I do not suppose with groups of plants so 
widely extended as they are, that there ever shd. be such difference, as there might be in case of 
Mammals. Therefore I agree that orders in a Prodromus not obeying my rule as with Labiatæ & 
Verbenaceæ is a serious objection; though not nearly so fatal, in my opinion, if in a local Flora.— I 
was led to all this work by a remark of Fries, that the species in large genera, were more closely 
related to each other than in small genera; & I thought if this were so, seeing that varieties & 
species are so hardly distinguishable, I concluded that I shd. find more varieties in the large genera 
than in the small: but at first, seeing the many causes of doubt, I certainly did not expect to find 
more than three-fourths of the Floras, yielding the result, which they have.—  
256 
 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2240  Ledebour shall go tomorrow you are most welcome to 
it whenever you want it always. I quite see in what respect local Floras are much the best suited to 
your purpose; or rather, how they would be so, if they were worked out upon the same principles 
as the general Floras, but the fact that they are not so, and that they are hotbeds of bad big genera, 
is a very serious objection to the use of them. I cannot so well see, & in plain truth I cannot at all 
appreciate your objections to such a monograph as that on Urticeæ. Are not the number of 
varieties registered by Weddell very many? From what I know of Urticeæ I think it would not be 
difficult so to alter Weddells genera & species as to suit your views—thus—by raising to species a 
few of the varieties in those genera with 6–7 species & several varieties—Parietaria for instance, 
which would thus come under the genera with more than 10 species, & materially alter the result. 
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2307  I have still one objection to discuss—if as many 
middling sized genera are decreasing as are increasing how do we know which are which.— Do the 
species of big genera run to varieties in decreasing as in increasing. perhaps they should do so—yet 
you say “it is idle to discuss this”! 
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2488  A friend objected to my title that word “Varieties” 
ought to stand before “Species”.— Another friend objected (but illogically) that “genera” & “orders” 
ought to be inserted.— This has led me to think that word “Varieties” had better be altogether 
omitted. The case of Species is the real important point; & the title, as now, is rather too long.— So 
if you do not object, I will omit word “Varieties”; but if on any account you do object, I do not 
care.— 
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2649  I am surprised considering how ignorant we are on 
very many points, that more weak parts in my Book have not as yet been pointed out to me. No 
doubt many will be. H. C. Watson founds objection in M.S. on there being no limit to infinite 
diversification of species: I have answered this I think satisfactorily, & have sent attack & answer to 
Lyell & Hooker. If this seems to you good objection, I would send papers to you.— 
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2703  With respect to your objection of multitude of still 
living simple forms, I have not discussed it anywhere in the Origin, though I have often thought it 
over.— What you say about “progress being only occasional & retrogression not uncommon” I 
agree to; only that in animal kingdom I greatly doubt about retrogression being common.— ... I 
think I must in any future Edit. discuss a few more such points— & will introduce this & 
H. C. Watson’s objection about infinite number of species—& the general rise in organisation. But 
there is a directly opposite objection to yours, which is very difficult to answer, viz how at first start 
of life, when there were only simplest organisms, how did any complication of organisation profit 
them? I can only answer that we have not facts enough to guide any speculation on the subject.— 
27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2741  Your fifth objection (p. 21) shows me that you think 
my idea of the spreading of the dominant species & their subsequent multiplication not 
satisfactory.— 
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2927a  Falconer has been holding forth today on the difft, 
Mastodons & Elephants not coming in chronologically as they shd do, according to yr views, but 
when one sees the new Maltese dwarf intermediate between E. antiquus & E. meridionalis & Anca’s 
new Sicilian cave elephant, a modification of the living Indian one leaning towards antiquus, & when 
one thinks that Falconer can distinguish all American varieties of Mammals from all European fossil 
species, I confess I attach little value to the objection. 
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2932a  What you say as to my difficulty is I suspect an 
explanation up to a certain point, but I hope to put the whole more clearly soon. Dogs of multiple 
origin & leporines would greatly weaken the objection to regarding the negro as of a different 
species, in the same sense that the Prairie wolf & common wolf may be. I should like a good 
naturalist to give me a list of reputed species in Mammalia not more remote than negro & white 
man. Would they not be many? 
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3036  I think little of his objection on the score of varieties of 
the lineal descendent of A. becoming confounded with those of    no doubt such cases occu   I have 
somewhere I think alluded to them as very probably frequent.  now put into this category all those 
anomalous plants which hover between two otherwise very remote species in genera or families. It 
struck me that such cases were well explained by your divergent series— Such cases if decided ones 
should be rare— so they are—  
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31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3131  This leads me to remark how singularly few have 
judged the argument on right principles many complain that I have not proved that any one species 
changes into another and they ignore the fact that the view given, apparently groups together and 
explains many phenomena. No one urges as a fatal objection to the Theory of Light that the 
undulations in the ether cannot be proved—or the very existence of ether, yet because the 
undulatory theory explains much it is now universally admitted— 
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3223  The view that each variation has been providentially 
arranged seems to me to make natural selection entirely superfluous, & indeed takes whole case of 
appearance of new species out of the range of science. But what makes me most object to Asa 
Gray’s view, is the study of the extreme variability of domestic animals.— He who does not suppose 
that each variation in the Pigeon was providentially caused, by accumulating which variations man 
made a Fantail, cannot, I think, logically argue that the tail of the Woodpecker was formed by 
variations providentially ordained.— It seems to me that variations in the domestic & wild 
conditions are due to unknown causes & are without purpose & in so far accidental; & that they 
become purposeful only when they are selected by man for his pleasure, or by what we call natural 
selection in the struggle for life & under changing conditions.  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3480  Another objection to my line of argument is the 
changes wrought in bees by either feeding or heat (as the case may be).— but this again is change 
of individual, & is not propagated, for the Queen after all lays again males & drones, not Queens. 
Darwin I believe holds with you as to the influence of external conditions on the variation of the 
brood. I have however failed to be convinced by him of it, & I do not think he recognises the facts of 
variation to the extent I do.  
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3831  You have not, as you ought, begun by attacking old 
false doctrines, that “like does produce like”   the first chapter of your book should have been 
devoted to this & to nothing else. But there is some truth I now see in the objection to you, that you 
make N.S. the “Deus ex machina.” for you do somehow seem to do it.—by neglecting to dwell on 
the facts of infinite incessant variation,— Your 8 children are really all totally unlike one another   
they agree Exactly in no one property   how is this?  
35 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4108  Dr. Carpenter seems to think that the fact of 
Foraminifera not having advanced in organization from an extremely remote epoch to the present 
day is a strong objection to the views maintained by me. But this objection is grounded on the 
belief—the prevalence of which seems due to the well-known doctrine of Lamarck— that there is 
some necessary law of advancement, against which view I have often protested. ... Therefore, it 
does not seem to me an objection of any force that certain groups of animals, such as the 
Foraminifera, have not advanced in organization. Why certain whole classes, or certain numbers of 
a class, have advanced and others have not, we cannot even conjecture. ... Sir C. Lyell, who has 
given so excellent a discussion on species in his great work on the `Antiquity of Man,’ has advanced 
a somewhat analogous objection, namely, that the mammals, such as seals or bats, which alone 
have been enabled to reach oceanic islands, have not been developed into various terrestrial forms, 
fitted to fill the unoccupied places in their new island-homes; but Sir Charles has partly answered 
his own objection. Certainly I never anticipated that I should have had to encounter objections on 
the score that organic beings have not undergone a greater amount of change than that stamped in 
plain letters on almost every line of their structure.  
36 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4459f  There is scarcely a county in England in which one or 
more plants will not be in danger of extirpation by the collectors for these prizes. Neither will the 
prizes promote scientific botany amongst the class for whose benefit they are intended, for there is 
nothing to ensure the recipient of a prize himself knowing the names or localities of the plants in his 
collection, or that he has examined a single botanical book, gathered any of the specimens, or even 
seen any of them. But supposing the case not to be so bad as this, the objection will probably apply, 
in some degree, to every collection sent to the Society; for no attempt is made (indeed it would be 
next to impossible) to ensure the collection being really formed, named, mounted and arranged by 
the candidate himself, without the help of other persons. 
37 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4746  We must indeed know far more than we do before we 
can dogmatise on the irrelevancy of particular colours to the well-being of a species. He ought also 
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to define beauty, and tell us whether it is in reference to man or bird. I have no objection to the 
idea of beauty or variety for its own sake, but to assume it so positively is unphilosophical. 
38 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4752  It seems to me extremely clever like every thing that I 
have read of his; but I am not shaken; perhaps you will say that neither gods nor men could shake 
me. I demur to the Duke reiterating his objection that the brilliant plumage of the male humming 
bird could not have been acquired through selection, at the same time entirely ignoring my 
discussion (p. 93 3rd Edition) on beautiful plumage being acquired thro’ sexual selection.  
39 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5013  You attach little importance to the Physicists 
objection;—I attach great;—because in the main, physical phenomena regulate the production & 
distribution of organisms; & because the your theory in contrast to it is a crude one not in harmony 
with the fact, that the relations of Life to conditions are intricate, & the results can only be 
accounted for after exploring a Labyrinth of conflicting facts. This is why I call yours a sledge-
hammer hypothesis.  
40 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5140  Now it seems to me that you have yourself led to this 
objection being made, by so often stating the case too strongly against yourself. For Example, at the 
Commencement of Chap. IV. you ask, if it is “improbable that useful variations should sometimes 
occur in the course of thousands of generations”;—and a little further on you say, “unless profitable 
variati do occur natural selection can do nothing.” Now such expressions h given your opponents 
the advantage of assuming that favourable variations are rare accidents, or may even for long 
periods never occur at all, & thus Janet’s argument would appear to many to have great force.  
41 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5656  The “machine metaphor is not mine, but the N.B. 
reviewers. I merely accept it and show that it is on our side and not against us, but I do not think it 
at all a good metaphor to be used as an argument either way. I did not half develope the argument 
on the limits of variation, being myself limited in space; but I feel satisfied that it is the true answer 
to the very common and very strong objection, that “variation has strict limits”. The fallacy is the 
requiring variation in domesticity to go beyond the limits of the same variation under nature.  
42 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5742  It at once occurred to me that you would not object to 
give me a letter to Mr. Murray in which you might refer to me as the person mentioned in the note 
to your “Origin of Species”. Of my competence to render the ideas from the High Dutch into the 
English idiom so far as they are capable of being transfused, you can, of course, say nothing. 
43 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5922  Also, I do not see your objection to sterility between 
allied species having been aided by natural selection. It appears to me that,—given a differentiation 
of a species into two forms each of which was adapted to a special sphere of existence,—every 
slight degree of sterility would be a positive advantage, not to the individuals who were sterile, but 
to each form.  
44 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6045  If the difficulty of grafting was as great as the difficulty 
of crossing, and as regular, I admit it would be a most serious objection. But it is not. I believe, many 
distinct species can be grafted while others less distinct cannot. The regularity with which 
Nat. species are sterile together, even when very much alike, I think is an argument in favour of the 
sterility having been generally produced by Nat. Select. for the good of the species. 
45 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6153  I hardly see your difficulty or your objection to the 
case of the ♀ protected butterflies. You argued before (& have proved) that, “characters appearing 
in one sex are sometimes transmitted to that sex exclusively”. The cases of these ♀ protected 
butterflies (by mimicry) are so few that we may well suppose the proper variations to have occurred 
sufficiently in that sex only.  
46 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6375  Exactly a similar objection is made to the whole 
doctrine of “mimicry”. Why, it is asked, are there any white and yellow, qu ite unprotected 
(apparently) Leptalis? We answer, we do not know, but we firmly believe that they have some 
protection which the others have not, & wh. exactly balances it. 
47 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-8725  I have read and studied all your books, including the 
latest, that on “Expression of the Emotions”, and find no serious objection to your theory of 
Development or Evolution, except that it seems to me “not proven”. It may be the true theory. You 
say much to make it seem probable; and I could accept it without giving up my belief, that the first 
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forms of life were created, and that the “variations`, without which “natural selection can do 
nothing”, may, also, be due to creative agency.  
 
 
Appendix 3.9 Intertextuality marker: regarding, in/with regard to 
 
1 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-502  (1st.) In describing what can be effected by crossing 
different species of plants, Mr. Herbert speaks, almost in the same terms, used by breeders of 
animals in regard to the almost unlimited effects of judgment and skill in uniting and opposing the 
different qualities of the parents. But breeders of animals always insist upon the great importance 
of choosing an animal, which not only possesses the requisite qualities, but which has possessed 
them for several generations, whereby they become fixed in the breed.  
2 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-607   We should be astonished did one genus of monkeys 
adopt from another a particular manner of opening hard-shelled fruit; how much more so ought we 
to be in a tribe of insects so pre-eminent for their instinctive faculties, which are generally supposed 
to be in inverse ratio to the intellectual! Moreover, from what I have above stated regarding the 
Antirrhinum, I much suspect that the practice of boring holes in its flowers is likewise a piece of 
acquired knowledge, whether the Humble-bees do it instinctively or not in other cases.  
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-734  I have notes on the comp. number of sp to gen in 
various places but they are at the Admiralty, for though I have been 4 months at home they have 
not yet returned me the notes drawings &c Botanical & others which I gave up as per order. When I 
receive them I shall tell you what little I have done; the results I think were curious regarding Arctic 
forms.— These lists are troublesome to make, as species are so loosely described.  
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-736  With regard to the dissimilarity between the Flora of 
the several Islds of the group, that is too extraordinary a circumstance for me to offer any remarks 
upon, until the florula is drawn up, the further I proceed the more I wonder. . 
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-844  From all that I heard at Leyden, the Indian Islands seem 
not only to be peculiarly rich in species, but also to present many curious facts regarding the 
distribution of the individuals & species in the different localities. I talked much with Schlegel, who 
appears a very nice fellow, he is strongly in favor of a multiple creation & against migration, & as he 
drew most of his arguments from Zoological grounds, I could not follow him well, he says he has 
long studied the subject & has come to that conclusion after a full consideration of the number of 
cases, in which a species is common to two narrow areas seperated by large tracts equally capable 
to all appearance of supporting the said species: from what I know of the Botany of these regions I 
incline decidedly to the migration principle, the number of dispersed species being very great & 
belonging to very transportable orders.  
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-983  In regard to your question respecting variations among 
the Mollusca I can only say that as far as my observations have gone I think their range is greater 
among fossils than in recent species & the most extraordinary varieties are from the Mam: Crag 
among estuary shells these are in some instances of extraordinary proportions removing the 
extremes of variation far beyond what is generally considered the limit of a species these variations 
(or perhaps more properly distortions) consist principally in the elongation or shortening of the 
spiral cone beyond its general proportions without affecting in any way the form of the aperture 
consequently there need be little or no alteration in the animal inhabitant & this I have always 
considered as depending upon an external cause & more particularly with regard to the Crag shells 
whose location was in an estuary where a sudden alteration or reduction of temperature may have 
partially paralized or injured the natural powers of the animal. the shells of the present day from 
similar localities do not appear to be similarly affected which I wod. attribute to a more uniform or 
rather a less variable temperature 
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1708  I think you have quite misunderstood me in regard to 
my object in getting you to mark in accompanying list with (X) all the “close species” ie such as you 
do not think to be varieties, but which nevertheless are very closely allied;—it has nothing whatever 
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to do with their cultivation, but I cannot tell you object, as it might unconsciously influence you in 
marking them.  
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1752   This species also was seen in a state of domestication 
in the interior of the Tippera hills, by the Rev. J. Barbe, a missionary of the Romish faith, & a fair 
naturalist, who even brought me a pair of horns of one of these domestic individuals to convince 
me that he was right regarding the species. The Gasur has generally been considered as 
untameable; & it is the finest of all known living Boves. 
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1792   Mr. Wallace could also well support his views by 
reference to the Helices & Bulimi collected in the Philippines by Cuming, —& also to the varieties of 
the Indian Melaniæ. What do you think of the paper in question? Has it at all unsettled your ideas 
regarding the persistence of species,—not perhaps so much from novelty of argument, as by the 
lucid collation of facts & phenomena.  
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1794   I have just remembered one other point, on which I 
shd. be very much obliged for an answer, viz whether you are sure that the Cyclophorus 
stemostoma Sow. & the Pterocyclus bilabiatus Sow. are certainly found in Ceylon: I have had a 
letter from Mr. Benson in answer to a query of mine whether any alpine shells were common to the 
heights of Ceylon, Neilgherries & Himmalaya & he speaks somewhat doubtfully on your authority in 
regard to the two above-named species. 
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1825   I am pleased to find that Owen does not oppose my 
views regarding the “great Orang-utan question”. I have a long letter from you undated, but 
mentioning in a P.S. that you had just recd. mine of Octr. 8th. & 22nd.  
12 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1832   And there can be no mistake regarding my 
experiments with the 1⁄2 bred Gallus Sonneratii of both sexes, which were infertile inter se, and 
either of them with other fowls; although the hen produced many eggs, & the cock was particularly 
salacious; for the eggs in which either was concerned never would hatch, although other eggs 
placed with them hatched as usual: & surely this instance of infertility may be fairly ascribed to the 
hybridity.  
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1837  Though I have nothing very particular to say I must 
thank you cordially for the extremely kind manner with which you have received my letter. I 
remember at Oxford that you had attended to many of the points on which I was then & am now so 
much interested. I hope that you will publish some of the facts on variation to which you allude: I 
shd. be particularly glad to see in print or M.S. some particulars in regard to the species from 
different elevations, which show different degrees of capacity for cultivation at a new level: Hooker 
has published a similar case in regard to the Himmalaya Rhododendrums. 
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1845  I suppose, ere this reaches you, that you will have 
read my article on wild Asses. Strange to say, the very day of its publication, the subject was 
engaging the attention of the Académie des Sciences in Paris, as I see by the Comptes Rendus; on 
the occasion of the presentation of two animals from the Syrian desert (as you will see by a note), 
which Is. Geoffroy distinguishes as a new species, E. hemippus, & I think he is quite right. But my 
suspicions are confirmed regarding the indigenous abode of the Ass; and I now feel satisfied that it 
is an African rather an Asiatic quadruped! I also now suspect that Chesneys “wild Horses” in 
N. Arabia refer to the hemippus, & his “wild Asses” in S. Arabia to asinus ferus (vel Onager), also 
that Wellsteads Sacotran “wild Asses” are asinus aboriginally wild & not ‘feral’! Already I have 
prepared another paper on the subject, in which I have gone sufficiently into details— Is. St. Hilaire, 
I perceive, confirms what I say regarding the voice of the Indian Ghor-Khur; & is of the same opinion 
as myself respecting the identity of the Indian animal with the hemionus of N. Asia, which is 
undoubtedly the Tibetan Kyang. But now comes the question regarding the relative distribution of 
these animals in S. Asia. The Mesopotamian is, in all probability, hemippus, or may not different 
species occur in the same region, to a greater or less extent?  
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1925  I want to beg one more favour to the many which 
formerly you have conferred on me. I am extremely much interested in regard to the blind cave 
animals, described some time since in your Journal by Prof. Silliman Junr., as the subject is 
connected with a work of somewhat general nature, which I am endeavouring to draw up on 
variation & the origin of species, classification &c.— 
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16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1938  I suppose in regard to specific centres, we are at cross 
purposes; I shd. call that kitchen garden, in which the Red Cabbage was produced, or the Farm in 
which Bakewell made the Short-Horn Cattle, the specific centre of these species! and surely this is 
centralisation enough!— 
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2034  I have received the 2d. part of your paper, & though I 
have nothing particular to say, I must send you my thanks & hearty admiration. The whole paper 
strikes me as quite exhausting the subject, & I quite fancy & flatter myself I now appreciate the 
character of your Flora. What a difference in regard to Europe your remarks in relation to the 
genera makes! I have been eminently glad to see your conclusion in regard to species of large 
genera widely ranging: it is in strict conformity with the results I have worked out in several ways. 
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2125  What you say about extinction, in regard to small 
genera & local disjunction, being hypothetical seems very just. Something direct, however, could be 
advanced on this head from fossil shells; but hypothetical such notions must remain.  
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2136   In regard to my abstract you must take immensely on 
trust; each paragraph occupying one or two chapters in my Book. You will, perhaps, think it paltry in 
me, when I ask you not to mention my doctrine; the reason is, if anyone, like the Author of the 
Vestiges, were to hear of them, he might easily work them in, & then I shd have to quote from a 
work perhaps despised by naturalists & this would greatly injure any chance of my views being 
received by those alone whose opinion I value.— 
20 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2359   From the statement in regard to the Clover in New 
Zealand, I wrote to Mr. Swale, of Christchurch in New Zealand, and asked him whether Leguminous 
plants seeded there freely before the hive bee was introduced; and he in the most obliging manner 
has sent me a list of 24 plants of this order, which seeded abundantly before bees were introduced. 
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2443  I hasten to thank you for your obliging letter of 
yesterday & for the interesting details regarding your work on Species contained in it.— 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2450  I shd. have liked to have seen several examples 
proving truth (or showing its probability) of some of your remarks; as of best marked vars. being on 
confines of the range. Or again in regard to your remark of a species remaining for many 
generations constant under culture & then suddenly commencing to vary.— 
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2520   Hooker sent me a few pages in which you propound a 
doctrine of migration into America like that, which I sent you last summer in a letter. Dana is of 
course a far better authority than I am; but his arguments have by no means convinced me in 
regard to the warm period subsequent to the Glacial period. I daresay I may be wrong, but I rather 
doubt whether his & your view will explain facts of distribution so well as my view of migration 
during the certainly warmer period anteriorly to the Glacial period.  
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2582  I have heard rumour that Busk is on our side in regard 
to Species: is this so? It would be very good.— [Enclosure] The drawings of Pigeons are by 
Wolstenholme (an excellent Fancier himself) & were made for Mr J. M. Eaton, author of excellent 
treatise, chairman of a Club & great winner of prizes.  
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2608  Since receiving your last letter on Hooker, I have read 
his Introduction as far as p xxiv where Australian Flora begins; & this latter part I liked most in the 
Proofs.— It is a magnificent Essay.— I doubt slightly about some assertions, or rather shd have liked 
more facts, as, for instance, in regard to species varying most on confines of their range.— Naturally 
I doubt a little whether his remarks about “divergence”, & about domestic races being produced 
under nature, without selection.  
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2719   I think you expect too much in regard to change of 
opinion on the subject of species. One large class of men, more especially I suspect of naturalists, 
never will care about any general question, of which old Gray of Brit. Mus. may be taken as a type; 
& secondly nearly all men, past a moderate age either in actual years or in mind, are, I am fully 
convinced physically incapable of looking at facts under a new point of view.  
27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2783  Sedgwick is to illuminate us on Monday at the 
Philosophical Society in regard to your supposed errors! How can Owen be so savage with your 
views when his own are to a certain extent of the same character— If I understand him, he thinks 
the “Becoming” of species (I suppose he means the producing of species), a somewhat rapid & not a 
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slow process—but he seems to think them progressive organised out of previously organized 
beings— 
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2794   Yesterday at my lectures I alluded to the subject, & 
showed how frequently naturalists were at fault in regarding as species, forms which had (in some 
cases) been shown to be varieties, and how legitimately Darwin had deduced his inferences from 
positive experiment— Indeed I had, on Monday, replied to a sneer (I don’t mean from Sedgwick) at 
his pidgeon results, by declaring that the case necessitated an appeal to such domestic 
experiments, & that this was the legitimate & best way of proceeding for the detection of those 
laws which we all endeavouring to discover— 
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2901  In connection with the above I would also refer to 
what you say in regard to our old friend the tucu-tucu. (Ctenomys.) Would not the blindness be 
explained in that case in some other way than as the result of accidental injury? I believe it is 
generally admitted by physiologists that the effects of mechanical injuries are not transmitted by 
inheritance & in view of the fact that the Jews after so many centuries of mutilation persist in being 
born with a prepuce, I am inclined to believe it.  
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2932a  What you say as to my difficulty is I suspect an 
explanation up to a certain point, but I hope to put the whole more clearly soon. Dogs of multiple 
origin & leporines would greatly weaken the objection to regarding the negro as of a different 
species, in the same sense that the Prairie wolf & common wolf may be. I should like a good 
naturalist to give me a list of reputed species in Mammalia not more remote than negro & white 
man. Would they not be many? 
31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3104  I do not think the result I have come to regarding the 
persistence of the Guiano-Amazonian fauna can be shaken. I can see no traces of a migration of 
high-temperate-zone forms across the region. Now there are a number of genera of insects 
characteristic of the high-temperate zones, which are now common to S. America & N. America 
with Europe; but they have not a single representative in Amazonia, although some of them have 
representatives along the Andes of New Granada & Peru. Your hypothesis only requires (as you 
have stated) a migration along belts of latitude & therefore I do not think that the conclusion I have 
come to affects your position much after all.— 
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3170   I am pretty confident there is a fine open field for 
research in regard to crossing varieties which have been greatly neglected under a scientific point of 
view, though largely & loosely practised by gardeners. Species on the other have been largely 
experimented on. As you have lived so much abroad, German is probably quite familiar to you (I 
wish it were to me) & I would most strongly advise you to get Gartners admirable “Versuche ueber 
die Bastardzeugung. 1849” & study it.—  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3387  Man is the great stumbling block in regard to all 
recent theories of species. He stands by himself as a Creation I think, & the Records in regard to him 
are explicit. I cannot overlook them in considering his plan in creation. 
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3658a  I am very much obliged to your several 
correspondents for their information in regard to the supposed differences in the bees of Britain. 
Possibly some few of your readers may be interested in the following case:— The hive bee was 
introduced many years ago into Jamaica. Having seen it stated that the cells were larger, I procured 
(through the kindness of Mr. R. Hill, of Spanish Town), some bees and comb.  
35 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3815  I am in the same predicament in regard to your other 
question on the greater facilities certain species present for fertilisation by other pollen than their 
own. I have only one experiment I can give you on this point and it is quite inconclusive.  
36 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4284  With regard to the value of the pliocene species—
identical with a living one—to be of any value the instances must be sound, and unquestionable: 
and if a sufficient number of good cases is adduced, there is a very wholesome basis for a 
generalization. With regard to the Badger, I cannot say. As soon as I get back to London I will send 
you Suess paper. I was not a little surprized to find myself so precisely formulated for so decided a 
Conclusion. Had I not thought that Suess must have sent it to you, I should have forwarded it to 
you. He deals directly with natural selection, under its German designation 
37 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4615  I beg to thank you for your so kindly acknowledging 
my inquiries regarding your works on “Orchids” and “The Cirripedia”. My friend, I have since heard, 
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did not know of Professor Bronn’s translation of the former work, although he possesses himself 
the late professor’s Translation of your excellent work on “The Origin of Species”: of which 
translation, I understand, the second edition of 1863 seems to be nearly exhausted.  
38 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4663   Amongst other things, he observes in regard to my 
charge that Prof. Agassiz had misstated your theory, that “Darwin in a recent letter to father thanks 
him for the manner in which he has conducted his opposition to his theory. So you see that opinions 
may differ on the misstatement of Darwin’s Theory”. In reply, I suggested that that fact merely 
showed that having been abused as an atheist, deist, infidel &c by other writers, you probably felt 
grateful to any writer who was willing to allow you “a spirit quite as reverential as his own”. (Meth. 
Study Pref. p. iv.) 
39 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4753  With regard to Mr Marshalls statement respecting the 
Polynesian Lice, it is a very extraordinary statement, & I cannot see any reason why the Lice of one 
Human being should not live upon another! It is a fact that the parasites of one Genus of animals do 
not live upon animals of another Genus.  
40 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5031   I am much obliged to you for the privilege of reading 
it; and in regard to the notes prepared for the new edition, I am amused to find how many of the 
topics are the same as those treated of in the letters of yourself, Hooker, and Bunbury, in 
commenting on the observations by Agassiz of marks of glaciation in the Organ Mountains.  
41 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6083  Up to this time I can not yet give a precise answer as 
regarding the seeds of 1866, but the close of the experiment is approaching. Euryale is a very 
extraordinary plant as regards the condition of its stigma, indeed so much, that I know of no 
parallel.  
42 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6095  My son, I am sorry to say, cannot see full force of your 
rejoinder, in regard to second head of continually augmented sterility. You speak in this rejoinder & 
in Par. (5) of all the individuals becoming in some slight degree sterile in certain districts; if you were 
to admit that by continued exposure to these same conditions the sterility would inevitably increase 
there would no need of Nat. Selection.  
43 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6728  I quite agree with you that Wallace’s sketch of Natural 
Selection is admirable. I wrote to tell him so after I had read the article & in regard to the 
concluding theory I reminded him that as to the origin of man’s intellectual & moral nature I had 
allowed in my first edition that its introduction was a real innovation interrupting the uniform 
course of the causation previously at work on the earth.  
 
Appendix 3.10 Intertextuality marker: say about, say that 
1 I quite agree with you in what you say about minute insects not having been commonly collected 
abroad—I have very seldom seen any but those remarkable for size or beauty in any Cabinets.—  
2 With respect to my far-distant work on species, I must have expressed myself with singular 
inaccuracy, if I led you to suppose that I meant to say that my conclusions were inevitable. They 
have become so, after years of weighing puzzles, to myself alone;; but in my wildest day-dream, I 
never expect more than to be able to show that there are two sides to the question of the 
immutability of species, ie whether species are directly created, or by intermediate laws, (as with 
the life & death of individuals). I did not approach the subject on the side of the difficulty in 
determining what are species & what are varieties, but (though, why I shd give you such a history of 
my doings, it wd be hard to say) from such facts, as the relationship between the living & extinct 
mammifers in S. America, & between those living on the continent & on adjoining islands, such as 
the Galapagos— It occurred to me, that a collection of all such analogous facts would throw light 
either for or against the view of related species, being co-descendants from a common stock. A long 
searching amongst agricultural & horticultural books & people, makes me believe (I well know how 
absurdly presumptuous this must appear) that I see the way in which new varieties become 
exquisitely adapted to the external conditions of life, & to other surrounding beings.— I am a bold 
man to lay myself open to being thought a complete fool, & a most deliberate one.— From the 
nature of the grounds, which make me believe that species are mutable in form, these grounds 
264 
 
cannot be restricted to the closest-allied species; but how far they extend, I cannot tell, as my 
reasons fall away by degrees, when applied to species more & more remote from each other. 
3 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1058  I hardly know when I shall come to Kew for a morning 
to hear what you have to say about my species-sketch: when there I shall get you to look over a 
paper with me in the Annales S. Nat. on the Norfolk Isld Flora—a very nice resumé, but it quite 
omits all notice of the general affinities of the indigenous species, which I daresay by running over 
the genera you cd. tell. How I do wish you had time to discuss all insular Floras, as far as present 
knowledge; what a truly splendid paper you cd make—the African islands—, Tristan d’Acunha Juan 
Fernandez, the Society Isd which you have partly done.— But I suppose I must remain content with 
wishing for it.— 
4 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1484  I cannot tell you how much gratified I am at what you 
say about the Cirripedia. I really feel rewarded for more labour than you would readily believe it 
possible could have been bestowed on the work. If I am ever proved wrong in it, I shall be surprised. 
But my pen is running away with me,—it is your fault for I have been so much pleased with what 
you say. 
5 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1542  I was astonished at parts & could not at all, 
understand his reasons:— But I have an unbounded respect for M. Edwards as a Naturalist From 
some old theoretical notions, I was interested by what you say about Crustacea not having been 
most developed in Tropics: should you ever work this out in other branches, either in regard to 
mere numbers of species, or their rank I shd. be particularly glad to hear the result.  
6 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1562  By the way, I hope, when you go to Hitcham towards 
the end of May you will be forced to have some rest. I am grieved to hear that all the bad symptoms 
have not left Henslow; it is so strange & new to feel any uneasiness about his health.— I am 
particularly obliged to you for sending me Asa Gray’s letter; how very p leasantly he writes. To see 
his & your cautions on the species-question ought to overwhelm me in confusion & shame; it does 
make me feel deuced uncomfortable. I cannot quite understand why you & he think so strongly that 
it “does more harm than good to combat such views.”— It is delightful to hear all that he says on 
Agassiz: How very singular it is that so eminently clever a man, with such immense knowledge on 
many branches of Natural History, should write such wonderful stuff & bosh as he does. Lyell told 
me that he was so delighted with one of his (Agassiz) lectures on progressive development &c &, 
that he went to him afterwards & told him “it was so delightful, that he could not help all the time 
wishing it was true”. I seldom see a Zoological paper from N. America, without observing the 
impress of Agassiz’s doctrine’s,—another proof, by the way, of how great a man he is.— I was 
pleased & surprised to see A. Gray’s remarks on crossing, obliterating varieties, on which, as you 
know, I have been collecting facts for these dozen years.— 
7 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1610  I solemnly vow I will not write again for an enormous 
age,—not even if you were to say that you had nothing to do, & liked answering never-ending, 
nowhere-going questions.— But I want you “twice awfully” (as Lenny says) to ask Mr. Bentham 
(whom I fancy you see often) whether he excluded from his list of aberrant genera, genera simply 
because they contained many species; for I am staggered at the fewness of the species; & cannot 
but fear that he has done so. 
8 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1696  What you say about no one realising creation strikes 
me as very true; but I think & hope that there is nearly as much difference between trying to find 
out whether species of a genus have had a common ancestor & concerning oneself with the first 
origin of life, as between making out the laws of chemical attraction & the first origin of matter. 
9 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1792  Wallace has, I think, put the matter well; and 
according to his theory, the various domestic races of animals have been fairly developed into 
species. I think that I before said that the Peacock had not varied for so many centuries of 
domestication in Europe, further than as regards albinism, complete or partial; but I overlooked the 
interesting “sport” of colour, exhibited by the Japanned (not ‘Japan’) variety, which seems to have 
originated more than once,—vide especially Sir R. Heron, in the Proc Zool. Soc. A trump of a fact for 
friend Wallace to have hit upon!  
10 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-1924  I am delighted at what you say about Huxley’s answer 
& I agree most entirely: it is excellent & most clear; I thought from the first that he was right, but 
was not able to put it clearly to myself.— What you say about the importance of the infertility of 
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species, when crossed, I quite agree with; & I think those who attribute our domestic varieties to 
the crossing of ma[n]y primordial forms, greatly underrate the evidence on this question—  
11 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2060  Your last letter, like all its predecessors has been very 
valuable to me; & every word in it has interested me. When I said that your remarks on your alpine 
plants “riled” me; I did not mean to doubt them, except in the Agassian sense that they went 
against some theoretic notions of mine. These notions are too long to give & indeed not worth 
giving, as far as America is concerned, & I can see from your letter that we shd. take very much the 
same view. I am very glad to hear that you think of discussing the relative ranges of the identical & 
allied U. States & European species, when you have time. Now this leads me to make a very 
audacious remark in opposition to what I imagine Hooker has been writing & to your own scientific 
conscience. I presume he has been urging you to finish your great Flora, before you do anything 
else. Now I would say it is your duty to generalise as far as you safely can from your as yet 
completed work. Undoubtedly careful discrimination of species is the foundation of all good work; 
but I must look at such papers as yours in Silliman as the fruit. As careful observation is far harder 
work than generalisation & still harder than speculation; do you not think it very possible that it 
may be overvalued? It ought never to be forgotten that the observer can generalise his own 
observations incomparably better than anyone else. 
12 I think (without going afresh into the statistics) that you may say that “23⁄29 endemic genera have 
all their species either apterous, or incapable of flight”.— 
13 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2124  www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2125  What 
you say about extinction, in regard to small genera & local disjunction, being hypothetical seems 
very just. Something direct, however, could be advanced on this head from fossil shells; but 
hypothetical such notions must remain. Thank you heartily for what you say about my Book; but 
you will be greatly disappointed; it will be grievously too hypothetical.  
14 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2252  Your kindness to me is really beyond thanks. Believe 
me that I feel it. By an odd chance yesterday morning, before I got your letter, I had just written 
down what I had to say on closely allied species in large genera; & I thought that you had forgotten 
all about your list, & knowing how hard you were worked, to my credit be it said, I firmly resolved 
that nothing shd. induce me to remind you. Therefore you may believe how delighted I was to get 
your list, which is now being tabulated.— 
15 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2254  I am extremely interested at what you say about the 
Cape animals being the same with European species during Glacial epoch: it is just like what I fancy 
has happened in case of Brazil in regard to Cordillera mammals.— According to my theoretical 
notions, I am not satisfied with what you say about local plants in S.W. corner of Australia & the 
seeds not readily germinating: do be cautious on this;—consider lapse of time.  
16 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2371   But I have been astounded at what you say that SE & 
SW Australia differ as much as Australia from world.  
17 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2501  In the first place at p. 480 it cannot surely be said 
“that the most eminent naturalists have rejected the view of the mutability of species— You do not 
mean to ignore G. St. Hilaire & Lamarck— As to the latter you may say that in regard to animals you 
substitute natural selection for volition to a certain considerable extent, but in his theory of the 
changes of plants he cd. not introduce volition—he may no doubt have laid an undue comparative 
stress on changes in physical conditions & too little on those of contending organisms— He at least 
was for the universal mutability of species & for a genealogical link between the past & the 
present.— 
18 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2531  I have this morning received a message from Mrs. 
Butler, (who was a Miss Edgeworth) that  Madame Belloc Rue Ecole de Medicine (5.) Paris wishes to 
translate my Book on Species into French.— She translated some of Miss Edgeworths novels very 
well, & some of Sismondi’s works. She writes in Revue des deux mondes. All this sounds very well; 
my only doubt is whether she is scientific enough. I am, also, excessively puzzled to think how she 
could have heard of my Book.— I presume that she wd. require to read it before agreeing to 
translate. I am extremely anxious for the subject sake (& God knows not for mere fame) to have my 
Book translated; & indirectly its being known abroad will do good to English Sale.— If it depended 
on me I shd. agree without payment & instantly send copy & only beg that she would get some 
scientific man to look over the Translation. But I suppose the affair rests in your hands. If you think 
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favourably, will you at once communicate with her (for she begs for immediate answer) & let me 
hear result. It will save much time if you will write direct. But please apologise for my not writing 
direct & you may truly say I am much out of health. You might say that though I am a very poor 
French scholar, I could detect any scientific mistake, & would read over French proofs. Please act as 
you think fit, remembering how earnestly I wish my views to be known & discussed. 
19 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2572  www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2575  I have 
very long interview with Owen, which perhaps you would like to hear about, but please repeat 
nothing. Under garb of great civility, he was inclined to be most bitter & sneering against me. Yet I 
infer from several expressions, that at bottom he goes immense way with us.— He was quite savage 
& crimson at my having put his name with defenders of immutability. When I said that was my 
impression & that of others, for several had remarked to me, that he would be dead against me: he 
then spoke of his own position in science & that of all the naturalists in London, “with your 
Huxleys”, with a degree of arrogance I never saw approached. He said to effect that my explanation 
was best ever published of manner of formation of species. I said I was very glad to hear it. He took 
me up short, “you must not at all suppose that I agree with in all respects”.— I said I thought it no 
more likely that I shd. be right on nearly all points, than that I shd toss up a penny & get heads 
twenty times running. I remember your remarks on non migration but I cannot say that I quite 
appreciate them. I entirely agree with you that difficulty of not finding intermediate fossils in 
number is very great, even when looking at the Geological Record, as being as imperfect as I 
believe— No one will think anything of my book, unless his mind leads him to put weight on the 
apparent explanation offered by the theory from several large classes of facts as affinities,—
homologies, embryology &c. &c— With respect to not finding intermediate gradations, I can only 
repeat what I have said that it is very unlikely that a future geologist, a few million years hence will 
be able to prove that certain forms, which are probable varieties are really varieties by discovering 
the intermediate links— I wish some sound Conchologist would compare Eocene Middle Tertiary & 
Recent Shells with the object of seeing whether any or how many of the middle Tertiary species 
stood in some degree intermediate between Eocene & Recent.— 
20 I quite agree with what you say on effect of admission of theory on Systematic work; (see p. 485), 
not but what I was haunted with endeavouring to guess what cirripedes would be ranked as species 
by other naturalists. With respect to your objection of multitude of still living simple forms, I have 
not discussed it anywhere in the Origin, though I have often thought it over.— What you say about 
“progress being only occasional & retrogression not uncommon” I agree to; only that in animal 
kingdom I greatly doubt about retrogression being common.—  
21 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2773  Hybridisation on the supposition (singular enough as it 
seems to me) of all the males of a rare species dying. Do you not think that you ought to say that 
this applies only to the unisexual animals & to but few plants—unless indeed you choose to 
suppose the male organs to fail in acting, during same season in all the individuals of a species. Such 
astonishing precautions to prevent extinction, seeing that the extinction of every form of life in the 
course of time is a law of nature, seems to me rather improbable.— 
22 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2915  I entirely agree with what you say about only one 
species of many becoming modified: I remember this struck me much when tabulating the varieties 
of plants. & I have a discussion somewhere on point.  
23 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-2943  1st. — I never supposed you to say that Natural 
Selection could act without previous Variability. On the contrary, throughout your book Natural 
Selection is represented as dependent on “favourable” variations & conditions, ready to take 
advantage of, to perpetuate & accumulate any profitable item of differentiation;—but, in strict 
language, to originate nothing. Hence in my letter I have called her a Wetnurse, rather than a 
Mistress, & hence I can see how we may accept her as the manufacturer of multitudes of “species” 
(so called), such as they exist in our arrangements; and yet reject her as explaining unlimited 
divarications.  
24 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3047  I most fully agree to what you say about Huxley’s 
article & power of writing. What a smasher for Owen! The whole Review seems to me excellent. 
How capitally Oliver has done the resume of Bot. Books. Good Heavens how he must have read!  
25 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3098  I quite agree with what you say on Lieut. Hutton’s 
Review (who he is, I know not): it struck me as very original: he is one of the very few who see that 
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the change of species cannot be directly proved & that the doctrine must sink or swim according as 
it groups & explains phenomena.  
26 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3123  As you are working at Birds of S. America, & for my 
credit sake do oblige me & look at Birds in Zoolog. of Beagle p. 67 & see what I say on the 3 species 
of Opetiorhynchus & consider whether I am likely to have blundered when I observed difference of 
Habits of the species; so at p. 74 on Scytalopus, when I specify difference of habits. Let me add 
another sentence.— Why should you or I speak of variation as having been ordained & guided more 
than does an astronomer in discussing the fall of a meteoric stone. He would simply say that it was 
drawn to our earth by the attraction of gravity, having been displaced in its course by the action of 
some quite unknown laws.— Would you have him say that its fall at some particular place & time 
was “ordained & guided without doubt by an intelligent cause on a preconceived & definite plan”? 
Would you not call this theological pedantry or display? I believe it is not pedantry in the case of 
species, simply because their formation has hitherto been viewed as beyond law,— in fact this 
branch of science is still with most people under its theological phase of development.— The 
conclusion which I always come to after thinking of such questions is that they are beyond the 
human intellect; & the less one thinks on them the better. You may say, then why trouble me? But I 
shd. very much like to know clearly what you think. 
27 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3329   What you said about Brown having observed the 
ducts running wrong in Habenaria is very likely (though he ought to have said so) but then he does 
apparently trust to position of ducts as far as he traced them by transverse sections.  
28 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3439   It is very true what you say about the higher races of 
men, when high enough, replacing & clearing off the lower races. In 500 years how the Anglo-saxon 
race will have spread & exterminated whole nations; & in consequence how much the Human race, 
viewed as a unit, will have risen in rank.  
29 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3544  I am going to bother you. Looking over some of your 
old notes, I see that you have kept the wild breed of Turkeys from Ld. Leicester & Powis. You know 
that they now say that the common Turkeys have descended from a southern so-called species. 
Have you ever crossed intentionally or accidentally your wild & common; & did you ever cross the 
hybrids inter se or with either pure parent & were they quite fertile? Have you ever given half-bred 
birds to other people, & did they with them become mingled with common Turkeys? Can you 
recognise the half-breds by their appearance? I shd be grateful for any information, which I might 
quote on your authority.— Do you remember about my Boy, Horace, on the natural selection of 
coward adders? I must tell you that the other day he overheard me talking about species; & 
afterwards he came to me, with his eyes open with astonishment & asked “Did people formerly 
really believe that animals & plants never changed? I answered oh yes. “Well then what did they say 
about the kinds of cabbages & peas in the Garden?” I answered that these were all due to man’s 
agency. “But do not wild plants vary”. I answered that they varied within certain fixed but unknown 
limits. To this he shrugged his shoulders with pity for the poor people who formerly believed in such 
conclusions.— I believe Horace is a prophetic type, as Agassiz would say, of future naturalists.— 
30 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3918  You not only give me information of much value, but 
you give it in the kindest manner possible. All that you say about peaches is particularly interesting, 
as the case struck me much in many respects. I have alluded in my M.S. from Gard. Chronicle to the 
Double-flowering peaches of China, though I have never seen them. The case struck me as good in 
showing what man can do by continued selection in two different lines on the same species, viz 
flowers & fruits— 
31 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-3935   I have been extremely much interested by what you 
say about the tracks of supposed mammalia.— Might I ask if you succeed in discovering what the 
creatures are, you would have the great kindness to inform me.—  
32 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4028  I hope to Heaven I am wrong (& from what you say 
about Whewell it seems so) but I cannot see how your Chapters can do more good than an 
extraordinarily able review.”  
33 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4052  I see what Treviranus says about Primula longiflora; I 
shd. like to know (if you are up in Primula) whether this species is closely allied to P. Scotica; 
because Mr J. Scott of Bot. Garden of Edinburgh, has been carefully observing Primulas (& I feel a 
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conviction that he is trust-worthy) & he says P. Scotica is never dimorphic, & is much surprised, as 
he says it is so like P. farinosa: he has sent me plants of both, but they look very sickly. 
34 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4148   I have written once again to own to certain extent of 
truth in what he says; & then if I am ever such a fool again have no mercy on me.— I enclose 
A. Gray’s letter, as you might like to read all. I quite disagree with what he says about Lyell acting as 
a Judge on Species; I complain that he has not acted as a judge; I sometimes wish he had 
pronounced dead against us rather than possessed such inability to decide.—  
35 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4153   The last I was glad to receive on Lyell, & will tell him, 
when I write, what you say on Species-portion. I am pleased at it; but cannot quite agree.  
36 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4554  In the last Nat. Hist Review there is an interesting 
article which must be by you, in which you say that Trichonema & some other plants present 
2 forms. I shd be particularly obliged if you cd give me the names of these plants; for then perhaps I 
cd get seed. For instance, you told me of Oxalis & I wrote to the Cape & have got about 20 species 
some of which are grandly Dimorphic. I know that I exaggerate the interest of whatever I am about, 
but the Lythrum case seems to me so surprising that I wish to pursue the subject. In yr Oxalis letter 
you say that Ægiphila is dimorphic; now I have no idea whether the species are rare or whether it 
wd cause much trouble to send me a dried flower of the 2 forms of any species. If it does not give 
much trouble I shd much like to see whether they are really dimorphic like Primula &c or like Thyme 
which latter is a very different case. I believe that you told me that this genus is a Labiate, but 
Lindley makes it one of the Verbenaciæ. I know how busy you are but I trust to your kindness to 
forgive me for troubling you— 
37 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-4752  It seems to me extremely clever like every thing that I 
have read of his; but I am not shaken; perhaps you will say that neither gods nor men could shake 
me. I demur to the Duke reiterating his objection that the brilliant plumage of the male humming 
bird could not have been acquired through selection, at the same time entirely ignoring my 
discussion (p. 93 3rd Edition) on beautiful plumage being acquired thro’ sexual selection. The Duke 
may think this insufficient, but that is another question. All analogy makes me quite disagree with 
the Duke that the differences in the beak, wing & tail are not of importance to the several species. 
In the only two species which I have watched, the difference in flight & in the use of the tail was 
conspicuously great. 
38 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5167   It is quite new & very interesting to me what you say 
about the endemic plants being in so large a proportion rare Species.  
39 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5193  I received a few days ago a sheet of your new work, & 
have read it with great interest. You confer on my book, the “Origin of Species”, the most 
magnificent eulogium which it has ever received, & I am most truly gratified, but I fear if this part of 
your work is ever criticized, your reviewer will say that you have spoken much too strongly. Your 
abstract seems to me wonderfully clear & good; & one little fact shews me how clearly you 
understand my views, namely your bringing prominently forward, which no one else has ever done, 
the fact & the cause of Divergence of Character. Oddly enough, as it now appears to me, it was 
many years before I clearly saw the necessity of admitting a tendency to divergence of character, & 
some more years until I could see the explanation. 
40 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5216   I have been much interested by what you say on 
seeds which adhere to the valves being rendered conspicuous: you will see in the new Edit. of the 
origin why I have alluded to the beauty & bright colours of fruit; after writing this, it troubled me 
that I remembered to have seen brilliantly coloured seed, & your view occurred to me.  
41 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5351  The consequence of this is that all the tap roots of our 
trees are destroyed—all depends on a series of horizontally spreading surface roots—thus 
rendering them infinitely less able to cope with the storms to which they are so subject here— I 
assure you, I do not exaggerate the character of our grounds when I say that throughout the rainy 
season they are fit only for the cultivation of rice!  
42 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5447  you must excuse me not having thanked you before 
for sending me the copies of my notice on Corydalis, but I was waiting for a little treatise of mine to 
be finished to send you a copy of it. I have ventured to show how right you are when you say that 
nature abhors perpetual self-fertilisation. I heard that there has appeared a new edition of your 
“Origin of Species”, perhaps you have said in it more about selffertilisation and intercrossing than in 
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the first, but I suppose that you did not enter in details and I hope that my little book will not 
appear quite useless for the public, though I do not believe that you will find much in it that you 
have not known before. I cannot send you as yet the paper on Aristolochia, it is very annoying that 
Pringsheim goes on so slowly with his Jahrbücher. 
43 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5554  I quite agree with what you say on the extreme 
interest of attempting to affiliate extinct & existing Species. The Duke of Argyll’s book is very fair & 
manly. He cannot agree with you, but he writhes about under you as one who feels himself likely to 
be beat. What he says about the humming birds is his weakest part.  
44 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5640  www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5642  I hope 
that you will not think me presumptuous if I cannot resist the pleasure of telling you how much I 
admire your argument of the origin of species in the Transact. of the Victoria Institute. The whole 
case strikes me as placed in the clearest & most spirited light; & I have no where seen so good an 
abstract. I quite agree with your Chairman that you have put the whole argument better than I have 
done. But I disagree with you, & it is the only point on which I do disagree, when you say that there 
is nothing in your article original. As I am writing I will ask you two questions, but if you cannot 
answer them easily, pray do not take any trouble on the subject; Firstly. Where have you seen an 
account of inherited baldness & deficient nails; & 2ndly of the case of the plane which sent up an 
evergreen sucker or shoot. 
45 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5772  What you say about the ocelli is exactly what I want, 
viz the greatest range of variation within the limits of the same species,—greater than in the 
Meadow Brown if that be possible.  
46 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5937  This proves that male fish do fight, and if one large fish 
meets with another, “then comes the tug of war”, which may account for the numbers of large-
sized dead male fish found in our rivers at the end of the Spawning Season.— As to the attachment 
of the fish, the only inference we can draw is that the first couple are the selected, but from what 
we have seen going on, they seem to have no more mutual attachment to each other than those of 
the canine species. I know little or nothing about other fishes. You are welcome to take notice on 
my authority of what I have said on the Salmon and if I can give you any further assistance on that 
point, I shall be happy to do so.— 
47 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-5997  I agree with what Dr Wallace says about collecting 
larvæ and as those of many species of Macro-Lepidoptera differ very much in size—the females 
being much larger than the males—they are more conspicuous and consequently are more often 
collected than the smaller ones which produce males— I do not suppose Mr Stainton has ever 
reared whole broods of any of the Micro-Lepidoptera from the eggs—it is the only way to ascertain 
the numbers of each sex— 
48 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6116   What he says about the males in these cases being 
always species with pectinated or branched antennæ is worth notice; because Réaumur and others 
have contended that the sense of smell resides in those organs. 
49 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6133  You must remember that I have been breeding 
Lepidoptera from the egg—partly because I found this a fascinating recreation (just as others take 
to gardening or fishing) & partly because I had formed an intimate friendship with Mr Buckler, who 
was desirous of figuring the larvæ of our Macrolepidopteræ; I have not therefore—as I told Mr 
Stainton—tried to rear a number of specimens— 6 or 7 of a species contented me; but when I say 
that I dont mean that in a general way I had the chance of selecting 6 or 7 larvæ out of a large 
number; I simply collected as many as I wanted (that is if I could get them) & then stopt; or if 
offered eggs—I told my friend to send me a few; besides I think that if in the case of such species as 
Eriogaster lanestris or Bombyx neustria I may have selected a few larvæ out of a nest, had I taken 
the finest I should have expected rather they would have produced male moths—as being more 
advanced than their fellows, & therefore likely to be the first to emerge from pupa,—& certainly the 
♂s as a rule do appear before the ♀s in the perfect state. I cannot get over my amazement at what 
you say about my Botanical work. By Jove, as far as my memory goes, you have strengthened 
instead of weakened some of the expressions. What is far more important, than anything personal, 
is the conviction which I feel that you will have immensely advanced the belief in the evolution of 
species.  
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50 www.darwinproject.ac.uk/letter/entry-6427   I entirely agree with what you say about each species 
varying according to its own peculiar laws; but at the same time it must, I think, be admitted, that 
the variations of most species have in the lapse of ages been extremely diversified; for I do not see 
how it can be otherwise explained that so many forms have acquired analogous structures for the 
same general object, independently, of descent.  
 
(Aberc rom bie, 1956; Adolphs , 2008 ; Ai jmer, Al tenberg, & Sv artv ik , 1991 ; Al lan, 1986; Alter, 1999; Angel i l-Carter, 2000; Ashmore, 1989; Paul  Bak er, 2010; Barker, 2004; Berg, 1988; Berger & Luc km ann, 1990; Bertac cini , et al ., 2010 ; Bhagat & Hovy , 2013; Biber, Connor, & Upton, 2007 ; Biber, Conrad, & Reppen, 1998 ; Bi l ig , 1996; Bloom field , 1969; Cam bridge, 2013; Carass a & Colom betti , 2009 ; Chartier, 1995; Cock burn, 2004; Cooper, 2003; Darwin, 2006; Derrida & Bas s , 1978; Derrida & Kamuf, 2002; Durk heim  & Al lc oc k, 1983 ; Fai rc lough, 1992; Fi rth , 1957; Fi rth  & Palmer, 1968 ; Fodor, 1975, 1998; Fouc aul t & Rabinow, 1984; Frege, Black , & Geac h, 1980 ; Gas parov , 2010 ; Genette , 1997; Gergen & Gergen, 2003; Giv ón, 2005; Granger & Meunier, 2008 ; Gris hakova & Lehtim äk i, 2004 ; Harris , 1993; Hey, 2001; Hodge & Radick , 2009; Hoey , 1991 , 2005; Honec k, 1971; Hornsby  & Longworth, 2006; Hul  & Sax on, 2009; Huns ton, 2002 ; Huns ton & 
Franc is , 2000; Hurford, 2007; Hyland, 2000; Jac kendoff, 2002, 2011; J ak obson & M epham , 1978; James  & M urphy , 1995; J ohns on, 2003 ; Kec sk es , 2008; Kel ler, 2011; Koteyk o, 2006; LaPorte, 2004; Lévi -Straus s , 1987; Li ttle ton & Whi te lock , 2005 ; Longino, 1990; Louw, 1993; Luhm ann, 1995; Luhm ann & Rasc h, 2002 ; Macdonel l , 1986; Maienborn, Heusinger, & Portner, 2011 ; Mc Carthy , 1996; M cEnery  & Hard ie, 2012 ; Nietz sche & Kaufmann, 1974; Olss on, 2004; Orm is ton & Schrift, 1990 ; Orr, 2003; Pechey , 2007; Pei rce, 1955, 1998; Potter, 1996; Prat, 1909; Putnam , 1979 ; Richards, 2010; Ric œur, 2003 ; Ric œur & Ihde, 2007 ; Ri ffaterre, 1983, 1990; Röm er, 2008 , 2010; Ruse & Richards , 2009; Rus t, 2006; Ryan, 2004; Sager, 1990; Saus sure, e t a l., 1974 ; Sauss ure, et al ., 1983 ; Searle, 1995, 2010; Sec ord, 2000; Soov ik, 2004; Stahl, 2006; Stanley , 2007; Strol l , 2002; M . Stubbs , 2005; Teubert, 2013; Teubert & Cerm ák ov á, 2007 ; Thelen & Steurs, 
2010; Ueml ian in, 2000; Vincent, 2013 ; Weigand, 2010; Wheeler & M eier, 2000; Whi te , 1990; Wilkins , 2009; Wittgens tein , e t a l., 2009 ; Wood, 1992; Wood & Bernasconi, 1988; Woraj i tiphon, 2012; Worton & Sti l , 1990) 
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